Taiwan/Flag of the Republic of China. On January 11, 2023, at a military base in Kaohsiung, Taiwan‘s armed forces conducted a two-day routine exercise. (Annabelle Chih/Getty Images)
[People News] On March 18, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the United States published the "2026 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community." In the section on "China-Taiwan," the report states, "In 2026, Beijing may continue to seek to create conditions for the eventual unification of Taiwan while avoiding conflict. Although China (the CCP) threatens to use force to unify Taiwan if necessary and to counter what it perceives as U.S. attempts to use Taiwan to undermine China's (the CCP's) development, if possible, the Chinese side prefers to achieve unification without resorting to force." The intelligence community assessment indicates that Chinese leaders currently have no plans to invade Taiwan in 2027, nor have they established a fixed timetable for achieving unification.
This can be interpreted as a response to recent discussions regarding whether the CCP might exploit the U.S. missile shortage and its involvement in the Middle East to launch an attack on Taiwan.
However, for the CCP regime, which embraces a philosophy of struggle, is authoritarian, dictatorial, favours opaque operations, and is prone to dishonesty, it is challenging to analyze and judge its words and actions through common sense or surface-level reasoning.
Xi Jinping lacks basic military knowledge and a clear understanding of the implications of attacking Taiwan.
The assessment report notes: "Chinese officials recognise that launching an amphibious assault on Taiwan would be extremely challenging and carries a very high risk of failure, especially in the event of U.S. intervention." However, in China, this understanding is limited to a few officials or high-ranking individuals, and those who dare to express this viewpoint or oppose an attack on Taiwan are either arrested or too afraid/unable to speak out, as Xi Jinping, who lacks military insight, harbours a strong obsession with reclaiming Taiwan.
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine. Around March 10, Vladimir Osechkin, the head of the Russian anti-corruption and human rights organisation Gulagu.net, shared an internal document and analysis report from the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) on Facebook. This document, authored by an anonymous FSB analyst who referred to himself as 'Wind of Change,' stated: 'Xi Jinping was at least tentatively considering an autumn offensive against Taiwan—he needs a small victory of his own to secure a third term—there is a significant power struggle among the (party) elites.' This information has been met with scepticism from the public due to its unverifiable nature.
However, it appears that Xi Jinping does indeed have such intentions.
Around March 16, the Chinese Communist Party convened a special working meeting on food security in Shanghai, attended by leaders from central and local food management departments, the China Grain Reserves Corporation, and representatives from food enterprises. Officially, the meeting focused on food security and reserve scheduling, with one of the key topics being the enhancement of the food emergency scheduling mechanism to ensure a quick response capability in case of emergencies. Sources close to high-ranking attendees revealed that the meeting also discussed food supply issues related to a potential attack on Taiwan. Motivated by Russia's swift actions in Ukraine, the CCP is preparing to launch a blitzkrieg against Taiwan, seizing the opportunity presented by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Before the military moves, the logistics must be in place.
In the upcoming months of October and November, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is set to hold its 20th National Congress. If Xi Jinping manages to take Taiwan during this period, he will be able to suppress all dissent and factional conflicts, thereby securing his third consecutive term without question.
However, the performance of the Russian military, touted as the second strongest in the world, in Ukraine has been unexpectedly poor. As Russia's offensive has stalled, what was initially expected to be a swift occupation has devolved into a prolonged war of attrition. The comprehensive and severe sanctions imposed by the international community on Russia have also instilled panic within the CCP. Consequently, Xi Jinping's plans to attack Taiwan have fallen through.
This situation highlights Xi Jinping's lack of basic military knowledge and a clear understanding of the complexities involved in launching a large-scale amphibious assault and mountain warfare on Taiwan, which far surpasses the Normandy landings. He has recklessly decided to act without the CCP military being capable or prepared. This also reflects Xi Jinping's personal ambitions and selfish motives hidden beneath the grand narrative of 'national reunification.'
As of today, the situation remains unchanged. Liu Yashu and Zhang Youxia, who possess a clear understanding of the Taiwan situation, have military expertise, and have dared to oppose the attack on Taiwan, have been arrested. The voices of dissent within the CCP have been silenced, leaving no room for opposition within the party.
