Is Chairman Xi No Longer Involved in 'Decision-Making Deployments'?

Is the military still following orders? Xi Jinping is uncertain! (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

[People News] On September 11, the military newspaper and military network of the Chinese Communist Party published an article titled 'Persisting in Advancing National Defense and Military Modernization with a Correct View of Achievements.' This article summarizes the outcomes of recent military-related educational initiatives and was authored by a reporter from the party media outlet Xinhua News Agency, rather than a military newspaper reporter.

While Xinhua's reports occasionally appear in the military newspaper and military network, it is generally the case that summaries of military conditions are primarily written by military journalists. The fact that this report on the military's educational achievements was penned by a party media reporter raises questions: does this indicate a lack of trust in the military, or is it a means of conveying some form of high-level information?

Notably, the report opens with the statement, 'All levels of the military resolutely implement the decision-making deployments of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, deeply study and implement Chairman Xi's important discourse on establishing and practicing a correct view of achievements, and earnestly learn and implement the spirit of Chairman Xi's important speeches and instructions.' The concluding paragraph states, 'Resolutely and effectively implement the major decision-making deployments of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and the spirit of Chairman Xi's important instructions.'

Isn't it peculiar that the phrase 'All levels of the military resolutely implement the decision-making deployments of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission' omits any mention of 'Chairman Xi'?

A similar oddity was observed in the editorial published by the Chinese Communist Party's military network and the Military Daily on August 1 of this year. The editorial primarily emphasizes the significance of "the Party commanding the gun." While it notes that "the fundamental aspect lies in Chairman Xi's leadership and guidance by Xi Jinping Thought," the concluding paragraph includes the loyalty phrase "two four four two." However, a notable change appears in one section of the article, which states that "the entire military must unify its thoughts and actions with the decision-making and deployment of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission," without any mention of "Chairman Xi."

Since Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, particularly at the height of his authority, military statements have typically included phrases like "resolutely implementing the decision-making and deployment of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi," and "the entire military must unify its thoughts and actions with the major decision-making and deployment of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi." Occasionally, references to "the Central Military Commission" are omitted, but the mention of "Chairman Xi" remains essential. Furthermore, expressions that elevate "Chairman Xi" above the Military Commission are not uncommon.

For instance, on February 4, 2017, the Military Daily published a report titled "Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission: Firmly Safeguarding the Core and Resolutely Listening to the Party's Command," which stated, "resolutely implementing the decision-making instructions of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi," and "the decision-making and deployment of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi...".

On November 2, 2022, the Central Military Commission issued a document titled "Several Opinions on Deepening the Implementation of the Chairman of the Military Commission's Responsibility System," which stated, "further strengthening the political consciousness of implementing the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission, and putting Chairman Xi's and the Military Commission's decision-making and deployment into practice."

Even after the news of Xi Jinping's stroke in July 2024, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has superficially shown support for Xi in an effort to conceal the truth. For example, in the editorial of the military newspaper on August 1, 2025, it stated that "the entire military must resolutely implement the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi."

The omission of Chairman Xi from the phrase "the entire military must resolutely implement the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission" raises an important question: does this imply that Xi can still issue directives and make statements for everyone to learn from, but is no longer involved in the actual decision-making and deployments?

Examining the specific report from September 11, while it mentions various military branches learning Xi's thoughts, speeches, and spirit, the "Party" consistently takes precedence over Xi. The learning by the military branches does not seem to express loyalty as it did in the past.

In the author's opinion, this report, along with Defense Minister Dong Jun's emphasis in his August 1 speech on "listening to the Party and following the Party," the military magazine featuring Xi on the cover for four consecutive months, and the unusually high-profile statements from senior officials like Li Qiang, all suggest that Xi's power status is diminishing. Whether this is due to health issues or other factors, there are increasing signs that the CCP is preparing for the "post-Xi Jinping" era.

(First published by the People News) △