Emergency Meetings: Why Was Zhang Youxia's Representative Qualification Not Dismissed?

The image depicts Beijing's Tiananmen Square. (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

[People News] On February 2 and 4, the Communist Party of China (CPC) unexpectedly convened two emergency meetings. The first was the 59th Chairman's Meeting of the 14th National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, while the second was the 20th Meeting of the NPC Standing Committee. The former discussed the report from the NPC Standing Committee's Qualification Review Committee concerning the qualifications of individual representatives. The latter focused on the dismissal of the qualifications of three individuals: Zhou Xinmin, Chairman and Party Secretary of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China; Luo Qi, a member of the NPC's Education, Science, Culture and Health Committee; and Liu Cangli, former president of the China Academy of Engineering Physics.

These meetings are termed 'emergency' because, according to data from the CPC's National People's Congress website, NPC Standing Committee meetings are typically held every two months, usually in the latter part of even months. This implies that, by convention, another NPC Standing Committee meeting is expected at the end of this month. Additionally, dismissals of NPC representatives' qualifications are generally announced after the National People's Congress meetings during the Two Sessions. Thus, these two meetings appear somewhat irregular. Why did the CPC hastily disregard established conventions and procedural norms to hold these two unusual meetings? Notably, the meetings did not address the dismissal of the representative qualifications of Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and others. Why was this the case? Is it due to significant opposition, or is the conflict between Xi and Zhang still at an impasse?

The CPC under Xi aims to establish legitimate grounds for detaining Zhang and Liu.

According to the regulations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), high-ranking officials who are officially announced to be removed will also be dismissed from their positions as representatives of the National People's Congress (NPC). Recently, those removed include Zhang Youxia, the First Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People's Liberation Army, Sun Shaocheng, the former Secretary of the Party Committee of Inner Mongolia, and Wang Xiangxi, the Secretary of the Party Committee and Minister of the Ministry of Emergency Management. While there is no public information indicating that Wang Xiangxi is a representative of the 14th NPC, the other three are confirmed to be. Interestingly, the qualifications of these three NPC representatives were not mentioned in the closing announcement of the 20th meeting on the 4th. In contrast, the CCP quickly announced the representative qualifications of three relatively unimportant individuals.

Typically, the CCP's two sessions are scheduled to begin on March 4 this year, and for these three individuals, it would have been entirely feasible to wait another month to announce their status after the two sessions. Consequently, some insiders have speculated that the original agenda for the 20th meeting included the announcement of the dismissal of Zhang and Liu from their NPC qualifications. However, due to the sensitivity of the issue and the public outrage that has yet to be resolved—especially since many have raised concerns about the procedures surrounding the detainment of Zhang and Liu—this item was temporarily removed from the agenda. The immediate priority is to establish a legitimate reason for the entire party and military to justify the detainment of Zhang and Liu. Reports indicate that Xi Jinping convened an emergency Politburo meeting on January 30, and party media noted that the meeting also addressed 'other matters.' This phrase suggests that sensitive topics were discussed privately, balancing various interests that are not suitable for public disclosure.

On February 3, Mr Tang Baiqiao, a pro-democracy activist based in the United States, referenced internal information from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that suggested this 'other matter' relates to Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. Some individuals have openly questioned the legitimacy of the arrests of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, even going so far as to directly recommend that Xi Jinping rectify his errors, with this person's comments receiving backing from other participants.

According to CCP regulations, to arrest a vice-state-level leader like Zhang Youxia, the Politburo must first hold a meeting to approve the action. However, the CCP's Ministry of National Defence announced that the arrests of Zhang and Liu were determined by the Central Committee. This indicates that the CCP's arrest of Zhang and Liu was a procedural afterthought made on the 30th, implying that their arrests are considered illegal detentions carried out without proper legal procedures. The CCP is also aware that the prior procedures violated its own regulations and are not suitable for public presentation.

This situation has already manifested within the CCP, as the party, government, and military systems have not experienced the usual surge of statements proclaiming 'the central government's wise decision' that typically follows the downfall of a high-ranking official. Instead, on January 31, the People's Liberation Army Daily published a commentary titled 'Firm Belief and Confidence in Winning the Anti-Corruption Battle and Strengthening the Military,' which called for the entire military to implement the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission, to resolutely follow Chairman Xi's directives, and to be accountable to him. It stated that 'all military personnel must firmly support the decisions of the Party Central Committee and maintain a high degree of consistency with the Party Central Committee in thought, politics, and action.'...

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) often vocalises its deficiencies; these loud proclamations highlight that the efforts to crack down on Liu (Liu) and Zhang (Zhang) have yet to achieve success, and the idea of a certain victory is merely a hopeful aspiration of Xi (Xi). As of now, the entire military remains reluctant to 'implement the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission,' unwilling to 'be accountable to Chairman Xi,' and has not yet 'aligned with the Party Central Committee'... This indicates that Xi is aware that arresting Zhang and Liu could lead to severe consequences. The military commission, which was originally made up of seven members, has effectively been reduced to just one member, meaning Xi has essentially dismantled the military commission of the People's Liberation Army. So why would Xi take such a significant risk and insist on these arrests? Why the approach of arresting first and filling in the details later? To uncover this mystery, we begin with the CCP's official announcement in early February regarding the handling of two senior officials at the ministerial level.

