[People News] On December 11, well-known Chinese political scholar Liu Junning released a piece of information stating that current Air Force Commander General Chang Dingqiu, during a period of “detention for questioning” by the Military Discipline Inspection Commission / Supervisory Commission, suddenly died of a heart attack.

When I saw this news, I felt it was very abrupt, for three reasons:

First, on October 17, when the CCP Ministry of National Defense spokesperson announced that He Weidong, member of the CCP Politburo and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Miao Hua, former member of the Central Military Commission and Director of the Political Work Department, and nine generals in total were expelled from the Party and the military and transferred to judicial authorities, I paid special attention to the list. Among the four major services—Navy, Army, Air Force, and Rocket Force—only the Air Force had no general implicated.

Second, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee held from October 20 to 23, Air Force Commander Chang Dingqiu and Air Force Political Commissar Guo Puxiao both attended. They were the only service among the four major branches whose military and political chiefs both appeared.

Third, Chang Dingqiu comes from a pilot background and has excellent physical fitness. At age 17, he passed strict pilot selection procedures and entered a basic flight school. He later served as an Air Force unit flight squadron leader, aviation regiment commander, deputy commander and commander of the 3rd Fighter Aviation Division, assistant chief of staff of the Air Force, and other posts.
During Xi Jinping’s first “September 3 military parade” in 2015, just as Chang was approaching the maximum flight age limit for fighter pilots, he flew a J-10A fighter jet over Tiananmen Square. Among the 56 general officers leading formations, he was the youngest major general.

Chang Dingqiu was born in 1967 and is only 58 years old, in the prime of life. With his excellent health and the best possible medical care, how could he have died suddenly?

However, the scholar who released this information, Liu Junning, holds a PhD in political science from Peking University, was a visiting scholar at Harvard University, and is currently a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Culture under the Ministry of Culture. He is a relatively rigorous scholar. On a matter of life and death—especially involving a senior general of such national and global attention—he would not speak recklessly. If the information were false, he would have to bear legal responsibility.

I then checked Baidu Baike. A senior general like Chang Dingqiu would certainly have an entry. But to my surprise, the Baidu Baike page introducing Chang Dingqiu’s resume had been “deleted”. This indirectly confirms that Chang Dingqiu may indeed have died.

If Liu Junning’s revelation about “Chang Dingqiu’s death” is true, then many major questions deserve in-depth discussion.

1. Did Chang Dingqiu die naturally, or was he “made to die”?

Since the CCP’s 20th Party Congress, at least three high-ranking officials have died under suspicious circumstances:

The first was former Politburo Standing Committee member and Premier Li Keqiang. On October 27, 2023, only seven months after retirement, Li Keqiang “died suddenly” in Shanghai. He became the youngest and earliest-deceased premier since the CCP came to power 76 years ago. There are many doubts surrounding his death, and many suspect he was “made to die.”

The second was former Politburo member and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu Qiliang. On June 2, 2025, only two years and three months after retirement, Xu “died suddenly” in Beijing. Xu also came from a pilot background and was in good physical condition, had no work pressure, and enjoyed the best medical care. How could he suddenly die? His death also raised many doubts, and many likewise suspect he was “made to die.”

The third was former Deputy Director of the General Office of the Central Committee and Director of the Central Guard Bureau Wang Shaojun, who died in Beijing on April 26, 2023. On April 27, a mainland WeChat account, Zhongjing Zhongcheng, posted his obituary, but it was quickly deleted. It was not until nearly three months later, on July 24, 2023, that Xinhua News Agency officially announced his death. Some people also suspect that Wang Shaojun was “made to die.”

After He Weidong was arrested on March 11, 2025, rumors spread that two generals committed suicide during investigation by the military disciplinary authorities: one was He Weidong himself, and the other was He Hongjun, executive deputy director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission.

The CCP has neither confirmed nor denied these rumors. He Weidong and He Hongjun remain “disappeared”, with their life or death still unknown.

Under normal circumstances, when the military disciplinary authorities “detain for questioning” a general-level officer, the highest level of security and medical safeguards should be in place, making suicide highly unlikely.

However, historically, CCP high-level power struggles have always been ruthless, especially when it comes to control of the military—the “gun barrel.”

If Chang Dingqiu experienced an accident during “detention for questioning,” whether suicide or being “made to die,” it is not impossible.

2. What did Chang Dingqiu do to be “detained for questioning”?

According to CCP state media, the core issues involving He Weidong and Miao Hua were not only economic corruption, but more importantly serious political problems. What were these political problems? In the words of CCP military newspaper editorials, they involved “loss of loyalty” and “serious violation of the principle that the Party commands the gun and the chairman responsibility system of the Central Military Commission.”

“Loss of loyalty” implies betrayal, defection, or collusion with enemies; “serious violation of Party control of the military” implies anti-Party behavior, military disorder, or power seizure.

Military newspaper articles further stated that He Weidong and Miao Hua were deeply influenced by the toxic legacy of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, acting in similar or even worse ways.

The CCP has explicitly labeled Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, both former Politburo members and Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission, as “ambitious schemers who attempted to seize Party and state power.” This indicates that He Weidong and Miao Hua were considered even worse.

The articles also stressed the need to “dig deep and thoroughly investigate”, warning that “if poisonous elements are not eliminated before shots are fired, political security will face grave danger.” This implies suspected military rebellion or coup plotting.

After the Fourth Plenum, a group of senior military officers may have been under investigation. Chang Dingqiu may have been one of them.

3. Who was behind the investigation of Chang Dingqiu?

From Chang Dingqiu’s resume, he was clearly one of Xi Jinping’s handpicked rising stars in the military.

  • In 2013, at age 46, Xi promoted him to Chief of Staff of the Shenyang Military Region Air Force, making him the youngest corps-level Air Force officer.

  • In January 2016, at age 49, Xi promoted him to Deputy Commander of the newly formed Southern Theater Command, the youngest active theater-level officer in the PLA.

  • In December 2017, he became Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department, helping Xi control air power.

  • In August 2021, at age 54, Xi promoted him to Air Force Commander, and in September he was promoted to full general, the youngest since the restoration of ranks in 1988.

Chang’s extraordinary career shows he was Xi’s most important Air Force successor after Xu Qiliang and a core member of Xi’s “Xi family army.”

Would Xi really bring down someone he personally cultivated and promoted? I believe the probability is very low.

The most likely person behind Chang’s downfall is Zhang Youxia, First Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

After Xi’s sudden illness and hospitalization in July 2024, Zhang Youxia reportedly took control, leading to the downfall of many of Xi’s military confidants. Xi’s military power has effectively slipped away.

Conclusion

The military purge in the three years since the 20th Party Congress has been more intense, fierce, and brutal than even the previous decade. Xi’s personally built “Xi family army” has been almost completely eliminated.

If Air Force Commander Chang Dingqiu truly died suddenly during detention, Xi has become a commander without loyalists.

Xi reached the peak of his power with his third term in 2022, but by 2025, he has fallen to the lowest point of authority.

If even the youngest general personally promoted by Xi has died, Xi’s long-held ambitions may truly be nearing their end.

The Dajiyuan
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