Kim Jong-un Angrily Rejects Xi Jinping; Wang Huning Humiliates Himself with Visit to Pyongyang

Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un have put on a remarkable performance of Tail Wags the Dog. (video)

[People News] Recently, there has been a surge in high-level interactions between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and North Korea. On July 15, Wang Huning, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, led a delegation to North Korea to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between China and North Korea, and to implement the strategic consensus reached between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un.

According to the diplomatic principle upheld by the CPC, smaller countries lack diplomatic power. In this diplomatic engagement between China and North Korea, CPC officials were expected to take the lead. However, the reality starkly contradicted Xi Jinping's expectations. Publicly available videos and meeting scenes revealed a complete reversal of roles during this 'friendly visit.' High-ranking CPC officials appeared overly respectful and submissive, resembling elementary school students being lectured by North Korea's supreme leader, Kim Jong-un, who exuded an air of arrogance and dominance. This was far from a routine diplomatic visit; it felt more like a change in leadership of the friendship boat between China and North Korea. Xi Jinping not only failed to maintain control over Kim Jong-un but also actively sought to ingratiate himself. Wang Huning's visit can rightly be described as a self-humiliating kneeling visit to North Korea.

Firstly, foreign media reported that from July 15 to 17, 2026, Wang Huning was invited to visit North Korea, where he held talks with Kim Yo-jong, the General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, and jointly attended a commemorative reception with North Korean Premier Pak Tae-song. During the discussions, Wang Huning reiterated the need to implement the agreements reached during Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea last month with Kim Jong-un, emphasizing the importance of 'firmly grasping the direction of the advancement of China-North Korea relations.' However, the CPC's party media reported Wang Huning's delegation's visit to North Korea in a very understated manner. Xinhua News Agency emphasized the 'traditional friendship' and strategic cooperation between China and North Korea but did not provide any on-site video.

Secondly, the delegation from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for this visit is of a high caliber, led by Wang Huning, the fourth-ranking official and a key advisor. Liu Haixing, the Minister of the International Liaison Department, and Sun Haiyan, the Deputy Minister, also accompanied him to North Korea. Both Liu and Sun were part of the entourage during Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea last month. In 2011, during the 50th anniversary of the China-North Korea Friendship Treaty, a delegation led by Zhang Dejiang, a member of the Politburo and Vice Premier of the State Council, visited North Korea. The current delegation's status is clearly higher than that of 15 years ago, underscoring the importance Xi Jinping places on this visit.

However, this high-profile visit did not yield the expected reciprocal respect and proper etiquette; instead, it resulted in a public, direct, and precise diplomatic humiliation.

Videos and images circulating on platform X depict Kim Jong-un sitting alone on one side of the conference table, facing a row of Chinese representatives led by Wang Huning. The Chinese officials sit stiffly, their expressions humble, as if they are paying homage to the 'Supreme Commander of the Universe.' Kim Jong-un appears calm in front of the CCP officials, even adopting a lecturing tone, while the Chinese personnel bow and nod, showing utmost respect. Such scenes have ignited heated discussions on X, with some referring to it as 'the treatment of house slaves on a visit' and stating 'in Kim Jong-un's eyes, Wang Huning is just a servant.' These visual impacts undermine the CCP's official narrative of being a great power, revealing the true dynamics of China-North Korea relations. While they superficially refer to each other as brothers, in reality, Kim Jong-un has already understood the CCP's inner workings. Last year, during Li Qiang's visit to North Korea, Kim Jong-un treated him similarly, indicating that Kim, the 'Fat Third,' is well aware of Xi Jinping's imperial mindset. Kim Jong-un is effectively instructing Xi Jinping on the proper way to treat subordinates, which can be considered a textbook example.

Third, following Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea in June, North Korean Premier Pak Tae-sung visited China from the 10th to the 12th. During his visit, Pak Tae-sung received a high-level reception from Xi Jinping, Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, and other top five members of the Communist Party of China. This marks the first time in 15 years that a North Korean Premier has made a solo visit to China, yet the Chinese Communist Party refrained from mentioning North Korea's nuclear issues or denuclearization. The initiative remains in Kim Jong-un's hands, and Xi Jinping has given him considerable face. However, Wang Huning's high-profile return visit to North Korea has been met with a consistent display of inequality and humiliation from Kim Jong-un, suggesting that the three chubby leaders do not hold Xi Jinping in high regard.

Both China and North Korea are accelerating their political, economic, cultural, and strategic communications through the 65th anniversary treaty. However, in the context of increasingly close ties between North Korea and Russia, China's actions seem more like a passive attempt to reinforce its influence over Pyongyang. The response has been akin to a scene of 'self-inflicted humiliation.'

