The 60th Anniversary of the Cultural Revolution: What Kind of Turmoil Will Follow Xi's Death?

Xi Jinping visits the Mao Zedong Memorial Hall to pay his respects. (online image)

[People News] May 16 marks the 60th anniversary of the launch of the 'Cultural Revolution' in modern Chinese history. Sixty years ago, Liu Shaoqi, the highest constitutional leader and designated successor, experienced a complete loss of life and dignity in the early chaos; sixty years later, could this catastrophe occur again? When power loses its checks and balances, both the Chairman of the state from that era and the achievements of today’s economic reforms may face the cycle of 'complete loss overnight.'

What Exactly Happened During the Cultural Revolution?

The Cultural Revolution, officially known as the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,' was a nationwide political movement initiated and led by Mao Zedong, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, lasting from May 16, 1966, to October 6, 1976, spanning a decade.

On May 16, 1966, the 'Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 5.16 Notice,' drafted by Mao Zedong, was released, which is considered the programmatic document for launching the Cultural Revolution. The main events of this decade can be summarised into five key points:

In 1966, the movement emerged and order was lost: Under the rallying cry of 'rebellion is justified,' the Red Guards movement, primarily composed of student organisations, rapidly swept across the nation. Schools were attacked, large-scale house searches were conducted, and intellectuals and officials were publicly denounced, resulting in a severe disruption of normal social order.

In 1967, a power grab and widespread armed struggle occurred as the so-called 'Revolutionary Committee' replaced the original party and government institutions under military dominance. Various mass organisations engaged in fierce, violent conflicts and 'armed struggles' to vie for political legitimacy. Historical documents describe this period as a 'total civil war.'

In 1968, the 'Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside' movement was initiated to address urban youth unrest and employment pressures. This large-scale movement saw millions of educated youth sent from cities to rural areas for labour, fundamentally altering the life paths of countless individuals.

From 1971 to 1976, intense power struggles unfolded at the highest levels. Following the downfall of Lin Biao's group in 1971, the power dynamics shifted dramatically, leading to the rapid rise of the so-called 'Gang of Four' and escalating conflicts over ideological lines and power within the party's upper echelons.

On October 6, 1976, the Gang of Four was dismantled. Following Mao Zedong's death in September 1976, Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Wang Dongxing, and others took decisive action to officially eliminate the 'Gang of Four,' bringing an end to a decade of internal strife. This ten-year movement left deep and far-reaching scars and consequences on Chinese society.

Politically, the party and state systems experienced fundamental destruction. Many founding figures and senior officials, including Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, He Long, and Tao Zhu, met untimely deaths due to the absence of checks and balances in power and oversight.

Secondly, on the social and cultural front, traditional culture and moral values faced devastating impacts. The Red Guards, under the slogan 'smash the four olds,' rampaged through the country, destroying countless invaluable historical artefacts and monuments, which were set ablaze. During the extended period of violent conflict, historians and literature estimate that the number of abnormal deaths across the nation ranged from millions to tens of millions.

In terms of education and the economy, schools at all levels faced prolonged closures, with the college entrance examination suspended for a full decade, resulting in a significant disruption in scientific research and talent development; national economic activities fell into a state of stagnation and chaos.

Why did Mao Zedong launch the Cultural Revolution?

To understand Mao Zedong's motivations for initiating the Cultural Revolution, we can refer to a passage he personally wrote in the 'May 16 Notification': 'There are representatives of the bourgeoisie who have infiltrated the Party, the government, the military, and various cultural sectors... Some have been exposed by us, some have not yet been uncovered, and some are currently being cultivated as our successors, such as individuals like Khrushchev. They are now sleeping beside us, and all levels of Party committees must pay full attention to this issue.'

The 'Khrushchev-like figures' that Mao referred to included Liu Shaoqi and his associates Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi, Yang Shangkun, and others. Liu Shaoqi was persecuted to death, marking him as the most prominent victim of the Cultural Revolution.

Historical records provide a detailed account of this process. At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Liu Shaoqi was the Chairman of the People's Republic of China, serving as the de jure head of state according to constitutional law, and was the officially designated successor, personally selected and included in the party constitution. The fundamental rift between Liu and the supreme leader began with the failure of the economic policies in 1958, which resulted in exaggerated production figures and economic imbalances that led to a catastrophic famine. In response, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping pursued pragmatic economic adjustment policies in an effort to rescue the economy. During the 'Seven Thousand Cadres Conference' in 1962, Liu openly stated in front of thousands of cadres that the disaster was '30% natural disaster and 70% man-made calamity.'

