People News – Recent evidence suggests that Xi Jinping’s power has been significantly diminished. A prominent example is the military theory conference held in Beijing from October 14 to 15. This meeting was attended by all relevant leaders of the Central Military Commission (CMC) departments, CMC-affiliated agencies, joint command centers, various theater commands, military services, and the paramilitary forces, indicating that this was an extremely important meeting, even more critical than a political work meeting. Not only military media but also Party media outlets of various levels widely reported on it. However, Xi Jinping, as the chairman of the CMC, was conspicuously absent. Instead, Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia attended and delivered a speech.

This arrangement is unusual. Normally, for a meeting of this importance, if the CMC chairman cannot attend due to foreign travel or participation in a more important international event, they would delegate a vice chairman to speak on their behalf. For instance, during the military political work meeting in Yan’an in June this year and similar meetings in previous years, Xi personally attended and delivered key speeches. Yet, Xi did not attend this crucial military meeting, even though he had no other public engagements at the time. Additionally, it seems unlikely that Zhang Youxia was officially delegated by Xi, as Xi would typically delegate his trusted ally, second vice-chairman He Weidong, if necessary.

So why wasn't Zhang Youxia officially delegated?

One reason could be that Zhang Youxia is quite “busy.” On the same day, October 15, Zhang met with Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov. Previously, when U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visited Beijing, he specifically requested to meet with Zhang Youxia. In September, during the Xiangshan Forum, Zhang met with defense ministers from Kazakhstan, Vietnam, and other nations, which was highly publicized. He has also presided over and spoken at numerous important military meetings, receiving extensive media coverage.

Previously, Xi had purged several high-ranking military officers, including those from the Equipment Development Department and the Rocket Force, who were Zhang’s associates. However, following the surgical procedure Xi reportedly underwent during the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, Zhang’s influence in the military has notably increased, revealing subtle tensions between the two. According to some reports, He Weidong’s rapid promotion to vice chairman was intended to monitor and sideline Zhang. In important meetings and events, He was expected to play a more prominent role. Analysts suggest that for such a significant military meeting, Xi would have likely delegated He Weidong. Instead, the surprise was that “Zhang Daxia” (a nickname meaning "Zhang the Great Hero") once again took center stage.

The reduction of Xi’s power became more apparent after his brain surgery, as observed by many external sources.

An article by Kazuto Tsukuda in Nikkei Asia claimed that since the Third Plenary Session in July 2023, movements within the Party, the government, and the military suggest that Zhang Youxia has gained a dominant position and may now have the strength to control the situation.

At the October 1 National Day reception, where 15 senior Party figures attended, political commentator Qin Peng argued, “Given all the strange developments, it seems that only a coup led by Zhang Youxia in alliance with Communist Party elders could explain everything clearly.”

While it remains unclear whether Zhang has indeed initiated a coup, his abnormal behavior is seen by some as evidence that Xi’s power has been significantly weakened.

Two additional signs indicate that Xi may have been humiliated by the Party and military, further supporting claims that his power has been diminished.

The first incident occurred at the October 14 cremation of former National People’s Congress Chairman Wu Bangguo. Notably, no retired senior leaders, apart from Hu Jintao, who sent a wreath, attended the funeral or sent wreaths, signaling a desire to distance themselves from the event. Xi attended, but as he shook hands with Wu’s family, he unexpectedly came face to face with a wreath labeled with the word "Winnie."

The term "Winnie" has become a widely known, albeit derogatory, nickname for Xi Jinping, comparing him to Winnie the Pooh, a moniker often used in protests abroad to mock Xi. This nickname and related references have been strictly censored in China, with the government banning the term and similar sensitive words or images. Despite this, Wu’s family boldly displayed the word "Winnie" in plain sight, fully aware that Xi would attend. Was this intentional? It certainly seems so.

The second incident occurred during a military drill around Taiwan on October 14, which was unusually referred to as an "exercise" rather than the usual term "training." Historically, the Chinese military has avoided using the term “exercise” to prevent any associations with Xi's name. Media reports have always referred to such events as "training" or "drills." For instance, in previous reports on the "Joint Sword-2024A" exercise around Taiwan in May, the terminology used was “military training” or “drills,” carefully avoiding the word "exercise." The fact that this term was used during this recent drill is widely seen as a subtle form of mockery aimed at Xi. What other explanation could there be for this change?