Photo Caption: The first session of the 14th National People's Congress will open on March 5, 2023, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China. (Photo by Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)
[People News] As we enter 2026, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) anti-corruption campaign is intensifying, with a more aggressive crackdown on high-ranking officials. Power struggles have deeply penetrated the leadership surrounding Xi Jinping. In the lead-up to the 21st National Congress, personnel positioning battles and counteractions have been rampant from the central to local levels, with various factions engaged in fierce conflicts. For the CCP, choosing the right 'successor' is critical, as it impacts the political lives, power, and wealth continuity of different factions. The intensity, speed, and number of high-ranking officials being targeted have reached a 'ministerial-level action' mode. In the past six months, according to incomplete statistics, at least ten officials at the ministerial level and above have been taken down as major tigers. Today, we will review this situation.
1. Wei Xiaodong
On June 22, during the 52nd chairman meeting of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, it was announced that Wei Xiaodong, the chairman of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, had his qualifications as a member of the 14th National Committee revoked.
Wei Xiaodong was announced to be under investigation by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) on June 6. On that day, the CCDI and the National Supervisory Commission's website stated that Wei Xiaodong, the secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee and chairman, was suspected of serious violations of discipline and law and is currently under review and investigation by the CCDI and the National Supervisory Commission.
What exactly did Wei Xiaodong do wrong? When did these violations occur? How serious are they? The CCP has not provided any clarification. Given the CCP's stern use of the term 'serious,' it can be inferred that the violations may be significant, and he could face severe penalties in the future.
Wei Xiaodong's case is marked by an unusual aspect: he was penalized before any investigation was conducted. It was only half a month after the announcement of the investigation that no conclusions had been reached regarding the specific crimes, the manner in which they were committed, or whether there were issues of collusion or cover-ups—all of which remain under investigation. Despite this, he was stripped of his status as a member of the Political Consultative Conference, indicating the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) deep animosity towards him. The political nature of the anti-corruption campaign and the characteristics of arbitrary rule are clearly evident.
Interestingly, on the same day the CCP announced its investigation, the official website of the Beijing Municipal Political Consultative Conference removed all of his historical information. Wei Xiaodong had made an appearance on May 27 at a special inspection event organized by the Beijing Municipal Political Consultative Conference for members from Hong Kong and Macau, as well as overseas Chinese and foreign friendship work advisors. At that time, party media such as the Beijing Daily praised him extensively, but now, the relevant website has returned a 404 error. This illustrates that the CCP's ruthlessness towards fallen officials is colder than 'a winter's chill.'
2. Wang Xiaodong
On May 17, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission announced that Wang Xiaodong, a member of the Standing Committee of the 14th National Political Consultative Conference and Deputy Director of the Agricultural and Rural Affairs Committee, is under review and investigation for serious violations of discipline and law.
Wang Xiaodong, who is 66 years old this year, has previously held positions such as Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee and Governor. Interestingly, just ten days before his downfall, on May 7, the People's Political Consultative Conference Daily published his signed article titled 'Establishing and Practicing the Correct View of Political Achievements to Promote the Implementation of the 14th Five-Year Plan.' In the article, he stated, 'For officials who do not take action, they must be decisively removed, and those 'officials who merely put on a show, muddle through, and seek positions' should not be allowed to gain power and benefits.'
During Wang Xiaodong's tenure as the head of the Hubei Province COVID-19 epidemic prevention and control headquarters in 2020, the province experienced a mask shortage. When he reported on the mask production figures, he initially claimed that a certain location produced 10.8 billion masks annually, but later revised this to 1.8 billion, and eventually changed it again to 1.08 million masks per year. His rise to power and subsequent downfall certainly reflected his own statements.
In reports about his downfall, Chinese media frequently referenced his former subordinates or colleagues who had also been dismissed, such as Zhou Xianwang, the former vice chairman of the Hubei Provincial Political Consultative Conference, and Jiang Chaoliang, the former secretary of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee, suggesting a strong connection among them.
On the day Wang Xiaodong was investigated, May 17, the Hubei Provincial Party Committee convened an expanded meeting to announce his investigation. Attendees unanimously expressed their strong support for the decisions made by the Party Central Committee and the National Supervisory Commission of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Colleagues and subordinates, who once greeted him with smiles and nods, quickly turned against him and even took the opportunity to undermine him, illustrating the fluctuating loyalties within the Chinese Communist Party.
3. Ma Xingrui
On April 3, Ma Xingrui, known as Xi Jinping's "most trusted confidant in the military industry" and a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC), as well as the former Secretary of the Xinjiang Party Committee, was officially reported to have fallen from power. Subsequently, on June 26, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress announced the termination of Ma Xingrui's qualifications as a national representative.
Interestingly, the state media of the CPC has reacted with surprising indifference to Ma Xingrui's downfall. They have neither hailed it as a "major achievement in the CPC's anti-corruption campaign" nor issued a statement expressing "resolute support" for the Party Central Committee's decision on behalf of the entire Party.
The reason may lie in the fact that Ma Xingrui, as a close confidant of Xi Jinping, has fallen from grace, which is not a source of pride for Xi. On the contrary, it serves as another typical example of Xi's "failure to recognize talent, improper personnel selection, and incorrect usage of individuals."
Ma Xingrui's downfall does not represent a significant achievement for the Communist Party of China (CPC) in terms of "self-revolution," "bone-scraping therapy," or "strict party governance." Instead, it reveals yet another ugly facet of the CPC's autocratic and dictatorial regime. Xi's method of selecting and employing individuals based on the "standards of Marxist politicians" and prioritizing political criteria to choose trustworthy, reliable, and competent officials has once again been undermined by Xi's inner circle. This situation underscores the fact that the corruption within the CPC's bureaucratic system is beyond repair, and the system of "party leadership over everything" is destructive, with internal conflicts causing significant turmoil within Zhongnanhai.
