Xi’s Deep-Seated Suspicion Drives Purge, Ousting 6 Military NPC Delegates

Dark clouds loom over Tiananmen Square in Beijing. (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

[People News] The shock from Zhang Youxia's downfall is still resonating, and Xi Jinping's extensive purge of military leaders shows no signs of abating. On June 26, the Chinese Communist authorities announced the termination of the National People's Congress representative qualifications for 15 officials, which includes 2 air force generals, 1 army general, 2 army lieutenant generals, and 1 air force lieutenant general.

This brings the total number of high-ranking generals purged since the 14th National People's Congress to an astonishing 42, including 19 generals. Additionally, the suspicious circumstances surrounding the 15th individual, Zhang Anjiang, whose reported "death due to illness" has sparked speculation about suicide by jumping.

In light of this series of alarming purges, political commentators, military analysts, and intelligence agencies both domestically and internationally have noted that Xi Jinping's actions have transformed his frequently mentioned "strong military dream" into a "strong military nightmare."

1. The Air Force and Joint Logistics, Cyber Forces are entirely compromised

Military experts from outside China have first drawn attention to the shocking "distribution of arms" among the purged generals.

Previously, it was thought that the purges were confined to the Rocket Force and the Equipment Development Department, but this latest list reveals that the Air Force, Joint Logistics Support Forces, and even the recently reorganized "Cyber Forces" commander Zhang Minghua have all been implicated.

The recent downfall of high-ranking officials, including Air Force Political Commissar Guo Pu and former Minister of Equipment Development Xu Xueqiang, highlights the deep-seated corruption within the modernized air force, high-tech network forces, and logistics support system that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has built with immense national resources. Analysts suggest that this situation reaffirms the internal unspoken rules of the CCP military: 'the best weapons are exported, second-rate ones are reserved for domestic use, and a significant portion of military funds is embezzled during procurement.' Such a military is fundamentally unfit to engage in modern high-intensity warfare in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea.

2. Surpassing Stalin-style Political Paranoia

International political scholars have drawn parallels between this incident and the 'Great Purge' of the Soviet army during Stalin's era in the 1930s.

Xi Jinping has been in power for over a decade, and the military's upper echelons have seen numerous replacements, predominantly consisting of his personally appointed 'Xi's Army.' Yet, by 2026, generals and lieutenant generals continue to fall in large numbers, akin to harvesting leeks. Analysts indicate that this reflects the ultimate paranoia of a dictatorial regime—Xi Jinping has lost trust in everyone.

The dismissal of 42 generals may implicate thousands of lower-ranking officers at the division and regiment levels. This extensive purging has thoroughly disrupted the military's normal command structure.

This is why the authorities dedicated 10 weeks to confine the surviving generals at the National Defense University for 'marching drills and formation practice' to ensure compliance. This is not an initiative for promoting integrity; rather, it is a fear-driven, high-pressure effort to maintain stability during a time of extreme turmoil and fragmentation within the military.

3. The Frenzied Accumulation of Wealth and Infighting at the End of a Mutual Destruction System

In addition to military personnel, the list also includes Ma Xingrui (a member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Xinjiang Party Committee), Li Yunze (Director of the National Financial Supervision and Administration), Hu Henghua (former Deputy Secretary of the Chongqing Municipal Committee and Mayor), Guo Yonghang (former Secretary of the Guangzhou Municipal Committee), former Director of the National Financial Supervision Administration Li Yunze, as well as local and financial officials like Fei Gaoyun and Guo Yonghang, alongside the suspicions surrounding Zhang Anjiang's alleged 'suicide'. Some commentators suggest that the continuous fall of so many officials indicates that the treasury of Zhongnanhai has been completely drained, with the vast wealth amassed through corruption by these fallen officials being funneled back into the treasury to fill the gap.

Ma Xingrui, whose status as a National People's Congress representative has been revoked, has long been seen as a representative of the 'aerospace faction' and technocrats during Xi Jinping's leadership. Sharing a hometown in Yuncheng, Shandong, with Xi Jinping's wife, Peng Liyuan, he has been viewed as a trusted member of the 'Peng faction' by outsiders. Ma Xingrui has held positions such as General Manager of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, Governor of Guangdong Province, Secretary of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Party Committee, and a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. However, after being unexpectedly transferred from Xinjiang in July 2025, he went missing and was officially reported to have fallen from power in April 2026. He is currently under investigation by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and had his qualification as a National People's Congress representative revoked in June of the same year.

Ma Xingrui's downfall breaks the unwritten rule within the CCP that 'criminal charges do not apply to current Politburo members'. He is not merely a regional leader; his true core power identity is that of a 'member of the Politburo of the Central Committee' (a high-ranking official at the vice-state level).

Following the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the Politburo has become entirely dominated by Xi Jinping's faction. Initially, many observers believed that after the Congress solidified the party leader's absolute authority, the internal 'distribution system' within the Politburo had become stable. It was generally assumed that, barring a rebellion similar to the Lin Biao incident, the members of the Politburo would not be easily removed, as this would undermine the collective image of 'the leader's wisdom and merit-based appointments.'

However, the fall of Ma Xingrui has shattered this political safety net. This sends a chilling message to the entire party: even a 'vice-state-level' leader who is part of the core decision-making circle in Zhongnanhai and meets with the party leader daily can find themselves on the midnight list if the leader's suspicions arise.

(First published in People News)
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