On March 4, 2024, during the establishment of the military and armed police delegation at the Chinese Communist Party&9;s two sessions, He Weidong (left) and Miao Hua (right) were seated at the praesidium. (Video screenshot)
[People News] On May 27, the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party issued 'Several Measures to Strengthen the Education, Management, and Supervision of Senior Military Officials,' which includes 26 articles across 7 areas. The aim is to establish 'iron rules' for senior military leaders through education, management, and supervision.
An editorial in the Chinese military newspaper described this as an important step for the military to 'deepen political training and advance political military building.'
What is the objective of the Chinese military's 'political training' and 'political military building'? It demands that all military personnel, especially senior leaders, be 'loyal to the core, support the core, safeguard the core, and defend the core.' In essence, it calls for 'absolute loyalty' to Xi Jinping, the highest leader of the Communist Party, government, and military.
Will the implementation of these 'Several Measures' from the Central Military Commission be able to achieve this goal? In my opinion, it is impossible. Here are three reasons why:
1. Are 'iron rules' applicable to Xi?
After the Cultural Revolution, which lasted ten years, and in light of the immense suffering it caused due to Mao Zedong's actions, An Ziwen, the former head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee, who spent over seven years in Qincheng Prison and was 'exiled' for three years and seven months in Anhui, upon returning to Beijing from exile, asked Bao Tong, who had previously served as the deputy director of the Research Office of the Organization Department, the first question: 'Who will supervise Mao Zedong?'
In 1992, Lu Dingyi, the former head of the Central Propaganda Department, remarked during a conversation with Qin Chuan, the former president of the People's Daily, that our party has already begun to corrupt. The anti-corruption agencies are all under the party's leadership and must follow the party's directives. If the party's top leader is corrupt, who will oversee it?
In 2026, it will mark 50 years since the end of the Cultural Revolution, and 25 years have passed since Lu Dingyi posed the question, 'If the top leader of the Party is corrupt, who should oversee them?' For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the fundamental institutional issue of who supervises its highest leader remains unresolved.
Since the end of the ten-year Cultural Revolution, which has now been 50 years, the CCP has established numerous 'iron rules,' including the 'Constitution of the CCP,' the 'Party Constitution,' the 'Responsibility System for Party Conduct and Clean Government,' the 'Responsibility System for Promoting Officials with Issues,' and the previously mentioned 'several measures.' However, none of these has effectively addressed the question of 'who, by what procedures, and how' supervises the highest leader of the CCP.
To date, from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin to Xi Jinping, is there a single instance within the CCP where an authoritative body, adhering to 'iron rules' and legal procedures, has supervised Deng, Jiang, or Xi and corrected one of their erroneous decisions? There is none.
When the upper beam is not straight, the lower beam will be crooked.
The issues stemming from the lack of supervision over the highest leader of the CCP are indeed substantial. Firstly, it creates an environment where, when the highest leader makes erroneous decisions, no one within the CCP dares to voice dissent. Secondly, when problems arise, the narrative becomes, 'the fault lies with others, and I am always right,' with all blame shifted onto others, while the highest leader of the CCP is perpetually deemed correct. Lastly, the lack of supervision over the highest leader sets a precedent, leading lower-level leaders to mimic this behaviour, asserting, 'In my small domain, I am the 'lord,' I also want to be 'the sole authority,' and I also want to 'have the final say.'
The outcome is that the highest leader of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the various top leaders beneath him have collectively transformed all 'iron rules' into 'mud rules', 'rotten rules', and 'no rules'.
What does the highest leader of the CPC seek? It is despotism, dictatorship, and totalitarianism. What does totalitarianism entail? It involves a complete disregard for all moral and legal boundaries, allowing one to act freely and without restraint.
However, loyalty has its limits; one must be able to distinguish right from wrong, good from evil, and recognise the righteous and the wicked, aligning oneself with what is right, good, and just.
Those who align themselves with what is right, good, and just cannot possibly be loyal to the highest leader of the CPC, who operates beyond all moral and legal boundaries, acting as he pleases and being lawless.
Conversely, those who side with what is wrong, vile, and wicked possess no loyalty; they are opportunistic and may betray their master at any moment, seeking out other nefarious leaders.
Thus, the 'iron rules' of the Central Military Commission do not apply to Xi (Xí), and he cannot expect this so-called 'iron rule' to secure the 'loyalty' of senior generals.
2. Why should anyone be loyal to Xi?
Xi has held the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission for 14 years, constantly grappling with the issue of 'absolute loyalty'. Yet, to this day, Xi has not only failed to achieve the 'absolute loyalty' of senior generals; on the contrary, instances of 'absolute disloyalty' have become increasingly frequent.
At the 20th National Congress of the CPC in 2022, Xi reached the pinnacle of his power in his lifetime, and his arbitrary authority reached unprecedented levels, undertaking actions that the entire party, military, and populace felt anger towards but could not openly express.