Using the attack on Taiwan as a means to pursue a fourth term or even a lifetime position.
Xi Jinping's third term is set to expire in 2027, and there is currently no successor in sight. To avoid the risk of betrayal or accountability after leaving office, it is highly likely that Xi will seek a fourth term or even a lifetime position, which may once again face resistance from within the party and the military.
In 2022, Xi Jinping's third term was strongly secured with the backing of Zhang Youxia, who represents the military. Following this, a political power struggle emerged between Xi Jinping and Zhang Youxia, along with Xi's close allies Miao Hua and He Weidong. This conflict has resulted in significant losses for Xi's trusted military associates (Miao and He), his own supporters (hometowns and lifelong friend Zhang Youxia), and Xi Jinping himself. The Southeast Political Work Department, Northwest Equipment Department, and the Central Military Commission have all suffered severe setbacks, leading to a substantial blow to Xi Jinping's standing and influence within the military. As Xi Jinping looks toward a potential fourth term in 2027, it is clear that he cannot rely solely on the Central Guard Bureau and the Special Police Unit of the Ministry of Public Security under his control; military support is crucial. An attack on Taiwan would provide the best opportunity for him to exert full control over the military, akin to a wartime president, allowing him to sidestep succession issues, eliminate various obstacles, and secure a fourth term. This alone indicates that Xi Jinping has a strong inclination to initiate a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Moreover, the goal of recovering Taiwan to achieve the 'reunification of the motherland' and the 'great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation' represents a 'great achievement' that highlights Xi's exceptional capabilities and ensures the safety of his family, making it an irresistible 'temptation' for him.
The possibility of peaceful reunification with Taiwan is no longer viable.
Taiwan is regarded by the Chinese Communist Party as the core of its core interests, an inviolable bottom line, the decisive point in the US-China rivalry, and a crucial bargaining chip for Xi Jinping to fulfil his personal political ambitions. From any angle, the Chinese Communist Party is resolutely determined to claim Taiwan.
The '1992 Consensus' has effectively ceased to exist in the current international landscape; the phrase 'one China, each expressing its own interpretation' is merely a temporary measure from a specific historical context, and today it has devolved into a self-deceptive verbal game. The authoritarian nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its consistent betrayal are starkly revealed in the context of 'one country, two systems' in Hong Kong. Anyone who still believes in the CCP's assertions of 'peaceful unification' and 'one country, two systems' is either naive or has ulterior motives.
Regardless of whether the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) or the Kuomintang (KMT) is in power, the notion of Taiwan as a sovereign nation will remain unchanged. The overwhelming majority of Taiwanese people would not consent to transforming the 'Republic of China' into the 'People's Republic of China.' Recent polls indicate that nearly 90% of Taiwanese harbour negative feelings towards the CCP and are opposed to unification, with over 80%-90% against military unification, and nearly 60% willing to resist vigorously (even if the United States does not deploy troops).
The CCP's rhetoric against 'Taiwan independence,' claiming it will resort to military action if Taiwan declares independence, is nothing more than a political slogan or a tool for shaping public opinion, prepared for a time when conditions are favourable for an attack on Taiwan. Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te has repeatedly asserted that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation, and that the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are not subordinate to one another, which effectively amounts to a declaration of Taiwan independence.
According to a threat assessment by the U.S. intelligence community, Beijing may continue to seek to create conditions for the ultimate unification of Taiwan by 2026 while avoiding conflict, showing a preference for achieving unification without military force. Currently, Chinese leaders do not plan to invade Taiwan in 2027. This appears to be a smokescreen and tactical deception by the CCP in preparation for a potential attack on Taiwan.
Has the window for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to attack Taiwan already opened?
