Zhong Yuan: Who is Targeted by the Politburo’s Sudden Mention of “Ability to Rise and Fall”?

Caption: Rumors from Beijing suggest a move to topple the "New Gang of Four." (People News graphic)

October 29, 2024 - On October 28, the CCP Politburo held a meeting, and in the short report by the state media, there was a line stating, “strictly implement democratic centralism, and promote the ability of leading cadres to rise and fall.” Currently, political rumors are rampant in Beijing, and the sudden mention of “ability to rise and fall” by the Politburo will inevitably spark new associations. State media should have been very cautious at this time, yet they did not shy away from using such sensitive language. If this phrase was intentionally released, then who might it be targeting?

Was the superficial third round of inspections used to make a point?

Xinhua News Agency reported only one item from the Politburo meeting on October 28, namely, the review of the Comprehensive Report on the Third Round of Inspections by the 20th Central Committee; other matters were simply referred to as “other items.”

On October 17, the CCP’s Central Leading Group for Inspection Work had already held a feedback meeting for the third round of inspections. Three days before the Politburo meeting, on October 25, state media also made a public announcement.

This round of inspections included 22 central and state agencies and 12 party committees of centrally managed financial companies. Issues raised in the report included: “some have gaps in fulfilling functional responsibilities, insufficient implementation of the Party Central Committee’s decisions and plans, and incomplete implementation of reform deployments; some lack adequate integration of development and security, have weak risk awareness, and lack robust control mechanisms; some are not vigorous enough in advancing full and strict governance of the Party, with notable integrity risks in key areas, and issues in adhering to the spirit of the central eight-point regulations still occur; some leadership teams and cadre formations are not solid, and grassroots party organization construction is relatively weak.”

These points were, in fact, understated; the inspections may not have uncovered significant issues, or they may have avoided disclosing major or numerous problems. The list of requirements in the report is full of formal language, including “raising political awareness,” “soberly recognizing the anti-corruption struggle situation,” “creating a clean and upright political environment conducive to hard work and entrepreneurship,” “strict cadre education, management, and supervision,” and so on. It also requires the “primary responsibility of the ‘top leader’” and the “strengthening of daily supervision of rectification.”

The third round of inspections targeting central agencies and centrally managed financial companies appears to have been merely a formality, likely without any intention of purging anyone, as the CCP currently fears further unrest. The tone of the report was not harsh, and there was no mention of “ability to rise and fall” among cadres.

Xinhua’s report on the Politburo meeting first noted that the Politburo affirmed the inspection work, also stating that the party building in central agencies and centrally managed financial units “has been strengthened, and various tasks have achieved new results”; it then simply noted that “some issues exist,” echoing some of the report's formal language.

However, the Xinhua report then took a sudden turn, stating that the Politburo meeting emphasized, “the need to strengthen leadership team building, strictly implement democratic centralism, and promote the ability of leading cadres to rise and fall.”

The discussion of the inspection report by the Politburo seems unexpectedly intensified, appearing to be making a point. What was initially a routine inspection was first affirmed, and then used to make an issue. The report did not reveal significant problems publicly, yet the Politburo intentionally elevated it to the level of “the ability of leading cadres to rise and fall,” making it seem abrupt. Alternatively, a reversal of some kind may have occurred in the agenda of the Politburo meeting as it was pre-set.

Who proposed “promoting the ability of leading cadres to rise and fall”?

Xinhua’s report stated that Xi Jinping presided over the Politburo meeting but did not say that Xi Jinping gave a speech, so who might have proposed the concept of “the ability of leading cadres to rise and fall”?

Given the current sensitive political situation, the appearance of such nerve-wracking language in the public report of the Politburo meeting is indeed unusual. Whoever proposed this idea, it seems to have received the approval of the majority and was required to be publicly reported by Xinhua.

If Xi Jinping himself proposed “ability to rise and fall,” others would likely not object; the various factions are covertly vying for position, awaiting the arrival of the moment of reckoning. If someone in the Politburo can “fall,” it presents an opportunity for others.

For those in Xi’s faction, particularly those who are still willing to follow him closely, this might be seen as the CCP leader’s response to various challenges, signaling a refusal to back down and a readiness to continue the life-or-death “struggle.” However, it might also suggest that the CCP leader is openly signaling a willingness to step back, in which case, Xi’s staunch allies may feel distressed and uneasy.