Why is Xi Jinping, who is known for his concern about face, able to tolerate humiliation from Kim Jong-un?

The primary reason lies in North Korea's pragmatic shift in diplomatic strategy, which places the Communist Party of China in a precarious position in geopolitical contests. Historically, North Korea has been seen as the little brother of the Communist Party, heavily dependent on China's economic and geopolitical support. However, following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Pyongyang has provided ammunition and military support to Russia in exchange for military technology, food, and economic assistance, successfully balancing its relations between China and Russia. Kim Jong-un is no longer tied to a single relationship but is instead demonstrating flexibility by actively pursuing a strategic partnership with Russia, thereby gaining greater geopolitical leverage.

North Korea, situated on the peninsula, serves as a geopolitical hub in East Asia and is vital for the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) control in the region. Historically, the CCP could manipulate Pyongyang through economic sanctions or aid; however, with Kim Jong-un now having the significant backing of Russia, his confidence has greatly increased. China is worried that North Korea may further align with Moscow and engage in more provocative actions, which could disrupt stability in Northeast Asia. In response, Xi Jinping visited North Korea last month, followed closely by Wang Huning, both of whom aimed to reaffirm China's role as an 'irreplaceable protector.' Nevertheless, the outcomes indicate that these efforts have yielded limited results. While Kim Jong-un voiced support for the 'One China' principle during their meeting, he did not make any substantial concessions regarding nuclear issues or strategic compliance. Instead, he used the opportunity to strengthen his own narrative power. Kim Jong-un's 'one-to-many' address to Wang Huning underscores this shift in power dynamics.

A deeper underlying reason for this situation is Xi Jinping's inner envy of the Kim dynasty. Despite North Korea being the 'little brother' in terms of geography and size, with the CCP as the 'big brother,' North Korea is a pioneer in authoritarian governance and the personal centralization of leadership. This year, Kim Jong-un revised the constitution to explicitly enshrine the perpetual ruling power of the Kim family dynasty into the fundamental law, thereby institutionalizing hereditary succession. This achievement is something Xi Jinping cannot replicate. While Xi Jinping is currently promoting a system of personal lifelong rule, he has yet to fully transform China into a 'Xi Jinping family dynasty.' He is constantly contemplating how to learn from Kim Jong-un, aiming to further 'Koreanize' China by enhancing personal worship, reinforcing family succession signals, and limiting the influence of internal party factions.

Xi Jinping's envy is clearly evident in his diplomatic approach towards North Korea. During his visit, Kim Jong-un extended a high-level reception, and there was a familial exchange between the two leaders, but it was the Chinese side that seemed more eager to curry favor. Park Tae-sung received special treatment during his visit to China, while Wang Huning faced a reprimanding atmosphere during his return visit, underscoring the inequality in their interactions. Kim Jong-un understands the strategic needs of the Chinese Communist Party, such as maintaining a buffer on the Korean Peninsula, countering the US-Japan-South Korea alliance, and alleviating international pressure. This allows him to adeptly navigate relations between China and Russia while securing advantages from Beijing. In the context of authoritarianism, strength and hereditary succession are often seen as more appealing than outright dictatorship.

Wang Huning, as a key figure in the Chinese Communist Party, has witnessed three generations of leadership and is recognized as the party's political strategist. His concepts like the 'Chinese Dream' and 'Chinese-style modernization' are highly regarded by Xi Jinping. However, during this visit to North Korea, he appeared diminished in front of Kim Jong-un. Xi Jinping's party-building ideology does not align with North Korea's 'Juche' philosophy or the Kim family's hereditary governance. Wang Huning's subservience reflects the true power dynamics; when confronted with a more entrenched and family-oriented dictator, the senior leadership of the CCP tends to belittle itself.

At the core of Xi Jinping's envy of Kim Jong-un is his aspiration for 'sustainable rule.' Following Kim Jong-un's constitutional amendment that solidified hereditary succession, Xi Jinping may be increasingly eager to learn from Pyongyang to steer China towards a more familial and hereditary governance model, despite the inherent risks this poses within a modern state framework.

Wang Huning's visit to North Korea turned out to be a self-inflicted embarrassment, revealing the true nature of China-North Korea relations. Kim Jong-un, with his geopolitical flexibility and dynastic exclusivity, maintains a strong advantage. In contrast, Xi Jinping's attempts at softening and flattery arise from an intense desire for perfect centralization and a compulsion to replicate such a system. In Xi Jinping's view, the path of China adopting North Korean characteristics represents the ultimate confidence in the system, regardless of the catastrophic consequences it may impose on the Chinese people.

(First published by the People News)△