October 7, 2024, 17:55

Editor's Note: This is a commentary written by Deng Yuwen for Voice of America. The views expressed in this commissioned article do not represent those of Voice of America. Please credit VOA or Voice of America if republished.

Ren Zhiqiang, the former chairman of Huayuan Group, who was sentenced to 18 years in prison, is reportedly gravely ill in prison. His daughter wrote an open letter to Xi Jinping, pleading for her father to be allowed to go abroad for medical treatment. This action has once again brought attention to the political fate of this former real estate tycoon. Four years ago, Ren was severely sentenced by Beijing authorities for an article in which he indirectly criticized Xi's political direction and domestic and foreign policies. He also mocked Xi as a “clown insisting on being emperor even when stripped naked.” Four years have since passed.

Since then, many more political dissidents and critics have been detained or sentenced. The most recent case involves Zhu Hengpeng, the former deputy director of the Economic Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. According to media reports, Zhu "disappeared" for several months after criticizing Xi in a WeChat group, and he was removed from his deputy director position. Additionally, the entire leadership of the institute was replaced in August.

The Unique Value of Ren and Zhu in the Anti-Xi Camp

In some ways, Ren and Zhu hold unique value among the long list of Xi's opponents, primarily due to their status as officials. Over the past decade, public opposition to Xi and the CCP has been a given, with several individuals courageously taking to the streets to express their dissent. These individuals have earned the respect of conscientious Chinese citizens. However, within the bureaucratic ranks, especially among officials with political standing and social prestige, while many are dissatisfied with Xi, it is rare to see anyone daring to criticize him openly or semi-openly, even on domestic social media. Ren and Zhu stand out as a few officials who have faced severe punishment by the authorities for their dissent.

Both Ren and Zhu share a common label: they are party officials. The Huayuan Group, managed by Ren, is a state-owned enterprise, meaning Ren was first and foremost a member of the Party. His management and performance evaluations were strictly conducted according to Party standards and procedures. In fact, Ren also held the position of deputy secretary of Huayuan’s Party committee. Thus, while he worked in a business, he was undoubtedly a Party leader and a member of the bureaucratic ranks. Zhu worked at the Economic Institute, which, while not a Party or government department, is a government-funded research institution. Like state-owned enterprise leaders, its officials are subject to the Party’s rules, discipline, and management, meaning that Zhu was also a Party official.

Additionally, both Ren and Zhu had recognition and social standing in their respective fields. For a long time, Ren was known for his commentary on public affairs, particularly the real estate sector. Although his remarks often sparked controversy and mixed reviews, they clearly set him apart from the typical real estate business figures and the general perception of real estate developers as profit-driven. He was considered part of the intellectual class ("public intellectuals"). Moreover, Ren’s status as a "second-generation red" (descendant of a revolutionary family) and his connection to Wang Qishan also contributed to his public profile.

Although Zhu was not as widely known as Ren, he was a prominent economist. The Economic Institute is one of China’s earliest and possibly still its most important economic research institutions. Zhu’s rise to the position of deputy director suggests his established standing and reputation in the field of economic research. From the fact that he has now been politically purged, it is clear that his position was not attained through flattery, but rather through merit.

A third similarity between Ren and Zhu is that their work is related to the economy. Ren’s real estate industry is a crucial part of the economy, and his research on real estate is on par with that of many economists in the field. Zhu’s primary work is in economic research, and he also provided advice and suggestions for government economic policies. Highlighting this similarity is important because, generally speaking, criticism of Xi and the current regime is expected to come more from politically sensitive areas and groups. This pattern mostly holds true, as the first groups in China to openly oppose Xi were the legal community, media, and scholars or observers in political studies. These three groups were the first to sense Xi’s authoritarian tendencies and began voicing their opposition accordingly.

The Illusion Was Completely Shattered in Xi’s Second Term

Relative to other groups, businesspeople, economists, and scholars tend to be less sensitive to political changes in China, despite the close relationship between the economy and politics. This group generally observes the world and their field with economic rationality, and by the time they realize the changes, they are often already well underway or even set in stone. From a practical perspective, Xi Jinping’s early years were marked by anti-corruption campaigns and consolidating power through small Party leadership groups, and few realized at the time that a new era was dawning. Toward the end of Xi's first term, he had already gained significant power. Some sensitive observers anticipated this shift, but Xi had not yet fully centralized authority, particularly in economic matters, where figures like Li Keqiang and the Party's liberal faction still exerted some influence, counterbalancing Xi's policies. As a result, although business and economic professionals were concerned about the future, there was still a glimmer of hope that the government’s economic policies and the state of the Chinese economy might improve.