If another Politburo member proposed “ability to rise and fall,” it would amount to open opposition to the “Party Central Committee,” or a public challenge to the CCP leader by various factions. If Xi Jinping is unable to prevent such language from the majority of Politburo members, it would indicate that the CCP leader is indeed facing a situation of losing power.

This time, the Politburo is eager to express “promoting the ability of leading cadres to rise and fall,” with the keyword being “promoting”; if it was not proposed by the CCP leader, then others must be eager to act. Additionally, the phrase “strictly implement democratic centralism” was added, which is equally intriguing and can have two interpretations.

If Xi Jinping himself said this, the emphasis would be on “centralism,” not “democracy”; this would imply that the CCP leader does not wish to relinquish power and still wants to remain the “one and only.”

If it was not said by Xi Jinping himself, the emphasis would be on “democracy,” not “centralism.” This would imply that other Politburo members are openly demanding that the CCP leader relinquish power, no longer tolerating “one-man rule” and autocracy; in this case, “promoting the ability of leading cadres to rise and fall” carries the implication of a public urging for the CCP leader to step down.

In either case, it indicates that the internal power struggle within the Politburo is beginning to surface publicly, and it may be difficult to maintain a facade of harmony, or that many are eager to move forward and can no longer hold back.

Will the "Regulations on Promoting the Ability of Leading Cadres to Rise and Fall" Need Revision?

At the very least, the Politburo meeting on October 28 discussed a personnel appointment. On the same day, Xinhua reported that Yi Lianhong would no longer serve as Secretary, Standing Committee Member, or Member of the Zhejiang Provincial Committee; Governor Wang Hao would assume the position of Zhejiang Provincial Committee Secretary. Yi Lianhong, born in September 1959, has reached the normal retirement age of 65, so this is a standard retirement rather than removal from office, and he should not be counted under the category of "ability to rise and fall" among leading cadres. Therefore, this phrase was not targeting him.

On September 19, 2022, Xinhua had previously published the CCP’s revised Regulations on Promoting the Ability of Leading Cadres to Rise and Fall, stating that the “focus is on solving the issue of removal.” At that time, it was just before the 20th National Congress of the CCP, and these regulations were likely used by Xi’s camp to strike at political opponents. As a result, Li Keqiang, Wang Yang, and Han Zheng stepped down from the Politburo Standing Committee, and Hu Chunhua, among others, was removed from the Politburo. Xi’s allies fully assumed top positions.

Following the official power transition at the CCP’s Two Sessions in March 2023, the political situation suddenly changed. Qin Gang, a State Councilor and Foreign Minister, was the first to disappear, followed by the dismissal of the Rocket Force commander and political commissar, a purge of the Rocket Force and the Military Commission Equipment Department, and then the disappearance of Defense Minister Li Shangfu. The CCP has fallen into turmoil, with officials continuously being removed, yet there has been no mention of “the ability of leading cadres to rise and fall.” Now, with the Politburo suddenly bringing up “the ability of leading cadres to rise and fall,” it is unclear whether this signals potential revisions to the related regulations, possibly custom-made for certain individuals.

Xinhua disclosed that on August 19, 2022, the Politburo Standing Committee had revised the Regulations on Promoting the Ability of Leading Cadres to Rise and Fall, yet party media never reported on this Politburo Standing Committee meeting. The current version of the regulations was revised by the previous Politburo Standing Committee, and whether it can still be used to “promote the ability of leading cadres to rise and fall” remains uncertain. The key issue now is whether the problem of “falling” needs to be resolved, or the problem of “rising,” or both simultaneously—a potential focal point in the next phase of internal struggles.

The existing version of the Regulations on Promoting the Ability of Leading Cadres to Rise and Fall lists 15 specific situations in which officials are deemed unsuitable to hold their current positions.

Among these, condition (5) states, “violating the Party's democratic centralism principles, acting arbitrarily or weakly and dispersively, disregarding orders...engaging in nepotism, forming cliques.”

Condition (8) states, “lacking leadership ability, unable to effectively fulfill duties, or failing to meet target requirements, with poor progress in advancing major strategies, important reforms, or key tasks, and work in one’s charge persistently lagging or experiencing significant errors.”

Condition (9) states, “making decisions in violation of rules, or with insufficient or imprudent decision-making assessment.”

Condition (10) states, “having prominent issues with formalism or bureaucratism, causing negative effects.”

Condition (14) states, “unable to perform work duties normally for over one year due to health reasons.”

