Dark clouds loom over Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. (Feng Li/Getty Images)
[People News] On July 23, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council recently issued the "Opinions on Strengthening Social Work in the New Era" (hereinafter referred to as the "Opinions"), which outlines strategies for improving social work in this new era.
A thorough examination of the "Opinions" indicates that the CPC is grappling with a significant political and social crisis, leading to a sense of urgency. Instead of seeking fundamental solutions, the Party aims to tighten its grip on society to maintain its regime.
The CPC stresses the importance of strengthening grassroots governance and building grassroots power. It plans to extend its management practices to rural areas, communities, enterprises, new economic organizations, new social organizations, and new employment groups. Specifically, this involves enhancing the so-called "Party building work" for mixed-ownership enterprises, micro-enterprises, individual businesses, professional markets, social groups, foundations, social service agencies, social intermediary organizations, and new employment groups, effectively placing them under Party control. In essence, the CPC intends to exert control across all sectors, leaving no gaps to prevent mass protests.
Regarding the improvement of petition work, resolving conflicts at their early stages, and strengthening basic guarantees, the underlying goal is also to avert the occurrence of mass protests.
Using 2025 as a reference, collective protest events in mainland China exhibited an increasing trend that year, with records showing multiple protests occurring throughout the year. Among the most notable incidents was the summer case of bullying and abuse of minors in Jiangyou, Sichuan, which prompted thousands of citizens to take to the streets in protest and confront the police. An alleged poisoning incident at a kindergarten in Tianshui, Gansu, drew strong criticism from family members and the public. Additionally, grassroots farmers in the Yunnan-Guizhou region staged collective protests against the enforced cremation policy and the ban on burials. In Kunming, Yunnan, street vendors clashed with urban management authorities over their resistance to regulatory changes; delivery riders in Changsha organized a united demonstration; protests for rights protection emerged following a medical accident involving 'Little Luoxi' in Ningbo; and land rights disputes arose among residents in Hainan and other regions, among other incidents.
In the first half of 2026, collective protest events in mainland China showed no signs of abating. Many areas witnessed collective wage demands and strikes, while numerous victims of financial fraud continued to petition and seek redress. Furthermore, in Maoming, Guangdong (Xinyi City), large-scale protests and clashes with police erupted due to the proximity of a funeral home to residential areas, with protesters even throwing objects at riot police. Residents in Hefei, Anhui, also launched environmental protests against the planning of a garbage transfer station, among other activities.
While the reasons behind public protests differ, they all stem from the authoritarian one-party system of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In this system, which lacks public oversight and checks and balances, officials at all levels prioritize their own interests and career advancement, all while claiming to "serve the people" and uphold the principle of "people first". In reality, they focus on harming the populace and achieving political gains. Furthermore, under the CCP's emphasis on "money and power", societal morals have significantly declined. Many individuals have abandoned basic ethical standards, leading to rampant crimes such as fraud, murder, and organ harvesting. The safety of people's lives and property is facing unprecedented threats, prompting localized protests out of sheer frustration.
In response to the escalating public protests, the CCP's approach has been to tighten control, as clearly outlined in the recently released "Opinions". In an authoritarian regime, strict control not only diminishes social vitality and stifles economic and innovative growth but also allows crises to build up over time. This reflects the current state of Chinese society; when the accumulated discontent finally erupts, it will unleash destructive power.
Notably, the "Opinions" emphasize the need to adhere to the guidance of "Xi Jinping Thought", implement the spirit of the CCP's 20th National Congress and subsequent plenary sessions, and diligently execute the directives from the Fourth Plenary Session. It also stresses the importance of "upholding the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee and enhancing the working mechanism for implementing the Party Central Committee's decisions and deployments regarding social work". The document frequently reiterates the Party's leadership.
This situation clearly contrasts with Xi Jinping's directives on social work and the Central Social Work Conference held in November 2024. Reports from state media at that time indicated that neither Xi's directives nor the speech delivered by Cai Qi, a member of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China and Secretary of the Central Secretariat, mentioned the phrase 'upholding the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee.'
In several recent articles, the author has highlighted some unusual developments among the senior leadership of the Communist Party of China. For instance, during the technology conference held in July, the images released by state media featured fewer photos of Xi alone with award winners, while the number of photos showing the seven Standing Committee members with award winners increased. Additionally, images of Xi waving as he entered and shaking hands with representatives were omitted.
On July 12, when Xi visited the Xincun residential area in Huangpu District, Shanghai for an inspection, state media surprisingly published images showing that Shanghai Secretary Chen Jining was nearly half a head taller than Xi.
On the same day, a report on a research visit by Liu Guozhong, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council, in Beijing stated that there should be a thorough study and implementation of Xi's 'important instructions and the spirit of the Central Political Bureau meeting, as well as the deployment of the State Council's executive meeting.' The unusual combination of 'learning and implementing Xi's directives and the spirit of the Central Political Bureau meeting' followed closely by 'implementing the deployment of the State Council's executive meeting' is quite rare. This emphasizes both the 'spirit of the Central Political Bureau meeting' and the 'deployment of the State Council's executive meeting.'
Furthermore, the military's 'Liberation Army Pictorial' continues to exclude references to 'Xi' from its cover and content, and the organizing body of the 'Strong Army Discussion Forum' remains downgraded, among other issues.
Does this situation once again validate the notion that Xi Jinping's power is constrained, and that the senior leadership of the Communist Party of China has come to a consensus regarding the mechanism of 'centralized and unified leadership'? If Xi were as powerful as he once was, the circumstances described above would not have arisen.
(Originally published by People News) △

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