Xi “Purges” Over 100 Generals as the West Focuses on CCP Infighting

Xi “Purges” Over 100 Generals as the West Focuses on CCP Infighting

[People News] The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping disciplined top military leaders in January, including Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and CMC Joint Staff Chief Liu Zhenli. The latest wave of internal CCP turmoil has drawn international attention. On February 24, two well-known international think tanks released reports examining the negative impact of Xi’s purge on the Chinese military.

U.S. Think Tank Builds CCP Military Purge Database: Xi’s Disruptive Power Is Striking

According to reporting by The Epoch Times, on the afternoon of February 24 (U.S. Eastern Time), the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a “Chinese Military Purge Database.” The database includes information on more than 100 senior CCP military officers who have been purged or are suspected of being purged since 2022. The report describes Xi as having launched a “political civil war” within his own military, finding that the scale of the purge far exceeds previous understanding.

In Xi’s first five years in power, former CMC Vice Chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, as well as then-CMC members Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang, were removed. The second major wave of purges beginning in 2023 eliminated six CMC members, including the recently fallen Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia. At present, only Zhang Shengmin remains as an active-duty general serving as CMC vice chairman.

The CSIS report states that since 2022, 36 full generals and lieutenant generals have been formally removed, while another 65 officers are missing or possibly purged (based on their absence from key meetings where they were expected to appear). This brings the total number of confirmed and suspected purges to a staggering 101 individuals, including both active and retired generals. (Because information on lower-ranking officers is less transparent, the database covers only full and lieutenant generals.)

Eleven retired generals have been purged, but most actions have targeted active-duty officers. Three statistics highlight the severity of the damage to the leadership:

  1. Of 47 senior military leaders who were serving as generals in 2022 or promoted thereafter, 41 (87%) have been purged or possibly purged.

  2. Of the 35 generals promoted by Xi since 2020, 32 appear to have come under investigation, with 29 ultimately confirmed or possibly purged.

  3. Among 176 high-level military leadership positions (excluding duplicate roles), approximately 52% have been purged or are possibly affected.

The report concludes that the purge has touched nearly every level of the PLA, with the Rocket Force suffering the most severe damage. Among the five theater commands, the Southern Theater Command has been hit hardest: its commander, political commissar, and five deputy commanders have all been removed, leaving top posts vacant.

The purge has disrupted departments responsible for planning and overseeing training and other operations, including the Joint Staff Department and Joint Operations Command Center under the CMC, as well as theater and service commanders responsible for major exercises and external operations.

The PLA operates under a dual-track system: political and operational. In the CSIS database, 61% of active senior officers came from operational backgrounds. Among purged CMC officials, 80% held key operational roles. Currently, there are no operational-background leaders left on the CMC.

Of 52 key military leadership posts, only 11 (about 21%) are currently filled with confirmed personnel. Another 23 (44%) are occupied by acting or interim leaders. Twelve appear vacant, and about six lack available information.

While the report notes that routine bureaucratic functions continue, it observes that PLA activities around Taiwan declined slightly year-over-year in the second half of 2025, and Chinese naval activity near Japan shortened in duration.

Delays in two large-scale Taiwan exercises in 2025 and differences in naming conventions suggest disruptions. The purge of the CMC Joint Staff Department may also have weakened China’s ability to plan joint exercises with Russia.

The report concludes that while acting officers may sustain day-to-day operations, it is unclear whether they possess the authority or experience to drive major reforms or manage crises. It suggests that regime security remains the CCP leadership’s top priority. Corruption charges alone cannot explain the purge’s scale—political maneuvering is likely central.

IISS: Purge Weakens Command and Readiness

On the same day, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) released its annual Military Balance report. It stated that the ongoing purge has created serious gaps in the command structure and likely weakened combat readiness. According to reporting by Reuters, the report noted that if promotions are relationship-based, weapons procurement flawed, and morale damaged, the purge would almost certainly have short-term disruptive effects—though it described them as “temporary.”

Analysts: Impact Not Merely Short-Term

Shen Mingshi of Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research told The Epoch Times that Xi’s two waves of purges differ in nature. Earlier removals were planned; the more recent actions against Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli appear driven by Xi’s anxiety about losing power. After detaining them, Xi reportedly rushed to construct justifications, leaving propaganda vague.

Shen said the purge has disrupted personnel structures, and finding loyal successors is difficult. Promoting officers too quickly risks inadequate expertise, affecting training and readiness.

He also warned of long-term morale damage: “If soldiers lose trust in leadership, it affects even the CCP’s ‘party commands the gun’ system.”

Su Tzu-yun, director at the same institute, emphasized that beyond weapons, military strength depends on people. If morale suffers, negative consequences follow. He suggested two possibilities: either corruption is deeply rooted, or—more likely—the military’s loyalty is in question, prompting political purges rather than purely anti-corruption measures.