Following the U.S. strikes against Iran, the U.S. military launched thousands of precision-guided missiles in just one week. These missiles play a vital role in the Taiwan Strait conflict, being used to intercept the CCP's ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles, as well as drone saturation attacks, and to conduct precise strikes against CCP forces and mainland targets. Notably, the THAAD missile system is essential for defending against the CCP's Dongfeng series missiles, but its stockpile has reached a critical level. By the end of 2025, it is projected to be around 534 units, and as of mid-March, it is estimated that over 100-150 units have already been consumed. The Patriot-3 missile system is estimated to have used up more than 20-25% of the global stock, while the Tomahawk missile stock, which stands at about 4,000 units, has seen a depletion of 20-25%. Reports suggest that the U.S. military has redeployed THAAD from South Korea to the Middle East and has mobilised Patriot missiles from the Indo-Pacific and other regions.
According to a 2023 war game simulation conducted by the U.S. think tank Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the U.S. could deplete its missile stockpile within a week during a high-intensity conflict in the Taiwan Strait. A report from the Heritage Foundation in January 2026 cautioned that the U.S. military's critical precision-guided munitions (PGM) stockpile is likely to be exhausted within the first few weeks of operations in the Taiwan Strait, with THAAD and Patriot missiles potentially running out after two to three volleys from the CCP's military. The ongoing conflict in Iran has further intensified this issue.
Despite Trump convening six major defence industry leaders on March 6 to demand a doubling of production capacity and the fastest possible delivery of weapons, the Pentagon has publicly stated that it "will not affect the emergency reserves in the Taiwan Strait." Analysts believe that the U.S. defence industrial base faces significant challenges in rapidly increasing production, with long replenishment cycles. For instance, before any increase in production, the annual output of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) is approximately 96 units, with a production cycle of 1-2 years; the annual output of Tomahawk missiles is less than 100 units, with a production cycle of about 2 years; and the annual output of Patriot-3 missiles is around 620 units, also with a production cycle of 1-2 years. Additionally, the supply chain is fragile, as 78% of weapon platforms (including over 1,900 systems and more than 80,000 components) depend on the Chinese supply chain.
There are widespread concerns in the West that "after dealing with Iran, there will be a 2-3 year gap in stockpiles in the Pacific."
The "Operation Epic Fury" has revealed the genuine shortcomings of the U.S. military in high-intensity attrition warfare. Assessments from Western think tanks and the U.S. military itself agree that Iran is merely a medium-level adversary, while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) represents the "pacing threat." The CCP possesses a missile stockpile ranging from 3,500 to over 10,000 units, a more advanced anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) system, and is geographically closer. A conflict in the Taiwan Strait could magnify all the issues the U.S. military has faced in Iran by more than tenfold.
This situation has prompted some mainland "observers," including scholars and media figures, to perceive an opportunity for a forceful unification of Taiwan. However, the question remains: will Xi Jinping seize the opportunity presented by the U.S. shortage of advanced guided weapons and its inability to disengage from the Middle East quickly, even if the CCP's military is not fully prepared, to launch an attack on Taiwan ahead of schedule (before 2027)?
Has the window of opportunity moved forward?
The U.S. strike on Iran has consumed a large amount of high-end weaponry, with equipment redeployed from the Asia-Pacific and replenishment production still taking time. This has weakened military pressure and combat capability against the CCP in the Taiwan Strait direction. Meanwhile, Iran’s theocratic regime continues to resist stubbornly, and the Middle East situation remains unsettled. The U.S. cannot quickly extricate itself from the regional quagmire. Trump has even postponed his visit to China because of this. NATO and EU countries’ lack of support, hesitation, or even opposition to the U.S.-Israel strikes on Iran have led to greater divisions and disunity among them. Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has driven up oil prices, causing inflation and economic strain, impacting midterm elections and forcing Trump to focus more on domestic economic issues. He may even seek increased Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural and other goods to stabilise the Republican voter base. Meanwhile, the Russia-Ukraine war continues, still requiring U.S. military support and mediation.
