October 14, 2024 – With increasing opposition from Communist Party elders and the military, signs of Xi Jinping's loss of power are becoming more apparent, and the race to succeed him as the CCP leader is surfacing. Retired and current high-ranking officials of the CCP are likely engaged in secret negotiations to determine Xi's successor, as the party tries to preserve itself. Xi himself may be unwilling to let go, but he likely has no way to stop the inevitable. Though the next steps remain uncertain, internal power struggles will likely intensify.

Becoming CCP Leader: First, Join the Politburo Standing Committee

Throughout the history of the CCP, most party leaders or chairpersons first became members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). Following the Party’s tradition, holding a PSC title greatly increases one’s chances of rising to the top.

For example, Xi Jinping became a member of the PSC during the 17th Party Congress in 2007 and served for five years as the heir apparent before taking over as CCP leader at the 18th Party Congress in 2012.

Similarly, Hu Jintao joined the PSC during the 14th Party Congress in 1992, serving as the heir apparent for 10 years before taking over in 2002 at the 16th Party Congress.

Jiang Zemin, however, is an exception. He joined the Politburo as a member in 1987 without being viewed as a potential successor. But during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, Jiang's opportunism was recognized by the Party elders. He was summoned to Beijing in May and replaced Zhao Ziyang as General Secretary during the 13th Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum in June, while also being promoted to the PSC.

At the time, Deng Xiaoping remained the true power in the CCP, and several Party elders were still influential, so Jiang Zemin was more of a puppet leader. After Deng's death in 1997, Jiang Zemin finally claimed leadership but was forced to hand over the General Secretary position to Hu Jintao at the 16th Party Congress in 2002. Jiang, however, continued to control the military and politics through his faction for years.

Zhao Ziyang became a member of the Politburo Standing Committee in February 1980 during the Fifth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee. Shortly after, he was appointed Premier of the State Council and, in 1981, became Vice Chairman of the Central Committee. In January 1987, Zhao was appointed Acting General Secretary at an expanded Politburo meeting. Later that year, at the 13th Party Congress in November, he officially became General Secretary and First Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. However, at the time, Deng Xiaoping and other Party elders held the real power, and Zhao was only the nominal leader.

Hu Yaobang was also promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee in February 1980 during the Fifth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee. In June 1981, after Hua Guofeng's downfall, Hu replaced him as the Chairman of the Party. At the 12th Party Congress in September 1982, the title of Party Chairman was abolished, and the position of General Secretary became the new head of the Party. Hu assumed this role, but he was not the real power holder. Despite ranking third in the Politburo Standing Committee, Deng Xiaoping remained the de facto leader. In January 1987, Hu Yaobang was blamed for mishandling student protests and was ousted by Party elders like Bo Yibo, with only Xi Zhongxun speaking out in his defense.

Hua Guofeng was added to the Politburo Standing Committee in April 1976 following Premier Zhou Enlai’s death. He was ranked second and led the central government, essentially positioning him as Mao’s successor. After Mao's death in September 1976, Hua ordered the arrest of the "Gang of Four" and was promptly named Party Chairman and Chairman of the Central Military Commission during an emergency Politburo meeting. He also served as Premier, holding all three top positions in the Party, government, and military. However, Hua lost a power struggle with Deng Xiaoping and was eventually removed from power.

Current PSC Members Eyeing Leadership

As history shows, most CCP leaders have come from the ranks of the PSC, and now the battle for Xi Jinping’s successor has begun. Current members of the PSC may be secretly vying for the position.

If Xi steps down due to health issues or is forced out, Li Qiang, the second-ranked PSC member, could theoretically take over. Li Qiang, although not eager to be sidelined, owes his political position entirely to Xi Jinping. The State Council’s Secretary-General, Deputy Secretaries-General, and even the Deputy Prime Ministers and heads of the National Development and Reform Commission were all handpicked by Xi to balance Li’s influence. As Premier, Li Qiang has had little choice but to remain loyal to Xi.

