Xi Jinping Skips Trade Fair Speeches, Hinting at Possible Personnel Changes

Xi Jinping. (People News)

[People News] On September 9, the 2026 Global Service Trade Summit took place in Beijing. Established in 2012, the Service Trade Fair has garnered increasing attention from the highest echelons of the Communist Party since 2019.

According to reports from the Communist Party's official media, Ding Xuexiang, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council, attended the summit and delivered a keynote address. Unlike similar reports from 2025 and 2024, this year's report omits the mention that 'Yin Li, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee, read Xi Jinping's congratulatory letter at the summit.' Instead, Yin Li's attendance and speech were relegated to the end of the news.

In addition to the absence of Xi's congratulatory letter, Ding Xuexiang's remarks this year also reflected slight changes from previous years. The report noted that Ding stated, 'Service trade is a vital component of international trade, and its role in promoting global economic growth and industrial upgrading is becoming increasingly significant. President Xi Jinping has delivered important video speeches or congratulatory letters at the Global Service Trade Summit on multiple occasions...'. Ding did not initially mention Xi's speech or congratulatory letter, intentionally downplaying these elements.

However, in the past two years, Ding Xuexiang has shown great respect towards 'Boss Xi'. In 2025, Ding opened by saying, 'Since 2019, President Xi Jinping has delivered important video speeches or congratulatory letters to the China International Service Trade Fair every year, announcing a series of practical measures to deepen the opening and cooperation of service trade...'.

In 2024, Ding Xuexiang opened by stating, "President Xi Jinping has delivered important video speeches or sent congratulatory letters to the Service Trade Fair for six consecutive years, which fully reflects China's firm commitment to promoting high-quality development through high-level openness...".

It is indeed peculiar that after seven consecutive years of Xi Jinping delivering video speeches or sending congratulatory letters to the Service Trade Fair, this year it suddenly came to a halt. A congratulatory letter does not require Xi to appear in person, regardless of his health status. Additionally, Ding Xuexiang, who previously prioritized Xi, has intentionally downplayed his role in this year's speech. This too raises questions.

The author believes this may be a strategic move by the senior leadership of the Communist Party of China to prepare for personnel changes at the Fifth Plenary Session scheduled for October, following the establishment of a "concentrated and unified leadership" mechanism. In recent months, numerous signs have pointed to this, and here are some observations made by the author:

1. High-ranking officials have begun to mention Xi's directives alongside the "spirit of the Political Bureau" or the "relevant decision-making deployments of the Party Central Committee" when discussing their study.

For instance, on September 8, the State Council held its twenty-first special study session. Premier Li Qiang emphasized the importance of deeply studying and implementing Xi's directives on urban renewal and the relevant decisions made by the Party Central Committee.

On the same day, a national conference on textbook work was held, attended by Ding Xuexiang, who also addressed the meeting. Ding stated the necessity to "deeply study Xi's directives and implement the decision-making deployments of the Party Central Committee and the State Council".

On September 2, the Tibet Autonomous Region government of the Communist Party of China held its first press conference regarding the mudslide that occurred in Jilong County on August 26. The overall commander and chairman of the autonomous region, Ga Ma Ze Deng, stated that the regional government is "implementing Xi's important instructions and the spirit of the Central Political Bureau meeting, in accordance with the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and the State Council...".

High-ranking officials, including Wang Huning and Cai Qi, frequently refer to the "Party Central Committee with Xi at its core," rather than merely mentioning Xi as was customary in the past.

2. Li Qiang is taking a more prominent role than before.

On August 27, Li Qiang, who had just completed research in Heilongjiang and Jilin, quickly traveled to the mudslide disaster area in Jilong Town, Jilong County, Tibet. This is quite rare compared to the past, and the author previously suggested that this indicates Li Qiang no longer feels the need to be cautious around Xi.

Li Qiang's visit to a key grain-producing area in Northeast China and his emphasis on food security is also unusual. In his research over the past few years, visits to grain-producing areas and concerns about grain output have been infrequent. Li Qiang's previous low profile was largely due to Xi Jinping's high-profile approach, where he oversees everything, including food security. Now that Li Qiang is adopting a more high-profile stance, does this suggest underlying issues?

3. Officials affiliated with Li Qiang's faction and those not aligned with Xi are continuously rising to power.

Recently, the newly appointed deputy secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Zhao Shiyong, and Zhang Zhong, as well as the newly appointed secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Government Party Group and incoming mayor of Shanghai, Zhu Zhongming, are all viewed as part of Li Qiang's team. On September 9, Qin Yunbiao was officially announced as the deputy minister of public security. While there are no indications that he is part of Li Qiang's faction, he is also not affiliated with Xi's faction, and his appointment by Li Qiang suggests that Li Qiang approves of this decision.

Li Qiang is strategically positioning his own personnel; what information is being communicated?

4. The military's Pictorial has removed Xi from the cover for four consecutive months.

On September 4, the Chinese Communist Party's military released the August issue of the 'Liberation Army Pictorial.' Similar to the May, June, and July issues, the cover once again 'removed' Xi, which is quite unusual. This raises significant questions about the extent of Xi's control over military power.

5. Xi's Director and Deputy Director of the General Office have taken on new roles, and troubling information regarding his confidant Chen Xi has surfaced.

Xi Jinping's close ally, Cai Qi, succeeded Xi's appointed official Chen Xi as the president of the CCP Party School at the end of May. Reports have emerged that Chen Xi and other senior members of the 'Fujian Gang' are under investigation. Furthermore, Kong Shaoxun, who complied with Xi's directive to remove Hu Jintao's Deputy Director of the General Office and Secretary-General during the 20th National Congress, officially took office as Vice Governor and Acting Governor of Gansu Province on September 2.

These appointments clearly seem to be aimed at clearing the way for future successors, as each new party leader typically prefers to work with their own team.

Do these signs suggest that the CCP is laying the groundwork for Xi's potential abdication?

(First published by the People News) △