What is Xi's Situation in Beidaihe? The Military's Illustrated Magazine Offers Some Insights

Xi Jinping rarely sits below the stage, submerged in the crowd. (Video screenshot)

[People News] As numerous high-ranking officials of the Communist Party of China (CPC) take their vacations in Beidaihe, likely discussing important matters or setting the agenda for the upcoming Fifth Plenary Session of the CPC in October, the CPC military released the July issue of the "PLA Pictorial" on August 6. Like the May and June editions, this issue's cover conspicuously 'shelved' Xi, featuring three flying military aircraft instead.

The repeated omission of Xi from the cover for three consecutive issues sends a striking signal, particularly during a time when top officials are gathered in Beidaihe. In my opinion, does this not suggest to the outside world Xi's current standing in Beidaihe? Does it not reflect his position within the CPC?

July was certainly not devoid of significant events. The "Pictorial" highlights two major occurrences: the celebration of the CPC's 105th anniversary on July 1, primarily reported by Xinhua News, and the ceremony for the promotion of generals conducted by the CPC Military Commission, where Xi Jinping issued the orders. The two individuals promoted to general were Zhang Shuguang, the secretary of the Military Discipline Inspection Commission, and Wang Gang, the commander of the Air Force.

These two important events could have easily warranted Xi's image on the cover of the pictorial, as seen in previous issues, yet the military appears to have forgotten this. Despite Xi's participation in these significant activities, they still refrained from featuring this nominal chairman of the Military Commission on the cover. Who could cause the military's pictorial to be so 'rebellious' yet remain unscathed? If Xi truly held substantial power within the military and the party, would anyone dare to act in this manner?

The removal of Xi from the cover and the downplaying of the term 'Chairman Xi' in the July issue's reports suggest a significant shift in messaging. For instance, the cover image is sourced from a report titled 'Great Power Iron Wings - A Strong Military Image Report from a Certain Regiment of the Air Force'. The report begins with the phrase 'At the command of the Party Central Committee' and emphasizes 'Listening to the Party's command', without mentioning 'Chairman Xi' at all. Notably, Air Force Commander Wang Gang was recently promoted to General by Xi.

Additionally, in a special feature celebrating the 105th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, two reports are featured. One is titled 'Striving for a Strong Military Under the Party's Banner', which continues to stress 'Listening to the Party's command' and 'Following the Party'. The text refers to Xi only in phrases like 'the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core' and 'Xi Jinping's thoughts on strengthening the military', without using the term 'Chairman Xi'. His three titles, including 'Chairman of the Military Commission', are only listed in the images accompanying the 2018 military training mobilization meeting.

The other report, titled 'The Passionate Heart Reflects the Party Flag, Advancing on a New Journey', is primarily pictorial. The brief text highlights how the military studies Party history and military history, and how it pledges loyalty to the Party, without any mention of 'Chairman Xi' or loyalty to him.

In other special features, aside from one pictorial news report about the Communist Party's military disaster relief that mentions 'Implementing Chairman Xi's important instructions', there is no reference to 'Chairman Xi' in any other news.

What message is being sent by the removal of Xi from the cover and the diminished emphasis on 'Chairman Xi' in the content?

In a previous article, the author noted that the June issue of the 'PLA Pictorial' featured no sign of Xi Jinping, neither on the cover nor within the content, with no reports of his activities. The May issue was similar; not only was Xi's prominent photo missing from the cover, which was replaced by an image of the 'Tianzhou-10 cargo spacecraft launch,' but there were also no reports of Xi's activities in any of the magazine's smaller sections.

This situation arose following the news of Xi's stroke and the subsequent power transfer during the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party in July 2024. The cover of the seventh issue published in August that year saw the absence of Xi Jinping's photo, which was replaced by an image of a military helicopter. Likewise, the covers of the eighth and ninth issues also did not feature Xi's photo. However, from September to November, Xi's photo reappeared on the cover of the 'Pictorial,' primarily due to his significant activities during those three months, only to vanish again in December.

In mid-January 2026, after Xi unexpectedly ousted Zhang Youxia, the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission who held actual military power, it appeared that he had regained some control over the military and party. Xi's military proxy, the newly appointed Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Zhang Shengmin, launched a new wave of purges and loyalty campaigns within the army. As a result, the covers of the first to fourth issues published from February to May prominently featured Xi's photos, and the content included reports on his related activities.

However, from June to August, the covers of three consecutive issues again saw Xi's prominent photo removed, and reports regarding his activities were downplayed, which is quite unusual.

At first glance, Xi's various tangible and intangible news continues to dominate the headlines, but it is an undeniable fact that the military is effectively downplaying his presence. Aside from military publications, the ninth 'Strong Army Discussion' held in Beijing in mid-July has also been downgraded; in the speech by General Dong Jun on 'August 1', he emphasized that the military must 'listen to the Party and follow the Party', only later mentioning that it should be guided by 'Xi Thought'. Similarly, the military newspaper 'August 1' followed this pattern, stating that 'the entire military must align its thoughts and actions with the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission', without mentioning 'Chairman Xi'. This all supports the notion that Xi's symbolic significance in the military outweighs his actual influence.

This trend is not limited to the military. Over the past two months, senior officials of the Communist Party of China, including Xi, have frequently referenced 'the leadership of the Communist Party' and 'upholding the collective leadership system of the Party Central Committee'. Just a few days ago, Xi's chief aide Cai Qi, while meeting with experts in Beidaihe, first stated that 'the Party Central Committee with Xi at its core is based on...', before mentioning Xi's 'concern for experts and talents'. This is a stark contrast to Cai Qi's statement in 2023 when Xi was still the dominant figure, where he said 'Xi Jinping and the Party Central Committee attach great importance to talent work'.

Regardless of the reasons, it seems that since June, Zhongnanhai has reached some internal consensus that Xi must adhere to. This indicates that Xi's 'dominant' status is no longer in effect, and he can no longer make unilateral decisions on many issues.

In other words, despite the existence of secret meetings among the senior officials of the Communist Party of China in Beidaihe discussing the resolutions of the Fifth Plenary Session, Xi Jinping's ability to influence the outcomes of the session appears limited, particularly regarding the handling of Zhang Youxia's situation, which cannot be decided by Xi alone. I am particularly curious about who will be appointed as the vice chairman of the Military Commission at the Fifth Plenary Session. Is there a chance that Xi might take the initiative to resign from his role as chairman of the Military Commission? This is not without precedent.

(First published by People News)△