Although Japan has made its intention to intervene in a Taiwan contingency clear, its normalisation as a state and military power is still underway, and constitutional restrictions on the Self-Defence Forces remain unamended. Nearly 96% of Japan’s oil comes from the Middle East, about 74% of which passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Any Iranian blockade would severely impact Japan’s energy supply and economy. Japan has already released 80 million barrels from its strategic reserves to prepare for potential disruptions. Even so, due to legal constraints preventing overseas deployment of the Self-Defence Forces, Japan faces a dilemma regarding Trump’s call to escort shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
Under the current security framework, if a conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, Japan cannot directly deploy troops to Taiwan or conduct large-scale offensive operations. Its more likely role would be allowing U.S. forces to use bases, providing logistical support, maritime transport, surveillance, and limited missile counterstrikes.
Although Japan has established a missile network across the Southwest Islands capable of covering key passages such as the Miyako Strait—gradually achieving basic denial capability between 2023 and 2026—upgrades are not yet complete. The closest island to Taiwan, Yonaguni, will not have missile deployments until fiscal year 2030. Overall, troop levels remain limited (a few thousand in total, with only hundreds per island), and missile launcher numbers are also limited (dozens per unit).
The deployment of long-range offensive missiles with a range of about 1,000 kilometres in Kyushu (capable of striking China’s coastal regions) will only be completed by the end of March and reach initial operational capability. The first destroyer equipped with Tomahawk missiles, Chokai, will not complete retrofitting, training, and testing until around September. Full fleet deployment of Tomahawks is expected around 2028. While this partially compensates for U.S. inventory shortages in the Indo-Pacific and marks a shift beyond Japan’s “exclusively defensive” posture, its short-term combat power and deterrence remain limited.
On Taiwan’s side, the CCP has deeply infiltrated Taiwan’s politics, economy, military, and society by exploiting its democratic system. Internal divisions persist, with opposition parties aligning with Beijing and obstructing defence budgets, including a proposed $40 billion special defence package. U.S. arms deliveries are delayed, and the “hellscape” deterrence concept between the U.S. and Taiwan has not yet taken shape. It remains uncertain whether Taiwan would mount a Ukraine-style total resistance in the face of invasion.
The CCP military is rapidly modernising, fielding new equipment such as “carrier killers” (DF-21D), “Guam Express” missiles (DF-26), and a globally leading arsenal of hypersonic weapons, directly threatening U.S. fleets (including carriers), Guam, and even the U.S. West Coast. This significantly constrains U.S. operations in the Western Pacific, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. China also possesses the world’s largest land-based ballistic missile arsenal, with mobile, silo-based, and submarine-launched ICBMs capable of global reach. As a major drone producer, it can conduct low-cost saturation attacks. It also has advanced cyber capabilities targeting U.S. infrastructure, command systems, and satellite networks, along with anti-satellite and space weapons. Its nuclear arsenal is rapidly expanding, and its navy has surpassed the U.S. in size. Its third aircraft carrier uses electromagnetic catapults, and a fourth nuclear-powered carrier is under construction. The timeline to achieve the capability to invade Taiwan by 2027 is approaching. (Note: all data cited are from U.S. official reports and authoritative analyses and cannot be ignored tactically.)
Taken together, these factors partially offset the gap in China’s readiness for a Taiwan invasion, creating a potential window of opportunity. Combined with the need to secure a fourth term in 2027, Xi Jinping may consider acting before the U.S. can replenish munitions, before it resolves issues in Latin America, and while it remains tied down in Ukraine and Iran. With all sides not yet fully prepared, 2026 is seen as a possible optimal timing. Xi may also be waiting for conditions to become even more favourable—continued U.S. depletion, prolonged conflict in Iran, and ongoing war in Ukraine.
On the other hand, by capturing Maduro, targeting Khamenei, and tightening control over Cuba, the U.S. is systematically dismantling China’s proxy networks in Latin America and the Middle East. Decades of CCP influence in these regions are being undone in months. At the same time, Russia’s influence is being weakened, while the U.S. uses a combination of pressure and incentives (economic cooperation, energy deals, SWIFT access) to bring Russia to negotiations. The U.S. is rapidly eliminating China’s external sphere of influence and tightening strategic encirclement. Lacking global military bases and power projection capabilities, China cannot match the U.S. globally and cannot directly confront it at this stage. It can only watch as its “partners” collapse one by one. Its broader strategy—to tie down the U.S. via Russia, Iran, and Latin America while preparing for Taiwan—has failed.