However, with Xi now apparently losing power, Li may feel that his opportunity has come, especially since he would find it difficult to accept someone else surpassing him. Yet, aside from his formal rank as the Party’s second-in-command, Li Qiang lacks significant political advantages and may not have the backing of Party elders. The Jiang faction, particularly the Shanghai group, might also work against him, given Li's past actions as Xi's enforcer against them.

Li Qiang also has no central government experience, leaving him without strong connections in Beijing. Even within Xi’s faction, many may see Li as undeserving of his position and question his abilities. Li could have both supporters and fierce opponents within Xi’s camp.

Cai Qi, another PSC member, has likely been dreaming of the top position for a while. Over the past year, he has acquired more titles than Li Qiang, controlling the Central Office and propaganda apparatuses. He likely won’t accept Li becoming his superior. While Xi may still have some influence in choosing his successor, mediating between Li and Cai will be a difficult challenge.

Ding Xuexiang, a relatively junior PSC member, is also seen as a potential successor, positioned by Xi to serve as a future puppet leader. Ding lacks experience governing regions but may have been suitable for Xi’s plan for lifetime leadership. However, Ding, still young, may be eyeing the top role himself.

Ding has long been part of Xi’s inner circle, managing the Central Office and likely holding secrets from internal Party struggles. He may already consider himself a successor but lacks the experience and support from Party elders, making him less of a viable dark horse.

Li Xi, the head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, may also harbor ambitions for leadership. Although ranked last in the PSC, Li’s role gives him access to corruption secrets of all senior officials. He may see himself as Xi’s loyal confidant, but he won't likely sit idly by while others vie for the top job.

Ding and Li Xi might feel they cannot outcompete Li Qiang or Cai Qi, leading them to wait for their chance or align with one of them for future gains.

Zhao Leji and Wang Huning are also dreaming of leadership, but they likely realize they cannot outmaneuver Xi’s faction. Their best hope may be to let others fight while subtly causing disruption.

Each PSC member has their own ambitions, watching and guarding against one another. The battle for the next CCP leader could erupt at any moment, with all contenders facing potential new challengers.

Potential Dark Horses Among Politburo Members

It appears that many within the current Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) may be waiting for Xi Jinping to falter, hoping to seize the opportunity to rise to power. Beyond the PSC, other members of the Politburo are likely watching closely as well. If Xi Jinping's health or political standing declines, these officials might get the chance to ascend to the PSC, and if infighting weakens the current PSC members, their chances could grow even more.

Among the Politburo members, Ma Xingrui, the Party Secretary of Xinjiang, is ranked first. In terms of seniority, he would have the greatest chance of being promoted to the PSC. However, a potential rivalry with Xi's close ally, He Lifeng, who recently led a central delegation to attend the anniversary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, could diminish Ma’s chances. Both Ma and He might compete for influence, but neither is seen as a serious contender for the top leadership spot.

Yin Li, the Party Secretary of Beijing, and Chen Jining, the Party Secretary of Shanghai, may also have ambitions. Historically, the heads of Beijing and Shanghai have often been seen as candidates for the top leadership role in the CCP.

Another potential dark horse is Chen Min'er, the Party Secretary of Tianjin. He was one of the more notable figures at the 20th Party Congress, but he lost out on securing a spot in the PSC, being transferred from Chongqing to Tianjin, and failing to obtain leadership positions in Beijing, Shanghai, or Guangdong. Chen was previously rumored to be a possible successor to Xi, but it’s believed Xi deliberately sidelined him. Now that Xi is reportedly losing influence, Chen may view this as a chance for a comeback. While Chen likely sees himself as a potential dark horse, getting into the candidate pool won’t be easy.

