Cai Qi Takes on New Role: What is the CCP Leadership Afraid Of?

The picture shows Cai Qi, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, attending the National People&9;s Congress on March 12, 2023. (Screenshot from the web)

[People News] Recently, it was reported that the CCP quietly established the 'Central Social Governance Work Leading Group' by the end of 2025, with Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi as the group leader. Other deputy leaders include Li Ganjie, Minister of the United Front Work Department, Li Shulei, Minister of the Propaganda Department, Chen Wenqing, Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, and Mu Hong, Executive Deputy Director of the Central Leading Group for Deepening Reform.

According to the report, the purpose of this 'Central Social Governance Work Leading Group' is to enhance the mechanism for the CCP's leadership in social work and to strengthen social governance to maintain social stability.

However, it is perplexing that the CCP has kept the establishment of the 'Central Social Governance Work Leading Group' under wraps, and no related information can be found on Baidu in mainland China. It was only after Hong Kong's 'Ming Pao' reported on relevant meetings held by local CCP governments that the existence of the 'Central Social Governance Work Leading Group' came to light.

The CCP is acutely aware that during a period of economic collapse, when people's livelihoods are at stake, the large-scale establishment of security control agencies 'specifically targeting the lower classes and new economic organizations' would only incite greater panic and backlash from society if publicized. Thus, they have opted for a covert operation under the guise of a high-level leadership group.

1. Cai Qi Steps Forward: Fear at the Highest Level Reaches Its Peak

Cai Qi is known as Xi Jinping's most trusted "iron-fisted executor," having previously gained attention for his efforts to clear Beijing of its "low-end population." His remark, "When it comes to the grassroots, it must be done with real knives and guns, it must be tough, and it must see blood," starkly illustrated the system's cold and ruthless approach towards the lower classes.

Currently, with Xi Jinping appointing Cai Qi as the head of a new group, and with leaders from key departments such as the United Front Work Department (Li Ganjie), the Propaganda Department (Li Shulei), and the Political and Legal Affairs Commission (Chen Wenqing) serving as deputy heads, what does this mean? It indicates that "social stability maintenance" has moved beyond the traditional domains of civil affairs and policing, being elevated to the highest political priority that surpasses all ministries.

This suggests that the Chinese Communist Party recognizes that relying solely on the police is insufficient to address public grievances and resolve petitioning issues. It is essential to mobilize the entire party's state machinery to implement a "full-grid encirclement" of society.

2. The previous model of "grid control" is no longer financially viable.

Wu Guoguang, a scholar and advisor to former Chinese Communist Party leader Zhao Ziyang, aptly described the Ministry of Civil Affairs as a "totalitarian patch." This characterization is strikingly accurate.

Historically, how did the Chinese Communist Party maintain stability? By leveraging a substantial financial budget to support police forces, auxiliary police, urban management, grid workers, and neighborhood committees.

However, with the economy now in severe decline, local governments are so financially strapped that they cannot even pay salaries within the system, resulting in a significant debt crisis. The previous strategy of "buying peace with money" and providing high salaries to grid workers to sustain community control has become increasingly untenable.

3. The Chinese Communist Party is extending its influence into the "poorest, most resentful, and most easily organized" populations.

A closer examination of the officially announced jurisdiction of the Ministry of Civil Affairs reveals it to be a list of 'the social high-risk groups that the CCP fears the most':

Firstly, there is the control of petitioners. The CCP views petitioners as a social volcano, as they are likely to be the most resolute anti-communist elements from the grassroots level. Whether it is the White Paper Revolution, the Grey Hair Revolution, or various collective events across the country—such as wage protests, anti-demolition actions, and agricultural land protection—the protesting crowds often chant slogans like 'Down with the Communist Party', 'Down with Xi Jinping', 'Overthrow the Communist Party', and 'Hit Xi Jinping'. Consequently, Xi Jinping has decided to place the National Petition Bureau directly under the Ministry of Civil Affairs.

The CCP believes that this approach can dismantle local governments' 'concealment and protection of interests', shifting from 'post-event fire extinguishing (interception of petitioners)' to 'pre-event intelligence control (precise strikes)'. By leveraging big data, they aim to implement 'precise control' or 'preventive detention' at the local level the moment petitioners buy train tickets or even when they initiate calls in group chats.

In the past, petitioners faced 'interception by various provinces'; now, it is a unified central effort for precise stability maintenance, driven by the fear that these individuals, pushed to desperation by the authorities, might band together.

Reports from Hong Kong media indicate that Xi Jinping has emphasized the importance of effective party building among the 84 million delivery workers, couriers, and ride-hailing drivers.

The economic downturn has resulted in hundreds of millions of people distancing themselves from traditional institutional units—unemployed youth, internet celebrities, delivery riders, Didi drivers, private enterprise employees, and flexible workers. These individuals were previously referred to as 'fish outside the net', and when they can no longer make ends meet, they could easily become the spark that ignites social unrest.

Furthermore, this group of individuals runs through the streets daily, maintains communication groups, and has strong mobilization capabilities. They are the ones most severely affected by the totalitarian economy and are the most likely to engage in collective protests, such as strikes and roadblocks.

Xi Jinping has decided to establish party branches at express delivery stations and food delivery hubs. In essence, this is about creating a 'snitching system' among these highly volatile grassroots workers to eliminate any signs of gathering or protest before they can develop.

Additionally, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is striving to completely suppress the possibility of spontaneous civil organizations. Even volunteer teams must be managed under the party committee's unified control, firmly preventing the emergence of protests driven by grassroots networks, similar to Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution' or Hong Kong's 'Anti-Extradition Movement'.

4. Can 'Totalitarian Patches' Address the 'Economic Big Hole'?

The CCP has made a clever calculation: since it cannot provide jobs and welfare for the populace, it will impose even heavier shackles on them, using inexpensive 'community workers' and 'surveillance grids' to keep everyone firmly within the social framework.

However, this strategy reveals the profound insecurity and fear within Zhongnanhai: the more it focuses on maintaining stability, the more limited resources are consumed. As the economy deteriorates, social discontent increases; the greater the discontent, the larger the stability maintenance team must grow. Yet, this vast community surveillance force also requires sustenance! This creates a vicious cycle of 'the worse the economy gets → the higher the costs of maintaining stability → the greater the fiscal collapse'.

A healthy society requires pressure relief mechanisms, such as media oversight, labor unions advocating for rights, and legal recourse. However, the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the Communist Party of China has entirely shut down the last avenues for civil self-help and expressing grievances. By tightening every screw on the pressure cooker, the outcome is not 'social harmony,' but rather an unpredictable collective explosion when the pressure reaches a critical threshold.

It is clear that the establishment of the 'Central Leading Group for Social Governance' by the Communist Party is not intended to 'enhance community services,' but rather to implement 'preventive martial law in anticipation of social upheaval following an economic collapse.'

While the Communist Party publicly asserts that the 'economy is flourishing and labor rights are being safeguarded,' it is secretly orchestrated by Cai Qi, who has mobilized the political and legal systems, propaganda, and united front efforts to create a high-level 'social governance group' targeting the 84 million poorest delivery workers and gig economy employees.

When a regime feels the need to establish party branches on delivery workers' electric bikes and on the little red hats of community volunteers, it starkly indicates a loss of fundamental trust in the social foundation that supports the Communist Party's continued governance. This 'totalitarian patch' in a time of desperation not only fails to address the vast chasm created by economic depression but will likely accelerate the overall eruption of social contradictions.

(First published by People News)
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