For a regime seeking to reshape global order, this is a severe provocation. The CCP’s emphasis on struggle and violence, combined with Xi’s calculated and ruthless style, suggests it will not accept failure easily. Cornered, it may lash out.
However, at present, the Central Military Commission effectively consists only of Xi Jinping and Discipline Inspection Secretary Zhang Shengmin, with missing operational command layers. A leader lacking military expertise but insisting on personally directing operations poses serious risks. Strategic misjudgment, tactical errors, overconfidence, and micromanagement could lead to catastrophic outcomes.
The Rare Earth Game Accelerates US-China Confrontation and Decoupling
According to a report by the South China Morning Post on March 10, the current rare earth inventory held by the United States is only sufficient to last approximately two months. This situation is directly linked to the extensive consumption of high-precision weapons in efforts to combat Iran. The production of these weapons necessitates a significant amount of rare earth elements; for instance, the propulsion and navigation systems of Tomahawk missiles depend on terbium-cobalt magnets, while the Patriot and THAAD systems require neodymium to enhance magnetic strength, with neodymium also utilised in precision guidance systems and radar. Approximately 70-80% of the US's rare earth imports originate from China, and the processing of heavy rare earths is nearly 100% reliant on Chinese sources.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has weaponised rare earths as a geopolitical tool. In April 2025, the CCP imposed export controls on seven rare earth elements, including terbium, which directly threatens the production of Tomahawk missiles and F-35 aircraft, leading to potential supply chain disruptions.
If the CCP leverages rare earths to choke the US during the military's subsequent increase in missile production and inventory replenishment, the production of US missiles could face delays ranging from months to years, potentially crippling the weapons production system. This would severely affect the US military's ability to replenish inventory and maintain readiness in the Taiwan Strait, thereby undermining its military deterrence and operational capabilities against the CCP. In the event of a full-scale conflict in the Taiwan Strait, shortages, rapid depletion, and difficulties in replenishing high-precision weapons could significantly heighten the pressure on both defence and offence. Given that rare earths are directly related to the military power dynamics between the US and China in the Taiwan Strait, the CCP is likely to tighten its control over these resources. Unless Xi Jinping intentionally relaxes rare earth controls in the short term to tactically mislead Trump and obscure intentions and preparations for an early attack on Taiwan.
Despite the United States and its allies exploring various alternatives—such as expanding import and processing channels, ramping up research and development efforts, and initiating the 'Treasury Plan' for strategic reserves of critical minerals—experts believe that changing the current situation in the short term is impossible, and that a complete decoupling from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will take over a decade.
As a result, the rare earth conflict between the U.S. and China is escalating, which is accelerating their confrontation and decoupling, while increasing risks in the Taiwan Strait.
Will the United States abandon Taiwan?
Taiwan holds a crucial position in the first island chain, acting as a gateway to the western Pacific and a hub that connects the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.
If the United States were to abandon Taiwan and it fell under CCP control, the first island chain would be fractured. The CCP would then establish a base leading to the second island chain and the Pacific, gaining control over key straits in the western Pacific and constraining/threatening the strategic space of the U.S. military. Japan would lose its defensive depth, with its maritime lifeline falling under CCP control, prompting a shift towards counterbalancing or appeasing the CCP, which would undermine the trust foundation of the U.S.-Japan alliance and severely impact the United States' leadership and influence within the alliance system. The Philippines would also lose trust in the United States, resulting in a diminished U.S. dominance in the South China Sea. The U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific would lose its strategic foothold, leading to a significant weakening, or even a loss, of U.S. dominance in the region. Most critically, in the ongoing U.S.-China rivalry, the United States would lose the most pivotal round, signalling the failure of its 'promoting peace through strength' strategy.