Here is just one example. Xi Jinping has always harboured a dream of unifying Taiwan by force. To achieve this, he needs generals capable of leading troops into battle. So, who is fit for this role? Xi searched throughout the military, looking for the right person among the many generals he had personally promoted, and finally identified a talent he had long sought after. This talent is He Weidong, who came from Xi's home base—the 31st Group Army stationed in Fujian—and was then serving as the commander of the Eastern Theatre Command.
It is reported that He Weidong organised several military exercises aimed at Taiwan, which greatly pleased Xi; he considers He Weidong to be the most exceptional talent among the millions of troops under his command.
During the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi promoted He Weidong—who was neither a representative of the 20th National Congress, nor a member of the 19th Central Committee, nor even a candidate member of the 19th Central Committee, nor a member of the 19th Central Military Commission—by three ranks in one swift move, elevating him to a full member of the Central Committee, a member of the Politburo, and the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. He Weidong's rapid ascent made him the third highest-ranking official in the military and Xi's most trusted confidant.
It can be said that without Xi's support and promotion, He Weidong would not have experienced such a meteoric rise. He Weidong is expected to be 'absolutely loyal' to Xi, right?
However, what Xi never anticipated was that just two years and five months after his promotion, He Weidong would be 'exposed'.
According to reports from overseas media, He Weidong was taken away by personnel from the military discipline commission upon returning to the Bayi Building after attending the National People's Congress on March 11, 2025.
He Weidong's arrest has dealt a significant blow to Xi Jinping. For a long time, Xi refrained from publicly announcing that He Weidong was under investigation for serious disciplinary and legal violations by the military disciplinary committee.
It was not until October 17, 2025, more than seven months after He Weidong's arrest, that a spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense announced just before the Fourth Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China that He Weidong, Miao Hua, and seven other generals had been expelled from the Party and the military for serious violations and that their cases had been referred to military procuratorial authorities for investigation and prosecution.
The following day, the People's Liberation Army Daily published an editorial asserting that Generals He Weidong, Miao Hua, and seven others had 'betrayed their loyalty' and 'seriously undermined the principle of party command and the accountability of the chairman of the Military Commission.'
Even He Weidong, who was personally promoted and rapidly advanced by Xi Jinping, has 'betrayed his loyalty' and 'seriously undermined the principle of party command and the accountability of the chairman of the Military Commission.' This raises the question: which senior general in the entire military can genuinely claim loyalty to Xi?
Why has Xi granted numerous 'benefits' to He Weidong—benefits that other senior generals could only wish for—yet He Weidong remains disloyal to Xi?
Xi once remarked, 'Corruption in governance is the greatest corruption.'
In the 14 years since Xi took office, he has investigated many officials at the provincial level and above, many of whom were personally promoted and reused by him. A review of the corruption history of any official sentenced by the Chinese Communist Party courts reveals a consistent pattern: they were all promoted while engaging in corrupt practices.
Since the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping has initiated successive purges of senior military generals. However, he has yet to publicly disclose any specific corruption cases involving these generals, including when they began accepting bribes and the amounts involved. Why is that? If made public, it would reveal that these generals were all 'promoted despite their issues,' each having accepted 'particularly large' bribes.
If the serious corruption case of He Weidong were to be revealed, it would raise two critical questions: First, if He Weidong was indeed a serious corrupt figure during his time as the commander of the Eastern Theatre Command, why was this not detected, halted, or investigated promptly? Who bears the primary responsibility for the oversight failure regarding He Weidong's long-standing corruption? Second, who is responsible for He Weidong's 'promotion despite his issues' to the position of Politburo member and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission?
According to the 'Party Style and Clean Government Construction Responsibility System' and the 'Responsibility System for Promoting Cadres Despite Their Issues,' the primary responsible individuals in these cases are none other than Xi Jinping.
Xi has remarked, 'Corruption in officialdom is the greatest corruption.' So, who is the primary responsible person for the 'greatest corruption' within the Communist Party? It is Xi himself.
He Weidong reflects, I am a serious corrupt individual, yet Xi personally, exceptionally, and rapidly promoted me to be a member of the Politburo and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Is Xi a 'wise and enlightened ruler'? Certainly not. Xi is not only not a 'wise and enlightened ruler,' but also a 'foolish and tyrannical ruler' who fails to recognise talent, select the right individuals, and utilise them appropriately. Why should I remain loyal to Xi?
He Weidong's downfall would represent a significant blow to Xi's authority, resulting in a considerable loss of face for him.
However, has Xi Jinping ever engaged in self-criticism? No. Has he ever sought punishment from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Political Bureau, or the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau? No. Have the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection or the Military Discipline Inspection Commission held him accountable for his party and political discipline responsibilities? No. Have the National People's Congress or the Supreme Court pursued his legal responsibilities? No.
Given this, any senior general in the military with common sense would naturally ask: What basis do I have to be loyal to Xi?
Have the "Several Measures" issued by the Central Military Commission addressed the questions that any senior general in the military with common sense would ask? No.
3. What is the root cause of Xi's escalating corruption?
During Xi's first and second terms, spanning 10 years (from November 2012 to October 2022), how many generals were investigated? A total of 8, including Xu Caihou, Guo Boxiong, Fang Fenghui, Zhang Yang, Tian Xiusi, Wang Jianping, Wang Xibin, and Liu Yashu (who was secretly reviewed in 2019). Among these, only two are currently active: Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang, while the other six are retired.