This pragmatic evaluation sparked intense power anxiety in the supreme leader, who felt his policies were being challenged and feared a Khrushchev-style purge after his death. With many cadres within the party system favouring a pragmatic approach, the supreme leader could not remove Liu Shaoqi through normal consultation processes. Consequently, he chose to bypass the party constitution and legal procedures, directly mobilising a mass movement to dismantle the entire party and government system as well as the bureaucratic structure.

In 1967, Liu Shaoqi was branded a 'traitor, internal spy, and capitalist roader,' expelled from the party, and secretly detained. In November 1969, while imprisoned in Kaifeng, Henan, Liu Shaoqi died under abnormal circumstances, isolated and deprived of proper medical care. The fate and dignity of a nation's highest successor were 'erased overnight' by a political whim.

The missing Cultural Revolution Museum and the unresolved history.

The Cultural Revolution was marked by a severe and nationwide systemic disaster that, in theory, should have prompted the entire country to engage in deep and public collective reflection. However, the reality is quite the opposite: the system has taken a cold approach to this historical period, even forcibly erasing the memories of the populace.

The Shantou Cultural Revolution Museum is the only memorial dedicated to the Cultural Revolution in mainland China, located in the Tashan Scenic Area of Chenghai District, Shantou, Guangdong.

In 1996, during an event, Peng Qian, who was then an advisor to the Shantou municipal government, stumbled upon a mass grave of Cultural Revolution victims on the hillside of Tashan. After learning about the horrific events that took place in Chenghai during the Cultural Revolution, he was inspired to establish a museum to honour the deceased and raise awareness among future generations. After retiring, Peng Qian began fundraising for the museum's construction, garnering support from various sectors of society and successfully raising tens of millions of yuan.

The Cultural Revolution Museum officially opened in 2005. For the next decade, it operated under a condition of official non-support and non-opposition, existing with tacit approval.

Within the Tashan park area, there are exhibition zones such as "Inscription Gallery of Historical Records," "Si'an Tower," "Mingjing Platform," "Stone Pen Writing History," and "Alarm Bell Ringing Forever," which display stone tablets inscribed with images and texts, statues of notable figures, and engravings reflecting on the Cultural Revolution. On the opposite side, the Resting Garden features statues of Cultural Revolution victims and Liu Shaoqi, with stone walls inscribed with various tortures and sufferings endured during the Cultural Revolution, alongside a wall filled with the names of the victims.

In May 2014, Peng Qian transferred the management of the Tashan park to the village committee of Tucheng Village, and that same year, he discontinued the annual public memorial event for the souls of Cultural Revolution victims held on August 8th.

In May 2016, just before the sensitive anniversary marking the 50th year since the start of the Cultural Revolution, the Cultural Revolution Museum was surrounded and obscured, with stone tablets and inscriptions covered by a series of posters promoting 'core socialist values.' Following this, all stone tablets, archways, inscriptions commemorating victims, and historical exhibitions within the museum were coated in cement, and several exhibition halls were repurposed for other uses.

Reports from Hong Kong media indicate that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has launched a stringent crackdown on 'historical nihilism,' asserting that the Cultural Revolution Museum 'smeared and denied the history of the CPC.' The authorities undertook rectifications under the guise of addressing illegal construction and demanded an investigation into the supporters behind the museum. Concurrently, several volunteers were advised by local police to refrain from participating in activities related to the tower garden.

The disillusionment surrounding this unique grassroots Cultural Revolution museum starkly illustrates a harsh reality: the CPC has never genuinely pursued systematic historical accountability or reflection, leading everything to an inconclusive end dictated by the system.

While the official position, as stated in the 1981 'Resolution on Certain Historical Issues of the Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China,' clearly identified the Cultural Revolution as an 'internal turmoil initiated by the leader's erroneous actions and exploited by counter-revolutionary groups, resulting in severe disasters for the Party, the country, and the people,' scholars argue that this characterization serves primarily to maintain the continuity of the system by attributing responsibility to specific groups, without establishing institutional checks and balances or legal protections. As a result of the absence of a genuine historical and legal reckoning, many of the perpetrators from that era have largely lived out their lives in peace.