Secondly, Taiwan's chip industry is crucial. Nearly all Western weapon systems—including fighter jets, missiles, aircraft carriers, satellites, radars, communications, electronic warfare, militarisation of AI, unmanned systems, and nuclear weapons—are heavily dependent on chips from Taiwan. Notably, the replenishment of precision-guided missiles used in operations against Iran relies 90% on TSMC's foundry for mature process chips in the 28 to 90 nanometer range. Should Taiwan and TSMC fall under the control of the Chinese Communist Party, the disruption of the supply chain would lead to a sharp decline in missile production, severely damaging the U.S. military's precision strike capabilities and expansion plans, potentially causing a collapse within months.
The U.S. military has significantly utilised AI in operations to capture Maduro and eliminate Khamenei. The leading AI sector in the United States—particularly in training cutting-edge large models, inference deployment, cloud services, and edge AI—relies heavily on the most advanced high-end chips, primarily in the domains of GPUs/accelerators, high-bandwidth memory (HBM), and advanced packaging. By 2026, the demand for AI computing power in the U.S. is expected to continue its explosive growth, with major players like NVIDIA, Google, Amazon, and Microsoft relying on TSMC's supply chain for high-end chips, over 90% of which depend on TSMC's 3nm/2nm technology, CoWoS advanced packaging, and HBM. If the supply chain is disrupted, advancements in U.S. frontier AI will slow down immediately. Although the U.S. government is trying to repatriate more high-end chip production through tariffs, investment requirements, and export controls, the short-term impact is likely to be limited.
The advanced and high-precision weaponry of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), along with its 'Artificial Intelligence +' strategy, heavily relies on high-end chips from TSMC. In its quest to compete fully with the United States in the high-tech sector and to identify the next economic growth driver, the CCP is making a significant investment in AI. However, due to U.S. high-tech export restrictions, the CCP is lagging 1-2 generations behind in hardware and chips within the AI domain. The gap in AI model capabilities has narrowed to less than one generation, with some areas even achieving partial leadership. Should the CCP manage to seize Taiwan and take control of TSMC, it would dramatically alter this landscape.
Most importantly, from a military standpoint, if the CCP were to attack Taiwan, it would face the implications of Japan's policy stating 'If Taiwan faces an issue, Japan faces an issue, and the U.S.-Japan alliance faces an issue,' along with the uncertainty regarding U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait. Consequently, the CCP would likely initiate a preemptive strike against U.S. military bases in Japan, Guam, and naval fleets. A high-intensity saturation attack would aim to weaken or destroy U.S.-Japan command structures, projection capabilities, and frontline combat power, thereby compressing the response window for both the U.S. and Japan. This would hinder or delay their support for Taiwan, ensuring a successful landing and a swift resolution to avoid a prolonged war of attrition. The U.S. military's response time from bases in Japan, such as Kadena Air Base in Okinawa and Yokosuka, is the shortest (just a few hours); if not preemptively struck, these bases would be at risk of destruction by the invading fleet.
Guam serves as the strategic frontline hub for the U.S. military in the western Pacific, acting as a launchpad for operations in the Taiwan Strait and a logistics centre. The B-52, B-2, and B-21 bombers stationed at Andersen Air Force Base (Andersen AFB) can deploy Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM) and Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM) from Guam, allowing for direct strikes against the amphibious fleet, landing zones, and coastal missile bases of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) military. Apra Harbour is a crucial supply and rearmament point for Virginia-class nuclear submarines tasked with hunting landing fleets. Fuel depots, ammunition storage facilities, and command centres support operations throughout the entire First Island Chain, facilitating rapid airlift and escort supplies to Taiwan. If the CCP military fails to preemptively neutralise the U.S. forward base in Guam, its landing forces will be vulnerable to the U.S. military's maritime and aerial firepower network outside their defence perimeter, resulting in a faster and more catastrophic defeat.
Nonetheless, an attack on Guam would resemble a Pearl Harbour 2.0 scenario, granting the U.S. a legitimate justification and a strong public backing for a full-scale retaliation.
What are the chances of success for the CCP?
In the 24 war games conducted by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the joint forces of the US, Taiwan, and Japan successfully defeated the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 22 times. The only scenarios in which the CCP military could achieve victory were in the extreme cases of 'the US not intervening' or 'Japan refusing to allow the use of its bases.' All think tank simulations, including those from CSIS, RAND, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), the German Marshall Fund (GMF), and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Japan, reached a consensus: if the US and Japan were to fully intervene, the CCP's chances of winning would be extremely low, and their casualties would be significantly higher than those of the US, Japan, and Taiwan.