While other Politburo members may harbor ambitions, their chances of emerging as a dark horse are slim. Zhang Youxia, who is rumored to hold significant control over the military, may also try to vie for the top position, relying on the old CCP principle that "power comes from the barrel of a gun." However, it’s unclear whether Zhang could garner enough support from Party elders or other officials.

Former Politburo member Hu Chunhua is reportedly making a resurgence. Once the designated successor from the Tuanpai (Communist Youth League faction), Hu still has a significant age advantage and may garner support from certain Party elders. However, to be considered a serious contender, he would need to re-enter the Politburo and eventually be promoted to the PSC. Xi's faction is expected to strongly oppose him, but some individuals within Xi's camp, especially those who were later co-opted, may switch sides if the political tides shift.

Wang Xiaohong, the Minister of Public Security and a key ally of Xi, could also be considered a "quasi-Politburo member" since he has attended Politburo meetings. He might try to leverage his position as the top public security official to influence the political situation, though his chances of securing top leadership are unclear.

Apart from these figures, there appear to be no other obvious dark horse candidates at this time. The ranks of the Jiang faction and Tuanpai have largely been purged or marginalized in recent years, cutting off their paths to higher office. Meanwhile, Xi’s allies, who have been rapidly promoted, often appear underqualified for their roles, making it difficult for them to maintain their positions or take on greater responsibilities.

The Struggle for Succession May Lead to the CCP’s Internal Collapse

Although Xi Jinping continues to meet foreign dignitaries, attend various meetings, and deliver speeches, and despite the continued promotion of "Xi Jinping Thought" by Party media, the increasingly strange political atmosphere in Beijing is becoming harder to conceal. Not only has the U.S. government reacted differently to the CCP’s actions, but Taiwan’s officials have also become more outspoken. Taiwanese Vice President Lai Ching-te's recent remarks about the "motherland" seem less like an off-the-cuff comment and more like a direct message to Beijing.

Taiwan’s intelligence agencies likely have access to the latest developments in Zhongnanhai, recognizing that the CCP is caught in a major internal power crisis. They may have confirmed that the PLA's current priority is to protect the CCP regime, leaving it unable to take external risks for now. There is even speculation that Zhang Youxia, one of Xi's top military allies, may have confided to U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, ensuring that China will avoid a confrontation with the U.S.

The CCP’s biggest issue now may no longer be about Xi Jinping’s future or the balance of power but rather about the Party's next steps. With the recent death of former Politburo Standing Committee member Wu Bangguo and last year’s sudden passing of former Premier Li Keqiang, CCP officials are reminded that no one is immortal, and no one can rule forever. Most members of the Politburo Standing Committee, Politburo, and high-ranking officials are unwilling to relinquish their privileges. They will continue to seek ways to secure the succession to preserve the Party’s rule and get through this crisis.

The battle for succession within the CCP is not just a power struggle but also a struggle over the Party’s future direction. The biggest risk facing the CCP is figuring out how to emerge from its current predicament and who among its leaders is capable of leading it out of this crisis.

The CCP often speaks of a "great change unseen in a century," but in reality, it faces a "great crisis unseen in a century." The current Party leader's policies have accelerated the Party’s fall into a precarious situation. The Party elders and many current officials are likely no longer willing to tolerate Xi Jinping’s unilateral decision-making, but can the current Politburo Standing Committee handle collective leadership? Can retired and current PSC members share leadership? Will the military use its power to command the Party?

A growing number of clear-headed Chinese citizens are unwilling to continue being the CCP's slaves. Likewise, governments and people around the world don’t want to see the CCP survive this crisis and continue to threaten global stability. The CCP’s fate seems sealed, but in the struggle for succession, internal conflicts are bound to escalate, with members undercutting each other and resorting to underhanded tactics. This ultimate internal power struggle may lead to the CCP’s downfall.

Perhaps history will produce brave individuals who will take the initiative to dismantle the CCP, doing a great service for the Chinese people and the world, and ushering in a new era for humanity.

(First published in Dajiyuan)
Editor: Gao Yi