2016 marked the third year of Xi Jinping's first term. His anti-corruption campaign exceeded that of any of his predecessors in terms of scope, depth, and intensity, which earned him considerable political capital and public support. At that time, few realised that the demolition of the Cultural Revolution Museum hinted at Xi Jinping's ambition to rival Mao Zedong, with a second Cultural Revolution on the horizon.

Can Xi Jinping initiate a 'Cultural Revolution 2.0'?

When we align this historical perspective with the current situation in China, we see that the historical narrative has been 'swept under the rug' by the system, allowing the same level of centralised power and ideological control to resurface within the Communist Party under Xi Jinping's leadership. This is why many scholars argue that contemporary China still exists under the shadow of the Cultural Revolution.

However, given the current structural economic downturn, the depletion of local fiscal resources, and a long-term population crisis characterised by a fertility rate falling below 1.0 and a dramatic decline in the number of newborns, can Xi Jinping truly orchestrate a 'Cultural Revolution 2.0'? Within today's Chinese system and social structure, there are three fundamental 'impossibilities':

First, there is a significant difference in the personal prestige of the supreme leader. Sixty years ago, Mao Zedong was able to instigate the Cultural Revolution and bypass the party and government structures, rallying millions of Red Guards with the slogan 'rebel is justified' due to the masses' blind faith in him. In contrast, Xi Jinping's centralisation today relies on administrative pressure and metrics of 'absolute loyalty.' This power, sustained through bureaucratic fear, cannot generate a widespread response within the party, military, or among the general public.

Secondly, there is a significant backlash from interest groups and the bureaucratic system. Sixty years ago, the bureaucratic class of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was largely impoverished, allowing Mao Zedong to easily dismantle it through mass movements. However, after forty years of reform and opening up, today’s CCP, military, and political circles have developed entrenched 'interest groups' that control substantial social wealth. From local officials at various levels to technical bureaucrats, their personal wealth, family prospects, and the existing market economic structure are deeply interconnected. In recent years, Xi Jinping has carried out unusual personnel purges in the military and other high-level sectors, completely disrupting the unwritten rules of collective negotiation. This has significantly affected the entire bureaucratic class's bottom line, resulting in a widespread 'soft resistance and non-cooperation movement' within the party. They are unlikely to cooperate with a mass rebellion that could lead to their interests being 'wiped out overnight.' 

Thirdly, there has been a fundamental transformation in social classes and economic structures. During the Cultural Revolution, China was a closed, isolated planned economy where people generally lacked private property. Today, Chinese society has experienced the emergence of a commodity economy, and the hundreds of millions of middle-class individuals and private entrepreneurs have a strong instinctive demand for property protection and legal stability. Although the authorities employ the tactic of labelling dissent as 'provoking trouble' to suppress normal expressions in society, the realities of livelihood crises and high unemployment rates have led to a growing undercurrent of dissatisfaction and resistance among the populace, rather than blind revolutionary fervour.

In summary, when the system tries to enforce a regressive path that contradicts the real economy, public sentiment, and the rule of law through high-pressure tactics, it fails to resonate with the masses and instead marginalises enlightened factions and technocrats. In reality, Xi Jinping's governance, which lacks institutional checks and balances, is driving the entire system toward a critical point of structural failure. This situation has become the fundamental reason for the intense anxiety expressed by rational forces within the Party at this moment.

Will Xi Jinping be revered like Mao Zedong?

Thus, we can conclude that Xi Jinping cannot initiate a genuine Cultural Revolution. So, if one day he were to 'pass away,' how many people would idolise him in the same way they idolised Mao Zedong?

Feng Chongyi, a professor of Chinese studies at the University of Technology Sydney and the International Research Institute, told the Central Broadcasting Station that the internal power struggles among the upper echelons of the Communist Party are extremely brutal, and there is a possibility of a coup or military uprising to oust Xi Jinping. If he is not ousted, then after Xi Jinping's death, the aftermath will be just as bloody and chaotic as it was following Mao Zedong's death. Within the Xi family faction, or among other factions that have been suppressed by Xi, a new life-and-death power struggle will emerge.

Wu Zuolai, a columnist based in the United States, directly stated that Xi Jinping's 'personal cult' cannot be established, and after his 'passing,' no one will worship him as they did Mao Zedong.

In 1985, the writer Ba Jin wrote this on his sickbed: 'Establishing a Cultural Revolution Museum is not the responsibility of a single person; we have a duty to ensure that future generations remember the painful lessons of those ten years. Only by not forgetting the past can we become the masters of the future.'

(People News first published)
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