Even with a shortage of advanced missiles in the US military, if the CCP were to initiate a conflict in the Taiwan Strait preemptively, the outcome would still be costly and difficult to achieve (the initial advantages of the CCP military would be amplified, while the defensive pressure on the US, Japan, and Taiwan would increase significantly, leading to heavier losses). This is due to the persistent core disadvantages of the CCP military:
1. The 'Death Strait' that cannot be crossed. The CCP military must transport troops and supplies over a distance of 100-200 kilometres, and the US and Japan's submarines, long-range counterattacks, and 'hellish scenarios' would inflict severe damage on the CCP's amphibious fleet (the primary reason for the CCP Navy's defeat in all CSIS simulations).
2. The bloody beachhead. Taiwan's 'porcupine strategy' employs a large number of shore-based missiles, artillery, mines, and drones to cover the narrow beachhead, resulting in heavy casualties for the landing forces; if supply lines are cut, it would be akin to shooting fish in a barrel.
3. The elusive nature of mountain and jungle warfare. The rugged terrain of Taiwan is extensive, making it difficult for heavy equipment to advance, and troops cannot quickly push forward, deploy on a large scale, or launch attacks, rendering them vulnerable to ambushes, division, and being defeated piecemeal.
4. Nightmarish Urban Warfare. Taiwan consists of 9 cities and 13 counties, and has a population of 23.5 million. The capture of any area would lead to a horrifying battle fought street by street, alley by alley, and house by house. (For more details, please refer to 'What Challenges Will the CCP Face in Attacking Taiwan')
The Taiwan Strait War is set to be the largest, most challenging, most complex, most fragile, and bloodiest amphibious landing operation in human history, resulting in significant casualties and economic losses for all parties involved. The CCP army could face around 10,000 casualties, potentially exceeding 100,000, with tens of thousands captured, losses of 155-216 aircraft, and the near-total destruction of the landing fleet along with aircraft carriers, leading to a GDP decline of 11-16%. The U.S. military may lose hundreds of aircraft and 10-19 vessels, including aircraft carriers, resulting in a GDP decline of 6.6%. The U.S.-Japan-Taiwan allied forces could suffer tens of thousands of casualties; the Taiwanese navy would be nearly wiped out, the air force severely impacted, and the economy devastated. Globally, GDP could see a loss of $10 trillion (approximately 10%).
Conclusion
In his memoirs, Khrushchev recalled that in 1957, Mao Zedong stated at a Moscow meeting that there was no need to fear atomic bombs, asserting that in any war, our socialist countries would inevitably triumph. 'He (Mao Zedong) claimed: 'If imperialist forces war upon us, and we currently have 600 million people, even if we lose 300 million, so what? In war, after several years, we will cultivate new generations, and the population will recover.'
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reported that over 80,000 people died in China, a figure significantly lower than the 1.22 million deaths in the United States. Experts, using data from the Ministry of Civil Affairs regarding the number of cremation furnaces and funeral industry workers, estimate that the death toll in China during the first three years of the pandemic could be around 344 million. This figure does not account for instances of 'multiple bodies in one furnace' during peak periods or burials in rural areas.
These two examples, which are unrelated to the Taiwan Strait, serve to illustrate that the CCP's disregard for human life has remained unchanged from the era of Mao Zedong to that of Xi Jinping. The party continues to prioritise its interests over the lives of the people, albeit with a more deceptive and concealing facade as times evolve. Concerning the Taiwan Strait issue, one must wonder if the CCP will once again play out a similar scenario—if the United States forces war upon us, what does it matter if tens of thousands of our 1.4 billion citizens are sacrificed? Defeating American imperialism would only make China stronger. Xi Jinping often quotes Mao Zedong's saying, 'Strike first to avoid being struck later.'
The world should remain highly vigilant regarding this situation.
(First published in People News) △
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