Revelation: Cybersecurity Troops Rendered Major Meritorious Service in the Zhang Youxia Case and Were Commended by Xi

Illustration of a cyberattack.

[People News] In the handling and disclosure of the cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, observers noticed something highly unusual. In the past, the downfall of senior generals was typically led by the discipline inspection authorities. In Zhang Youxia’s case, however, the entire process was handled exclusively by the military, while local and civilian organs remained tight-lipped. Meanwhile, overseas Chinese-language internet platforms were flooded with rumours and commentary about the case.

Former Inner Mongolia official Du Wen received what he described as major inside information that may explain this anomaly. According to the tip he received, the Central Military Commission issued a special commendation order. This commendation was not awarded to frontline combat units, but instead to “a certain regiment of the Cybersecurity Force” and several other units. The reason for their commendation was particularly striking: they were rewarded for achieving major success in “external online operations related to the handling of the Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli cases.”

More importantly, this commendation order was personally signed by Xi Jinping. This raises the question: how exactly was the public-opinion battle surrounding the Zhang Youxia case fought, and why did Xi Jinping choose to reward this cyber force?

From the timeline, this appears to have been a carefully designed “public-opinion guidance show.” First, mysterious overseas self-media accounts began leaking information, triggering speculation. Then the Ministry of National Defence held a special press conference to announce the news at a high profile. After that, the PLA Daily ran a series of critical articles. Even major international outlets such as The Wall Street Journal were drawn into the narrative.

Du Wen said that the CCP employed a strategy of exploiting information gaps and deliberately feeding leaks in order to control the rhythm of public opinion. They successfully portrayed Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli as “traitors” or “failed coup plotters,” while packaging Xi Jinping as a so-called “strategic enforcer of the law.” Behind the scenes, the operator of this entire effort was the “cyberspace force.”

According to Du Wen, in the Zhang Youxia case, Xi Jinping personally deployed and issued operational orders to the cybersecurity troops. Through coordinated domestic and overseas actions, this cyber force adopted a new style of warfare: “advance deployment, proactive attack, forward operations, and rear-area coordination,” successfully dominating the pace and intensity of the campaign.

At the moment Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were arrested, even within the Party, it was top secret; even people inside the Central Military Commission were unclear about what was happening. Everyone only began paying attention after seeing overseas reports. This suggests that the initial “rumours” were very likely deliberately released by the CCP itself.

Why release the information proactively? Du Wen explained that a downfall at Zhang Youxia’s level could not be concealed. Rather than waiting passively for an explosive revelation, it was better to “test the waters” by releasing information in advance, dispersing the shock and preventing turmoil within the military. While suppressing overseas anti-CCP media, the authorities also cultivated new narrative platforms and new spokespersons.

Du Wen also revealed a disturbing piece of information: when the CCP cultivates online spokespersons, they attract large numbers of followers. Through backend data from these bloggers, state security and public security organs can locate and analyse those followers. If such followers are inside mainland China and are identified, the consequences could be unimaginable.

Du Wen warned mainland netizens: it is enough just to watch his program on YouTube and not to subscribe as members. Because if his backend were compromised, it would be extremely dangerous for viewers.

He stressed that this cyberspace force is not a scattered group of “keyboard warriors,” but a systematic, large-scale operational organisation. Their sole objective is to implement Xi Jinping’s will, guide online public opinion, and shape the online environment.

Their methods include agenda-setting, emotional manipulation, traffic hijacking, and algorithmic driving. They use AI in coordination with human operators. You think you are reading news, but in fact, your emotions are being arranged. You think you are making judgments, but your framework of judgment has already been preset. The account you see may actually be run by a team working in shifts.

Du Wen also pointed out that this force has fatal weaknesses.

According to insiders, their greatest frustration is the lack of credible, real-name, long-term opinion leaders. Because they cannot, in the identity of real soldiers, invest emotionally in cultivating a genuine, long-term, trustworthy persona.

Therefore, they rely on “mysterious accounts that hide behind the scenes and never show their faces.” These accounts are often operated by organisations; even if exposed, they can be replaced at any time without the risk of a personal brand collapsing. They adopt a model of “large accounts setting the tone, small accounts amplifying it,” using platform recommendation mechanisms to create the illusion of public-opinion heat.

Du Wen observed that the accounts attacking him all used identical rhetoric, robot-like avatars, and had only a few dozen or even zero followers, with no personal information—mass-produced comments. His response is to block them all.

How can one identify these “opinion-guiding” cyber troops? To help people stay clear-headed, Du Wen summarised five characteristics:

1. Clear mission orientation: They do not attack power itself, but systematically attack real opponents. They elevate themselves, belittle others, suppress rivals, and squeeze out others’ space to speak.

2. Abnormally abundant “inside information”: They often claim to have “internal” news from offices, mixing truth and falsehood, but when asked for evidence, they become vague, saying, “I can’t say too much.”

3. Never cross the “mobilisation red line”: They may criticise lightly while ultimately helping the authorities, but they never openly call for any real resistance inside China.

4. Fierce outward, soft inward: They attack opinion leaders aggressively, even fabricating and smearing, but are extremely cautious when it comes to criticising Xi Jinping.

5. Highly organised: When one account speaks, many accounts on multiple platforms follow up simultaneously, using similar wording and screenshots to form an organised dissemination effect.

According to China’s Ministry of National Defence, the PLA Cyberspace Force was established on April 19, 2024. This force is at the deputy theatre-command level, officially named the “PLA Information Support Force,” under the unified command of the Central Military Commission, with Commander Bi Yi and Political Commissar Li Wei.

On September 3 last year, the cyberspace force formation appeared for the first time in the Beijing military parade. It is reported that the average age of its officers and soldiers is 24, with a high proportion of highly educated personnel drawn from frontline operational units and research institutions such as the Information Engineering University.

Du Wen concluded that in the face of a systematised cyber army, people must stay clear-headed, respect facts, and think independently. This in itself is a powerful form of resistance. True strength does not lie in who speaks the loudest, but in who can hold fast to reason and humanity amid the noise. △