People News - Another signal has emerged indicating that Xi Jinping's power and authority are steadily shrinking.

On October 16, Xinhua reported that Xi Jinping conducted an inspection tour in Fujian Province from October 15 to 16, accompanied by the Secretary of the Fujian Provincial Committee, Zhou Zuyi, and the governor, Zhao Long. The report mentioned that "He Lifeng and officials from relevant departments of central and state authorities accompanied the visit."

Notably absent from the trip was Cai Qi, Xi Jinping's top aide and Director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee, which is a rare occurrence. In a brief video clip from CCTV of Xi Jinping’s inspection in Zhangzhou, Xi appeared dispirited and his smile seemed forced. Behind him, none of the usual top central officials such as Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, or Wang Yi were present. Only He Lifeng, who appeared just as weary as Xi, was seen mingling among the officials with a bitter smile.

In the past, whenever Xi Jinping visited regions, Cai Qi was almost always by his side, acting as a close protector, with enthusiastic crowds of actors and officials surrounding Xi with smiles and praise. For example, during Xi's visits to Gansu and Shaanxi in September, Shandong in May, and Chongqing in April this year, Cai Qi was constantly at Xi’s side, personally ensuring his security and highlighting Xi’s status and prestige.

According to Xinhua, on October 14, Wu Bangguo’s body was cremated, and Cai Qi, along with Xi and the other five members of the Politburo Standing Committee, attended the farewell at Babaoshan. On October 11, Cai Qi held talks with Le Quang, a senior Vietnamese official, at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. In the report on this meeting, Xinhua only mentioned Xi Jinping once in connection to Cai's discussion.

Normally, unless Cai Qi were bedridden at the 301 Military Hospital, it would be unthinkable for him to not accompany Xi on his Fujian visit. Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, and He Lifeng are key figures in Xi’s Fujian clique, and for them to be absent from this trip raises questions. Why were Cai and Wang, key figures in Xi’s faction, notably absent?

It seems that Xi Jinping, once the towering figure in Chinese politics, may soon fall. The 20th Central Committee’s third plenum seems to have triggered a rapid erosion of Xi’s power, with rumors of Xi suffering a stroke possibly being the catalyst for his gradual decline. Since the plenum, Xi has mysteriously disappeared from public view, his media presence has sharply declined, and even Wang Xiaohong, a loyalist in Xi’s security apparatus, made no mention of Xi during his recent inspection in Yunnan. There are rumors that Wang has aligned himself with Zhang Youxia, and the two reportedly conspired to unseat Xi at the plenum.

Recent developments suggest that Xi’s power is being reined in. Overseas reports have surfaced about the downfall of Qin Shengxiang, Director of the Central Military Commission’s Reform Office, and Qin Shujong, Political Commissar of the PLA Ground Force—both considered to be Xi’s loyalists in the military. Earlier, there were reports of Xi’s close allies in the military being sidelined, with General Office Director Zhong Shaojun reassigned to National Defense University, and Discipline Inspection Commission Deputy Secretary Chen Guoqiang demoted to a lesser role at the National University of Defense Technology. These moves reflect Zhang Youxia’s efforts to chip away at Xi’s influence in the military.

On October 14-15, the All-Army Military Theory Conference was held in Beijing, where Xi Jinping was notably absent, and Zhang Youxia attended and delivered a speech. Xi Jinping only issued important instructions for the meeting but was, in fact, traveling alone to Fujian at the time. In late August, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visited China and specifically requested to meet with Zhang Youxia. On October 15, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Belousov visited China and also met with Zhang Youxia. These signals have been interpreted by outside observers as signs of Xi Jinping losing his grip on military power.

Xi Jinping's political, diplomatic, and economic power appears to be undergoing significant changes. After the Third Plenary Session, the visibility of Premier Li Qiang in state media has notably increased. On October 12, Li Qiang visited Vietnam, where he met with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Nguyen Phu Trong, and received high-level treatment. Before the National Day commemoration, the Chinese government unexpectedly injected nearly one trillion yuan into the stock market, and on October 8, the Ministry of Finance announced a high-profile expansionary fiscal policy. According to former Inner Mongolia official Du Wen, these large-scale monetary and fiscal policies reflect Li Qiang's basic economic approach. During the pandemic, Li Qiang had implemented a "coexistence with the virus" strategy in Shanghai through Zhang Wenhong, which was later overruled by Xi Jinping. However, after the 2022 "White Paper Revolution," Li Qiang persuaded Xi to abandon the strict "dynamic zero-COVID" policy, earning Xi's approval. Li Qiang, having long served in the more open-minded Jiangsu and Zhejiang regions, is considered relatively liberal in his thinking. Du Wen believes that China has entered the "Li Qiang moment," with Li being the strongest candidate to succeed Xi Jinping.

On October 1, former Premier Wen Jiabao and former Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Li Ruihuan made a rare appearance at the National Day reception, sitting on either side of Xi Jinping. This indicated that Xi Jinping had to rely on the support of reformist party elders to maintain the appearance of unity. However, this display of harmony belies deeper compromises and helplessness, signaling that Xi's influence is waning.

Exiled Hong Kong businessman Yuan Gongyi recently stated that during the Beidaihe meetings, an agreement was reached that Xi Jinping would retire, and he will not seek another term in the next leadership cycle. According to Yuan, former Premier Wen Jiabao was tasked by party elders with managing Xi’s "exit plan" and cleaning up the mess left behind by Xi. Exiled Australian-based independent media figure Jiang Wangzheng also claimed on his program that various factions have reached a deal: Xi Jinping would cede power during the Third Plenary Session, step back during the Fourth Plenary Session, relinquish his leadership of various governing committees by the Fifth Plenary Session, and fully retire by the Sixth Plenary Session.

Xi's foreign and military policies, particularly the worsening of U.S.-China relations and his aggressive provocations in the Taiwan Strait, are seen as two major liabilities. Xi had hoped to use these areas to bolster his image as being on par with Mao Zedong, but they have instead generated significant dissatisfaction within the party, especially among influential party elders, "second generation reds" (descendants of party founders), reformists, and the military. On October 15, Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory letter to the U.S.-China National Committee's 2024 awards ceremony, stating that the success of both nations presents opportunities for each other and that they should help rather than hinder each other's development. Xi's rare conciliatory tone was seen as a sign of him softening his stance. On October 14, in response to recent remarks by Taiwan's Vice President Lai Ching-te on Taiwan's sovereignty, the Chinese military staged a sudden drill near Taiwan. However, the exercise was abruptly cut short after just 13 hours, exposing it as merely a domestic propaganda effort aimed at pleasing nationalist hardliners. The next day, while visiting Zhangzhou in Fujian, a location close to Taiwan, Xi made no mention of Taiwan, revealing the military exercise's superficiality.

As Xi's grip on power weakens, he is being forced to scale back his aggressive actions regarding both Taiwan and U.S. relations. Should his power truly be curtailed, a fierce battle over his succession seems inevitable. The author believes that Li Qiang may indeed be the strongest candidate to succeed Xi, not because of his competence or flawless record, but because his relatively weak performance as premier reassures different factions. Li's lack of a domineering personality makes him seem like someone who could maintain the party's stability and respect the wishes of the powerful elders, reformists, and "second-generation reds." He also poses less of a threat to Xi, as Li is unlikely to purge Xi or his loyalists. Figures like Wang Xiaohong and Cai Qi, however, are seen as potential turncoats who might betray Xi at critical moments, as their loyalty could easily shift based on personal interests.

(Originally published by People News)

 

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