In the more than three years of Xi's third term (from October 2022 to May 2026), how many generals have been investigated? So far, 26 have been publicly announced, including Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Li Shangfu, Miao Hua, Liu Zhenli, Wei Fenghe, Zhou Yaning, Li Yuchao, Wang Houbin, He Hongjun, Wang Renhua, Gao Jin, Shen Jinlong, Qin Shengxiang, Li Qiaoming, Han Weiguo, Chen Lei, Ding Hanglai, Yu Zhongfu, Li Wei, Wang Xiubin, Lin Xiangyang, Qin Shutong, Yuan Huazhi, Wang Chunning, and Zhang Hongbing.
At the conclusion of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, there were over 40 active generals. As of today, only four active generals remain: Zhang Shengmin, Dong Jun, Han Shengyan, and Yang Zhibin. Notably, Han and Yang were only promoted from lieutenant general to general last December.
Dong Jun was recommended to Xi by Miao Hua. Following Miao Hua's downfall, he has been identified as a major corrupt official who accepted large sums of money. It is likely that Dong Jun also provided money to Miao Hua. However, both of Dong Jun's predecessors as Minister of Defence—Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu—have been investigated. If Xi were to pursue an investigation against him, it would create a very negative perception internationally. Dong Jun has temporarily avoided disaster, but whether he can ultimately escape remains uncertain.
Aside from Dong Jun, Han Shengyan, and Yang Zhibin, only Zhang Shengmin remains among the more than forty active generals following the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
Xi Jinping does not trust Zhang Shengmin either. As early as 2023, when Xi assigned Zhang to investigate a major case within the Rocket Force, he was also secretly investigating Zhang.
For 14 years, Xi has been engaged in an anti-corruption campaign, targeting high-ranking officials, and has established numerous 'iron rules,' repeatedly declaring harsh statements such as 'there are no pardons' and 'no untouchables.' As a result, many high-ranking party, government, and military officials have received suspended death sentences or life imprisonment. What has been the outcome? The more they fight corruption, the more it seems to proliferate.
Why is this the case?
It is not that Xi's 'iron rules' are insufficient; rather, Xi has never genuinely intended to combat corruption. His anti-corruption efforts are merely a manifestation of internal power struggles within the Communist Party.
Why do I assert that Xi lacks a sincere commitment to fighting corruption? Because addressing corruption involves both superficial and fundamental solutions; the superficial approach is akin to 'lifting the pot to stop the boiling,' while the fundamental approach is like 'removing the firewood from under the pot.'
Lifting the pot to stop the boiling is less effective than removing the firewood.
From an international standpoint, there are many fundamental anti-corruption strategies, such as the 'public declaration system for officials' assets.'
However, like his predecessors, Xi is aware that implementing this 'iron rule' would be the most effective means of combating corruption, yet he steadfastly refuses to establish a public declaration system for officials' assets. It has been 32 years since the National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China included the 'Asset Declaration Law' in its legislative agenda in 1994, and to this day, the Communist Party's 'asset declaration and public disclosure system' remains nonexistent.
On December 22, 2019, Professor Zheng Yefu from Peking University published an article titled "Property Disclosure, Please Start with the Standing Committee," in which he discussed the property declaration and disclosure system as being "fair, peaceful, low-cost, and free from ideological interference, with non-Western traditional countries also adopting it in succession."
Zheng Yefu suggested, "The seven members of the Standing Committee should take the lead in disclosing their assets. I have heard many times: to strike iron, one must first be strong oneself. Leading by example in asset disclosure is an effective way to prove one's integrity and set a standard in the officialdom. If this is done, there will be no fear that the implementation of asset declaration and disclosure will falter."
It has now been over six years since Professor Zheng Yefu made this suggestion, yet Xi Jinping and the other six members of the Politburo Standing Committee have all ignored it completely.
Conclusion
In summary, without fundamentally addressing the issue of supervision over the highest leader of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and without resolving the problem of "who should supervise when the Party's top leader is already corrupt," no amount of "iron rules" established by the CPC military will secure the loyalty of senior military generals.
Despite being established for 105 years and in power for 76 years, the CPC still has not resolved the issue of supervision over its highest leader. Why is that?
Because this problem is unsolvable. Why is it unsolvable?
Because the CPC is a party guided by Marxism. What is the essence of Marxism? It is "false, evil, and struggle."
The highest leaders of the CPC are all adept at "false, evil, and struggle," and they will never allow the establishment of "iron rules" that impose strong supervision over them.
However, the Chinese Communist Party's approach to 'political military building' and 'political training' must persist. How is this 'building' done? How is the 'training' conducted? It's quite straightforward, as it has always been: target a few unfortunate individuals, and then implement a system where 'superiors exert pressure on subordinates, with each level pressuring the next, all the way down to the soldiers; meanwhile, subordinates deceive their superiors, with each level tricking the one above, all the way up to the Chairman of the Military Commission.'
First published by Dajiyuan
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