That hope was completely shattered in Xi’s second term. Xi became increasingly authoritarian, with no checks on his power within the upper echelons of the Party. He could now govern China’s economy entirely according to his own logic and approach. This was evident in his efforts to upgrade and transform industries, which involved cracking down on the real estate sector and shifting the burden of industrial transformation to state-owned enterprises. At the same time, out of fear that the growing platform economy might encroach on finance and politics and challenge the CCP's rule, Xi's government clamped down on internet companies under the guise of regulation. Despite China’s already slowing economic growth since Xi took power, his methods pushed the economy toward recession. Private enterprises suffered, and both the real estate and stock markets were on the verge of collapse. To make matters worse, the three-year-long isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic destroyed most people’s confidence in the future. After the pandemic, the economy did not bounce back as expected, weighed down by the lasting scars of the pandemic.

This situation is clearly not what most people wanted, and dissatisfaction and resentment toward Xi filled both the public and the Party, including the bureaucracy. For business and economic professionals, although they may have “woken up” a bit later, once China’s overall development trajectory reversed, they likely felt the consequences of this reversal more directly and concretely than those in the political and legal fields. After all, the economy is closely tied to everyone’s lives, and economic downturns, unemployment, and falling incomes are tangible realities for all. This forces those who previously preferred not to engage with politics to confront the core issue: that Xi’s development path is digging the regime’s grave.

More Officials Will Join the “Anti-Xi” Camp in the Future

It is against this backdrop that Ren Zhiqiang and Zhu Hengpeng expressed their strong dissatisfaction with Xi. Ren, with his background as a “second-generation red” (a descendant of Communist revolutionaries) and his connections with high-level figures, was more aware than most entrepreneurs of the political implications and consequences of one-man rule. This led him to criticize Xi’s stance that the Party should control the media, which got him into trouble at the time. He remained quiet for a period, and could have lived a peaceful retirement if he had chosen to turn a blind eye to current events. However, perhaps due to his restless nature or his unwillingness to see China’s ship sink under Xi’s leadership, Ren fiercely criticized Xi at a time when darkness loomed, paying a heavy price along with his family.

To Xi, Ren’s criticism was tantamount to a political manifesto against him. In the early days of the pandemic, Xi found himself in a vulnerable position due to the government’s cover-up of information, leading to suspicions that an internal faction was trying to use the pandemic to oust him. Xi may have feared that Ren’s public dissent was part of a broader plan to rally public opinion against him and eventually take more drastic action. Thus, Xi could not tolerate such a threat and made an example of Ren, sentencing him to 18 years in prison on charges of corruption and bribery, with his son also receiving a nine-year sentence.

In contrast to Ren’s widely publicized anti-Xi statements, little is known about what Zhu Hengpeng said to criticize Xi or whether his “disappearance” was due to an internal Party investigation or a secret arrest. This lack of information has only fueled curiosity about the severity of his alleged offense. Given the fact that Zhu’s case has implicated the entire leadership of the Economic Institute, it is clear that his comments were deeply offensive to Xi. Whether Zhu will face a harsh sentence like Ren remains uncertain, but what is certain is that the current political climate remains unstable. China’s continuing economic decline has shaken Xi’s leadership. If prominent economists like Zhu, who hold leadership positions, can criticize Xi and his policies without facing severe consequences, it would only embolden other dissatisfied scholars to follow suit. If unchecked, this could undermine military morale and erode Xi’s authority. Thus, this case will likely serve as an example to punish those who dare to “disrespect” the central leadership and Xi, in order to send a warning to others.

Zhu’s disappearance is not an isolated case. In recent years, several other economists have been "invited for tea" by the authorities or had their travel restricted. From Ren to Zhu, the increasing harassment and repression of business and economic professionals reflect the worsening state of China’s economy. On the other hand, as both Ren and Zhu are part of the Party-state bureaucracy, the government’s handling of these cases also indicates that this bureaucratic system is becoming increasingly difficult to manage. Despite the government’s use of strict Party discipline and authoritarian tools to control its officials, it is clear that it cannot completely suppress their political dissent. This list will undoubtedly continue to grow with new names in the future. Given that the bureaucratic system is the pillar of CCP rule, more officials joining the “anti-Xi” camp is certainly not a good sign for Xi’s regime.

Deng Yuwen is a special commentator for Voice of America. He previously worked as a journalist in China and now resides in the United States. He describes himself as "once on the fringes of the system, and thus better able to see through the absurdity of the so-called 'New Era.'”