He Lifeng’s “Clarification” – Is He Weidong Safe? A Telling Moment from Zhang Youxia

During the closing ceremony of the Two Sessions, video footage showed that as Xi Jinping was leaving, several Politburo members, including Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) He Weidong, turned around and stood by their seats to watch Xi depart. However, Zhang Youxia remained facing forward, not even glancing back as Xi walked past behind him. (Screenshot from video)

[People News] According to reports from Chinese state media, on March 16, He Lifeng, a member of the CCP Politburo and director of the Central Financial Office, met in Beijing with former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. However, just two days earlier, on March 14, He Lifeng and Defense Minister Dong Jun were both absent from a State Council plenary meeting chaired by Premier Li Qiang, sparking speculation.

Dong Jun’s absence was not surprising. As early as November 27 last year, foreign media had reported that he was under investigation, allegedly linked to Miao Hua, a close ally of Xi Jinping and head of the CMC’s Political Work Department. Dong’s promotion was likely facilitated by Miao. Although Dong made a brief public appearance after the investigation rumors emerged, his subsequent disappearance suggests that his case remains unresolved.

The other missing figure, He Lifeng, is considered part of Xi Jinping’s “Fujian faction” and is believed to have risen through political connections. The absence of both Dong and He from a key State Council meeting drew attention because their potential downfall could indicate Xi’s weakening grip on power.

However, two days later, He Lifeng resurfaced, seemingly refuting the speculation. Yet, based on past CCP practices, a high-ranking official appearing in public after rumors of an investigation does not necessarily mean they are safe. Such appearances can mean either they have cleared their name or that their fate is still undecided, with higher authorities yet to make a final decision. If He Lifeng is not deeply implicated in corruption and chooses to pledge loyalty to the new party leadership, he may have a soft landing. His future remains uncertain.

Compared to He Lifeng, He Weidong—Vice Chairman of the CMC—has not made any public appearances to dispel rumors. On March 11, according to exiled Chinese journalist Zhao Lanjian, He Weidong was taken away for investigation, and his homes in Beijing and Shanghai were searched. Unlike He Lifeng, He Weidong has not reappeared at any meetings or issued any statements, and the military has remained silent on the matter.

Additionally, He Weidong, who is responsible for political work in the military, was absent from the March 14 symposium in Beijing marking the 20th anniversary of the Anti-Secession Law, an event he was expected to attend. Instead, Liu Zhenli, a CMC member and Chief of the Joint Staff Department, attended in his place.

The eerie silence surrounding He Weidong mirrors the mysterious disappearances of former Defense Ministers and Foreign Minister Qin Gang, who vanished without explanation. Notably, when foreign media first reported on Dong Jun’s investigation last November 27, the very next day, Defense Ministry spokesperson Wu Qian publicly denied the allegations, calling them “pure fabrication.” In early December, Dong Jun even made a public appearance.

For a lower-ranking official like the Defense Minister, the military responded immediately to rumors. Yet for He Weidong—a trusted confidant of Xi Jinping—there has been no official clarification, raising serious questions: Is He Weidong safe?

One possibility is that He Weidong’s case is far more severe than Dong Jun’s. Some independent media sources speculate that He Weidong may have been involved in a coup attempt to help Xi regain control of the military. If true, his arrest would signal the failure of the power grab, and he would likely face harsh consequences.

Another possibility is that Xi has completely lost control over the military. If true, the silence from the armed forces could be a deliberate signal to the outside world. With Miao Hua already officially purged, the potential downfall of He Weidong—one of Xi’s key military allies—could indicate that Xi’s position is in serious jeopardy.

In fact, over the past nine months, there have been numerous indications that control of the military is not held by Xi Jinping himself, but rather by Zhang Youxia, the first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, who has the backing of CCP elders. Two particular scenes illustrate this issue well: the first occurred on January 17 of this year, prior to a New Year cultural performance organized by the Central Military Commission for retired senior officials stationed in Beijing. In this instance, Xi Jinping entered alongside Zhang Youxia and other officials, shaking hands with the retired officials. Although Zhang was positioned behind Xi, both appeared almost simultaneously on camera, with Xi receiving little to no close-up shots, while Zhang's presence was significant, indicating they were essentially in the same frame. Such a scenario would have been unthinkable in the past.

The second scene took place during the closing ceremony of the Two Sessions, where video footage revealed that as Xi Jinping was leaving, several Politburo members, including Military Commission Vice Chairman He Weidong, turned to stand by their seats to bid farewell to Xi. In contrast, Zhang Youxia remained facing forward and did not turn around even as Xi walked past him. The implications of this are quite clear: the two have undoubtedly 'fallen out,' and Zhang Youxia feels confident enough to act in this manner.

In recent months, reports have surfaced regarding Xi's close aides or faction members, such as Miao Hua, Dong Jun, Wang Chunying, Ding Xuexiang, He Weidong, and He Lifeng, facing various issues, some of which have been confirmed. This has led to heightened scrutiny regarding whether and when changes in power at Zhongnanhai will take place. The long-awaited Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP may provide answers to these pressing questions.

Historically, the timing of the Fourth Plenary Sessions of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has often coincided with key transitional years, addressing major issues pertinent to the CPC. The Fourth Plenary Sessions from the 14th to the 17th CPC were consistently held in September, while the 18th and 19th sessions took place in October. However, the 20th Fourth Plenary Session was postponed from last year to this year due to developments in Zhongnanhai. Notably, it was during the 16th Fourth Plenary Session in September 2004 that the Central Committee approved Jiang Zemin's resignation as Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission. Thus, it seems unlikely that the upcoming 20th Fourth Plenary Session next year will face similar delays; could we see a repeat of this situation?