The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which claims to represent the proletariat, continues to uncover large-scale corruption cases, with high-ranking officials involved in billions of yuan in bribery being caught one after another. Following the punishment of a batch of deputy ministerial-level officials on October 11 and 12, including the former Vice Chairman of the Tibet government Jiang Jie, who was sentenced to death with a reprieve for accepting over 225 million yuan in bribes, the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) announced on October 14 that more corrupt officials, including several at the deputy ministerial level, have been brought down or sentenced. This includes individuals from the legal and disciplinary inspection sectors. Analysts believe these events reflect ongoing factional struggles within the CCP.
Two Deputy Ministerial-Level Officials from the Legal System Punished on the Same Day
Yang Fasen, a member of the Standing Committee of the Qinghai Provincial Party Committee and Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, was reported on October 14 for serious violations of discipline and law. He turned himself in and is currently under investigation.
The 53-year-old Yang, from Gansu, held various positions in Xinjiang for many years. In March 2021, he was promoted to Vice Chairman of the Xinjiang government by then-Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo. In October 2022, he was elected as an alternate member of the 20th Central Committee. In May 2023, he was transferred to Qinghai as a member of the Standing Committee and Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission.
Yang's last public appearance was on July 12 this year, at the sixth plenary session of the 14th Qinghai Provincial Party Committee. Since then, he had not appeared in public for several months.
So far this year, the CCDI has publicly announced investigations into 47 high-ranking officials. This year has seen the highest number of senior officials brought down since the 18th National Congress of the CCP.
Also on October 14, the Intermediate People’s Court of Xiangyang in Hubei Province sentenced former Vice Governor of Liaoning Province and former Secretary of the Party Committee and Director of the Public Security Department, Wang Dawei, to death with a reprieve for bribery, and confiscated all his personal assets.
Wang was accused of accepting bribes totaling approximately 555 million yuan between 2008 and 2022 while serving in various positions, including Member of the Standing Committee and Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of Harbin City, Deputy Secretary and Deputy Director of the Public Security Department of Heilongjiang Province, and Director of the Public Security Department and Vice Governor of Liaoning Province.
In January 2023, a CCP-produced anti-corruption documentary detailed how Wang Dawei and his two predecessors, Li Wenxi and Xue Heng, successively amassed wealth through corruption. The three were accused of illegally accepting a total of 1.2 billion yuan in bribes, with both Li Wenxi and Wang Dawei each involved in corruption exceeding 500 million yuan.
At one of Wang’s sister's residences in Qiqihar, authorities found billions of yuan in cash. Over 100 million yuan in cash was discovered in the residence of one of his mistresses in Shenyang.
In total, four former heads of the Liaoning Public Security Department have fallen, including Li Feng (arrested in 2016), Li Wenxi, Xue Heng, and Wang Dawei. Five former deputy directors of the department have also been investigated: Bai Yuexian (September 2020), Liu Leguo (May 2022), Liu Jiaduo (August 2022), Zhou Chaodong (September 2022), and Dong Xuefeng (November 2022).
In addition to corrupt officials in the legal system, several "insiders" within the CCP’s disciplinary inspection system have also been brought down. For example, Chen Xiaobo, former Deputy Secretary of the Hainan Provincial Discipline Inspection Commission and Deputy Director of the Hainan Provincial Supervisory Commission, is currently under investigation. In October, other disciplinary officials who were announced to be under investigation included Liang Wanli, former Deputy Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Discipline Inspection Commission, and Zhang Ping, former Deputy Secretary of the Guizhou Provincial Discipline Inspection Commission.
Why the CCP’s Anti-Corruption Campaign Rarely Targets Top Officials
It has been noted that in the past two CCDI terms, over the last seven years, the anti-corruption campaign has mainly targeted deputy ministerial-level officials, such as vice governors, vice chairmen, deputy directors, or deputy secretaries, with few cases involving ministerial-level or higher officials.
Among the 47 high-ranking officials brought down this year, 40 were deputy ministerial-level, including Wang Yong, Vice Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region; Peng Guofu, Deputy Director of the Hunan Provincial People’s Congress; Dai Daojin, former Vice Chairman of the Hunan Provincial People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); and Su Zengtian, former Deputy Director of the Fujian Provincial People’s Congress. Various heads of central ministries and state-owned enterprises were also mostly deputy ministerial-level, such as Zhong Ziran, former Director of the China Geological Survey; Wang Yilin, former Chairman of the China National Petroleum Corporation; Li Xiaopeng, former Party Secretary and Chairman of China Everbright Group; and Cui Maohu, former Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs.
When Xi Jinping first came to power during the 18th National Congress, many believed that the arrests of several top-ranking officials during Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s era had broken the "unwritten rule" that senior officials above the ministerial level would not face prosecution. However, since the 19th Congress, the anti-corruption campaign has largely focused on deputy ministerial-level officials, rarely extending beyond that level.
It seems that the CCP has set limits on how far its anti-corruption efforts will go, with only one or two ministerial-level officials allowed to be taken down each year, and top-level national officials generally remaining untouched. Even when officials like Qin Gang, Li Shangfu, and Wei Fenghe disappear from the public eye, their cases remain shrouded in mystery.
Why the CCP Rarely Targets Ministerial-Level Officials in its Anti-Corruption Campaign
One can't help but ask: is it that deputy ministerial-level officials generally have lower awareness, while those at the ministerial level suddenly become more ethical, and national-level leaders are even less corrupt? This defies common sense. Since corruption stems from the abuse of power, the greater the power, the greater the potential for abuse, as oversight tends to be weaker at higher levels of authority. Logically, the higher an official's position, the more serious the corruption should be. It stands to reason that officials at or above the ministerial level would engage in larger-scale corruption.
In reality, deputy ministerial-level officials face political and economic issues because they have protection from those higher up. It’s a case of a "crooked upper beam leading to a crooked lower beam." For example, figures like Jiang Zemin, who indulged in improper relationships with young pop stars, or a vice premier involved with a tennis star, set examples for lower-ranking officials, emboldening them. Instances of coups, embezzlement, debauchery, and even mass killings can ultimately be traced back to top-level figures from the Jiang faction, such as Zeng Qinghong and Luo Gan. These individuals engaged in corruption on an astronomical scale, yet they remain untouched and continue to enjoy comfortable lives. Who is holding them accountable?
Why is there an unwritten rule in the CCP's anti-corruption campaign about limiting investigations to lower-level officials? Why don’t they dare to target officials at or above the ministerial level?
Political commentators believe that the CCP’s authoritarianism is different from typical authoritarianism. If too many ministerial or national-level officials were brought down publicly, it would create a poor public perception and lead to a series of issues, potentially causing a collapse in public trust that could endanger the regime itself. Therefore, there seems to be a consensus among the leadership to limit investigations into provincial and ministerial officials. Even if a high-level official is implicated, any action taken against them would be done quietly, without public announcement, or in ambiguous circumstances, like the sudden and unclear death of former Premier Li Keqiang. The core priority of the CCP is to preserve power, using the Party to maintain control. This approach applies both to managing public stability and to selectively arresting officials.
Experts suggest that anti-corruption efforts will likely continue at the provincial level and below, as this helps maintain Xi Jinping’s image as a just leader and keeps lower-level officials in check, showing that the CCP’s anti-corruption efforts are fair and lawful. It keeps both high-ranking and lower-ranking officials fearful of his authority. However, unless there are political reasons, officials at or above the ministerial level might not be seriously challenged for issues like corruption or debauchery.
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