These provisions could be applied by various factions to the CCP leader. Now that the Politburo has raised “promoting the ability of leading cadres to rise and fall,” if Xi Jinping is forced to accept it, ultimately stepping down for health reasons, perhaps everyone could accept this outcome as a way to cover up the internal chaos as much as possible.

Zhang Youxia Still Seated in the Old Position?

On the afternoon of October 28, the CCP Politburo held a collective study session. In a video by CCTV, Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, was still seated in the second row behind the Politburo Standing Committee table, with He Weidong continuing to sit in the front row, suggesting that He Weidong still ranks higher than Zhang Youxia among Politburo members. However, in recent military events, Zhang Youxia has repeatedly appeared publicly, while He Weidong has been absent.

On October 15, Zhang Youxia met with the visiting Russian Defense Minister. On October 17, during Xi Jinping’s inspection of a Rocket Force brigade in Anhui, Zhang Youxia accompanied him.

From October 20 to 22, a joint training meeting of the CCP military was held in Zhangjiakou, Hebei Province, where Zhang Youxia observed, participated in discussions and summarized, yet Xi Jinping’s remarks during the inspection of the Rocket Force were not mentioned, nor was there any reference to “political restructuring” or “building the military politically,” nor to following Xi Jinping’s command or expressions of loyalty.

From October 24 to 26, Zhang Youxia visited Vietnam, meeting with Vietnamese leaders including General Secretary Su Linh, President Luong Cuong, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, a high-level reception. The CCP’s Premier Li Qiang had just visited Vietnam from October 13 to 14 and met with these three leaders.

If Zhang Youxia’s visit was merely for discussing military cooperation, it would not require three of Vietnam’s “four pillars” leaders to meet with him. The CCP Ministry of Defense’s statement did not disclose details of their specific military cooperation discussions, but it stated that Zhang Youxia expressed the desire to “follow the trend of history... and continuously strengthen exchanges and cooperation in political, economic, security, cultural, and other fields.” This seems to go beyond the purview of a Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, as though he is showing that he has acquired greater power.

The newly appointed President of Vietnam, Luong Cuong, previously served as the Director of the General Political Department of the Vietnamese military. In May of this year, he became the Executive Secretary of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of Vietnam, and in October, he assumed the role of President. Zhang Youxia met with him, potentially indicating an expression of equivalence.

Is Wang Xiaohong Also Eager to Show Expanded Authority?

From October 15 to 16, Wang Xiaohong conducted an inspection in Tianjin. Xinhua reported that he visited relevant enterprises to gain detailed knowledge of production and operation. He also stated the need to “promote continuous economic recovery... take effective measures in stimulating the vitality of business entities, building a unified national market, and expanding institutional openness, while developing new productive forces suited to local conditions.”

Wang Xiaohong’s role in the Central Committee Secretariat and as a State Councilor is due to his position as Minister of Public Security, but he has not been granted authority over economic matters. The State Council of China includes a Premier, four Vice Premiers, and a Secretary-General, which likely leaves no room for Wang Xiaohong to oversee economic issues.

However, from October 19 to 21, Wang Xiaohong also conducted an inspection in Xinjiang, visiting the Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Bayingolin Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture, and the Sixth Division of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. Xinhua reported that he visited various industrial parks, planting bases, enterprises, communities, and grassroots public security units, gaining detailed insights into economic operations and maintaining stability and security. Wang Xiaohong also stated, “we must ensure the effective implementation of existing policies while precisely implementing a package of new policies.”

In these rare economic inspection activities, Wang Xiaohong completely echoed a series of speeches by Xi Jinping, as though he was fervently supporting the CCP leader, though it cannot be ruled out that he may also be building his own influence.

During the Politburo’s collective study session on October 28, Wang Xiaohong was still seated in the third row, in the primary seat for quasi-Politburo Standing Committee members. He has likely long desired to move forward in seating. The newly appointed General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Su Linh, previously served as Vietnam’s Minister of Public Security, became President in May of this year, and took on the role of General Secretary in July. Wang Xiaohong undoubtedly aspires to continue rising, possibly even harboring ambitions of reaching the top.

The CCP Politburo meeting’s sudden mention of “strictly implementing democratic centralism and promoting the ability of leading cadres to rise and fall” likely signals the official beginning of a more intense internal power struggle.

Originally published byDajiyuan

Responsible Editor: Gao Yi