Official Media Publishes Article Highlighting Xi's Limited Power

The persecution has led to a backlash, resulting in a loss of power, and those in high positions are merely playing supporting roles. (Illustration by People News)

[People News] In a recent article titled "The NPC and CPPCC Exhibit Abnormalities Again, Xi's Power is Limited," I discussed several irregularities concerning the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Among the news reports related to the study sessions of the party groups of the NPC, the CPPCC, and the CPPCC's secretariat, there was a statement that has been quite rare during Xi's dominance over the past few years. It explicitly mentioned that the "Party Central Committee" clearly proposed Xi's thoughts on party building and "made arrangements for effectively studying and implementing them." Only after this was the significance of Xi's thoughts on party building and the "two-four-four-two" mentioned. This also applies to the high-ranking officials of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Procuratorate.

Therefore, I deduce that this confirms the inclusion of "the Party Central Committee's centralized and unified leadership" into Xi's thoughts on party building at the CPC's party building symposium is not without reason. It corroborates that Wang Dongfeng, during the CPPCC study session, did not mention the "two safeguards," but instead referred to the "resolute maintenance of the Party Central Committee's authority and centralized and unified leadership," which was not an oversight. This also confirms that Xi's power has indeed been limited, indicating that a consensus has been reached in Zhongnanhai regarding the point of "centralized and unified leadership."

On June 26, the official media of the CPC and the military network published a front-page headline report: "Under the Party's Leadership, Build a More Beautiful Homeland—General Secretary Xi Jinping's Inspection in Dezhou, Shandong." This statement was made by Xi Jinping during his inspection in Dezhou, accompanied by farmers who were brought in to participate in the event. It is noteworthy that this wording as a headline is quite significant.

When Xi Jinping states 'under the leadership of the Party', it suggests that he too is subordinate to the 'Party', a phrasing that has been notably rare in the titles of his inspection reports across various regions. In fact, I have not encountered such expressions in the titles over the past three years.

In March of this year, during Xi's visit to Xiong'an, the official media reported with the title 'We are full of confidence in the development prospects of Xiong'an'.

In November 2025, when Xi visited Hainan and Guangdong, the official media's report was titled 'Where the tide of reform surges, the sea and sky are vast — A report on General Secretary Xi Jinping's visit to Hainan and Guangdong and his attendance at the opening ceremony of the 15th National Games'.

In July 2025, during his inspection in Shanxi, the report was titled 'Determined to hold on to the green mountains, steadily and orderly advancing forward'. In March, the title for the report on Xi's inspections in Guizhou and Yunnan was 'A happy life blooms like flowers'.

In November 2024, the title of the report on Xi's inspection in Hubei was 'Striving to create achievements that can withstand the test of history, practice, and the people'; in October, the title for his inspections in Fujian and Anhui was 'Now is the time to row and sail'; in September, the title for his inspections in Shaanxi and Gansu was 'Cultural veins, water veins, national veins'; in June, the title for his inspections in Qinghai and Ningxia was 'The 56 ethnic groups coming together is the community of the Chinese nation'...

In comparison to previous similar titles, the fact that this time the report on Xi's inspection in Texas used the phrase 'under the leadership of the Party' makes the implication less clear, doesn't it? What has transpired within the upper echelons of the Communist Party of China?

In fact, following the news of Xi Jinping's stroke after the Third Plenary Session in July 2024, his military and party powers were diminished. After a period of internal power struggles within the party, the senior leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began to return to the collective leadership model reminiscent of Hu Jintao's era.

On June 30, 2025, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP held a meeting and approved the "Regulations on the Work of the Central Decision-Making Coordination Mechanism." Reports indicate that the establishment of this mechanism is "an important institutional arrangement to enhance the centralized and unified leadership of the Central Committee over significant work and to facilitate the implementation of major tasks." The regulations outline the establishment, responsibilities, and execution of the Central Decision-Making Coordination Mechanism, stating that its primary functions include "top-level design, overall coordination, comprehensive advancement, and supervision of the implementation of major work." The introduction of this mechanism is clearly intended to undermine Xi Jinping's status and authority.

On December 22, both the official and military media of the CCP published an article by Meng Xiangfeng, the deputy director responsible for daily operations at the General Office of the Central Committee. The article, titled "Improving the Mechanism for Implementing Major Decisions and Deployments of the Central Committee," begins by noting that the "Suggestions" approved at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee stress the need to "enhance the mechanism for implementing major decisions and deployments of the Central Committee, ensuring effective communication and strong execution from top to bottom." The article then elaborates in three sections, with the central theme emphasizing that the "Central Committee" holds precedence over Xi.

However, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began to implement a collective leadership mechanism, Xi Jinping unexpectedly removed Zhang Youxia, the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission who effectively held military power, in January of this year, using his private army. This move seemed to allow him to regain some authority. However, he did not foresee that this action would lead to dissatisfaction within both the military and the party. Various military regions have made subtle statements regarding the investigations into Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, indicating that the situation cannot be resolved simply through a large-scale military purge.

Without strong military support, the newly empowered members of the Politburo Standing Committee and other officials likely expressed their discontent with Xi. The second, third, and fourth-ranking officials in the CCP—Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, and Wang Huning—are no longer as obedient to Xi as they once were. Li Qiang and Zhao Leji have even failed to adopt Xi's perspectives on establishing a correct view of political achievements and party-building ideology, which is quite unusual.

The recent unusual behaviors of several high-ranking officials suggest that Xi is unable to alter the established collective leadership system set by the Fourth Plenary Session and is even hesitant to position himself above the 'Party.' This is why the documentary from Texas emphasizes that it is under the leadership of the 'Party,' rather than under Xi's singular leadership. The CCP's top leadership appears to have reached a consensus on the 'collective leadership system.'

On June 23, a news report from the 17th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) provided additional evidence. Wang Huning, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the CPPCC, emphasized the need to 'seriously implement the decisions and deployments from the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee,' focusing on the top-level design for economic and social development during the '14th Five-Year Plan' period, guided by 'Xi Thought.' Another Standing Committee member, Premier Ding Xuexiang, who was invited to the meeting to give a report, reiterated that the CPC Central Committee is centered around Xi.

Furthermore, on the morning of June 26, there were significant points in the report regarding Xi Jinping's meeting in Beijing with Hun Sen, Chairman of the Cambodian People's Party and President of the Senate, who is considered an old friend of the CPC. After expressing his agreement with Xi's assessment of the strong friendship between China and Cambodia, Hun Sen 'sincerely congratulated' China on its remarkable development achievements under the correct leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core...

However, during a meeting in December 2024, Hun Sen did not mention Xi or the 'CPC Central Committee.' When he met with Xi on February 10, 2023, while still serving as Prime Minister, he stated, 'I believe that under the leadership of Chairman Xi Jinping, China will...'

Do the differences in Hun Sen's phrasing reflect changes in the power dynamics within the upper echelons of the CPC? In other words, if Xi's power were not constrained, such anomalies would not appear in the CPC's official media.

(First published by People News) △