Li Weiwei (Li) and Tang Yijun (Tang) were sentenced to life imprisonment in early February.

On February 3, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced that Li Weiwei, the former deputy director of the Population Resources and Environment Committee of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the former chairman of the Hunan Provincial CPPCC, was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Hainan Province First Intermediate People's Court for accepting bribes totaling over 117 million yuan. Li Weiwei had a long career in Hunan Province, where she held various positions since January 2006, including member of the Standing Committee of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, Minister of the United Front Work Department, and Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission. In January 2016, she became the chairman of the Hunan Provincial CPPCC, and in March 2023, she was appointed as the deputy director of the Population Resources and Environment Committee of the 14th National Committee of the CPPCC, until she was officially announced to be under investigation in July 2024. In January 2025, she was 'double-opened.' The court indicated that the sentence for Li Weiwei was relatively lenient, as she 'actively disclosed the vast majority of criminal facts that the supervisory authorities had not yet uncovered.' Just a day prior, on February 2, the CCP reported that Tang Yijun, the former Minister of Justice and the former Secretary of the Party Group and Chairman of the Jiangxi Provincial CPPCC, was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Xiamen Intermediate People's Court in Fujian Province for accepting bribes exceeding 137 million yuan.

Tang Yijun and Li Weiwei share a commonality: both have been out of office for two years, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has only recently announced their sentences, with both receiving severe life imprisonment for corruption involving over 100 million yuan. In the past, many CCP officials who embezzled hundreds of millions or even billions were only given fixed-term sentences. However, the CCP's official statements suggest that these sentences are now considered lenient, as both individuals voluntarily revealed most of the criminal facts that the authorities had not yet uncovered upon their arrival. This indicates that both were arrested for corruption involving tens of millions, suggesting that their arrests were not primarily about economic issues. The facts they disclosed were not related to bribery; it is clear that they were treated as corrupt officials due to political reasons, as they implicated larger figures that the CCP intended to target. The CCP aims to send a message to even bigger tigers that they must comply, as they have obtained evidence of their crimes.

Removing Obstacles for the Two Sessions in March and Next Year's 21st National Congress

So, why did the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wait until early February this year to issue warnings about bigger tigers? Observant readers might recall that in January, the CCP officially announced the downfall of 10 high-ranking officials, including Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, and two ministers, Sun Shaocheng and Wang Xiangxi. This group encompasses officials from the party, government, military commission, central ministries, local leaders, and executives from state-owned enterprises, including several members of the 20th Central Committee, five of whom were investigated while still in office. The intensity, speed, and number of these actions, along with their extensive implications, have set a historical record for this period. It is clear that the number of tigers taken down this year will likely surpass last year's total of 65.

Examining the officials who were removed in January, nearly half are from the party and government system, indicating that this year, the party and government system has become a precarious environment. At the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) plenary session held in early 2026, Xi Jinping remarked, "Anti-corruption is a significant struggle that we cannot afford to lose and must not lose."

In outlining the anti-corruption efforts for 2026, the plenary session specifically identified the financial, state-owned enterprise, and energy sectors as the "key minority." The communiqué from the plenary session stated that the campaign against tigers must "resolutely eliminate the 'two-faced people' who harbour dual intentions and exhibit inconsistent words and actions," which clearly indicates that the so-called anti-corruption stance is fundamentally a matter of political loyalty. Economic corruption serves merely as an excuse; the true objectives are political discipline and absolute loyalty, which the CCP seeks to instil in party officials. It is possible that the CCP has already identified the disloyalty of these "key minorities" and is simply waiting to act accordingly. This year, the CCP plans to reform the party, government, and military systems. Furthermore, regarding the larger "disloyalists" within these parties and government systems, Xi has gained a clear understanding through the testimonies of corrupt officials who have already fallen.

Why is there a stringent crackdown on the party, government, and military systems this year? This year is pivotal for the personnel arrangements of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as the 21st National Congress is scheduled for next year. Key personnel at the provincial and ministerial levels need to be positioned this year, and local governments are also preparing for leadership changes. If Xi Jinping aims to secure re-election at the 21st National Congress, he must eliminate all obstacles in his path.

So why are some high-ranking officials, who voluntarily disclosed previously unknown crimes, being sentenced in February? This is because the CCP will convene the Two Sessions starting on March 4. These Two Sessions are critical for personnel changes, particularly the National People's Congress (NPC). The attendees of the NPC meeting are the same individuals who participated in the NPC Standing Committee Chairperson's meeting and the 20th NPC Standing Committee meeting held on February 2 and February 4, indicating that the same group of people is involved across different meetings.

This clarifies two mysteries: first, why the NPC Chairperson's meeting and the 20th NPC Standing Committee meeting were held in early February, and second, why the official announcements regarding Tang Yijun and Li Weiwei were postponed until early February. This was done to prepare for personnel changes at the Two Sessions and to deter disloyal individuals. This year's Two Sessions also aims to remove personnel obstacles for Xi's re-election at the 21st National Congress. According to insider sources, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli are opposed to Xi's re-election at the 21st National Congress. Consequently, the previously complex issues now have clear and straightforward answers: Zhang and Liu must be arrested, and any violations of procedures and regulations will also result in arrests. Everything is aimed at the 21st National Congress, and everything is for Xi Jinping's re-election.

(People News first published)
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