Examining Ma Xingrui's rise to power reveals that he initially leveraged Jiang Mianheng's aerospace technology background. Under the leadership of Jiang Zemin and his son Jiang Mianheng, Ma Xingrui gradually transitioned from one form of corruption to another along the socialist path of "power, money, and sexual transactions," making it exceedingly difficult to avoid becoming a major figure of corruption. As long as the CPC's violent and tyrannical system and the system of personal rule remain unchanged, and the issue of oversight is unresolved, the "big tigers" at the provincial and ministerial levels within the CPC will continue to proliferate.
4. Hu Henghua
On March 20 at 2 PM, the official website of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced that Hu Henghua, the Deputy Secretary of the Chongqing Municipal Committee and Mayor, is under investigation for "serious violations of discipline and law." On June 26, the same day that Ma Xingrui was stripped of his qualification as a representative of the National People's Congress, Hu Henghua was also announced by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress to have his qualification as a national representative terminated.
Hu Henghua has had a long career in Hunan, where he was appointed as the Director of the Hunan Provincial Economic Commission in July 2005, eventually becoming the Mayor of Changsha and Secretary of the Changsha Municipal Committee. In October 2020, he took on a new role outside the province as the Deputy Secretary of the Shaanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, and in December 2021, he was reassigned as the Mayor of Chongqing. While the Communist Party has not specified the details of Hu Henghua's offenses, it has been revealed that they are linked to two prior disciplinary actions against him. The first occurred on May 21, 2023, when the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission launched an investigation into the dereliction of duty related to the significant collapse of self-built houses in Changsha on April 29, 2022, resulting in Hu receiving a warning from the party. The second incident happened on July 19, 2014, when a major traffic accident involving hazardous materials occurred on the Hukun Expressway in Shaoyang, Hunan Province, leading to 58 fatalities. Investigations later uncovered that two chemical companies registered in Changsha were engaged in illegal transportation and filling of ethanol. Consequently, Hu Henghua, who was serving as the Mayor of Changsha at the time, received a formal reprimand. Despite his health issues, he was still promoted to Mayor of Chongqing, and subsequently fell from grace, a rare occurrence in the Communist Party's anti-corruption history.
Although the Communist Party has not elaborated on Hu's 'serious' crimes, reports suggest they involve family-related corruption. It is rumored that Hu Henghua's son is one of the 'Seven Young Masters' in Hunan who has gained wealth through projects by leveraging family connections and public authority. Furthermore, Hu Henghua's brother has also profited by using his brother's power and influence to secure contracts and projects. Hu Henghua is implicated in failing to manage his family's affairs properly.
5. Yi Lianhong
Public records indicate that in May 2013, Yi Lianhong was appointed Secretary of the Changsha Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China. He became the Governor of Jiangxi Province in October 2018, and in 2019, he took on the role of Governor of Liaoning Province. In 2021, he was reassigned to Jiangxi as the Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, and in December 2022, he was appointed Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Committee. In November 2024, he is set to become the Deputy Director of the Financial and Economic Committee of the National People's Congress. He was placed under investigation in February of this year, and on April 30, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress terminated his qualifications as a representative.
Reports reveal that both he and Hu Henghua face similar charges related to 'family corruption' and 'failing to enforce strict discipline among family members.' As he is being investigated, several of his family members are also under scrutiny.
Sources suggest that Yi Lianhong's main issues arise from his tendency to 'form cliques' at the local level and engage in factionalism. 'Whenever he arrives in a new location, he builds connections and promotes his allies. He has formed factions in Liaoning, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang, and in Hunan, he has established a significant Hunan faction, which is particularly infuriating to higher authorities.'
During his time as Secretary of the Municipal Committee in Changsha, he extensively promoted his close associates and allowed his family to accumulate wealth. His son, Yi Shiwei, is known for his ostentatious behavior and is considered one of the 'Seven Young Masters' in Hunan's political landscape. Yi Shiwei has exploited his father's influence to secure projects, easily earning bonuses from these projects that often exceed ten million yuan.
However, the economic and corruption issues are not the primary concerns; they serve merely as excuses. The central issue lies in the faction he has formed, which combines the 'knife handle, money bag, and pen holder,' and is unacceptable to the senior leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), directly impacting the stability of local political power. This explains why he has been frequently reassigned to different positions, yet he consistently manages to establish his own faction wherever he is posted.
Interestingly, Yi Lianhong often publicly praises Xi Jinping. In Jiangxi, he published a signed article in the CPC's official newspaper, the People's Daily, asserting the need to integrate the 'Two Safeguards' into the bloodline and forge them into the soul. In Zhejiang, during a provincial leadership meeting, Yi Lianhong highlighted that 'Xi Jinping Thought' is a significant source of inspiration, and he firmly supports the 'Two Establishments' and 'Two Safeguards.'
Yi Lianhong comes across as a typical two-faced individual, a fence-sitter, and a performer nurtured by the CPC. Ultimately, his flattery seems to have backfired. Many political observers believe that his arrest may not originate from Xi Jinping but rather from the anti-Xi faction, which has used the pretext of 'forming cliques locally' to undermine Xi, forcing him into difficult decisions. This reflects Xi's political setbacks and his inability to protect his close associates.
(First published in People News)
△
News magazine bootstrap themes!
I like this themes, fast loading and look profesional
Thank you Carlos!
You're welcome!
Please support me with give positive rating!
Yes Sure!