Photo Caption: The first session of the 14th National People's Congress will open on March 5, 2023, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China. (Photo by Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)
[People News] Following an analysis of the collective study session held by the Party Group Theory Learning Center of the CPPCC at the end of May, which only referenced the 'two establishments' and the 'resolute safeguarding of the authority of the Party Central Committee and centralized unified leadership' without mentioning 'safeguarding Xi's core,' and the unusual absence of synchronized learning by CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning as seen in previous instances, another peculiar event has emerged within the CPPCC.
On June 8, coinciding with Xi Jinping's flight to North Korea, the eighth group of the CPPCC 'Xi Thought' study seminar convened its second quarter learning seminar for 2026 to discuss Xi's diplomatic thoughts. Participants included CPPCC Vice Chairman Mu Hong, CPPCC Vice Chairman and Chairman of the Zhigong Party Central Committee Jiang Zuojun, CPPCC Foreign Affairs Committee Deputy Secretary He Ping, Deputy Secretaries Liu Jieyi and Li Fei, and member Wang Bingnan, among others, some of whom have backgrounds in media and diplomacy.
The report, after extolling Xi's diplomatic thoughts as a crucial component of 'Xi Thought' and a product of the 'two combinations,' also highlighted the concepts of 'establishing' and 'safeguarding.' It emphasised the necessity to 'effectively align thoughts and actions with the analysis and judgment of the international situation and the decision-making strategies of foreign affairs by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, with Xi at its core.'
Interestingly, in the following third paragraph, the committee members unanimously declared, "We must always uphold the comprehensive leadership of the Communist Party of China, particularly the centralised and unified leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and ensure that foreign affairs are under the authority of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China." While this statement was highlighted during the foreign affairs meeting led by Xi Jinping at the end of 2023, it was notably placed at the end of the reports that year. All senior officials of the Communist Party of China understand that this is merely a façade for external audiences; the real control over foreign affairs lies solely with Xi Jinping.
This is indeed the reality. Xi, who is eager to establish a community with a shared future for mankind and to lead the world, has been consolidating his power since the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2017, taking charge of the party's foreign affairs. On one hand, Xi frequently makes appearances on the international stage; on the other hand, he promotes the "Belt and Road" initiative globally, aiming to bring multiple countries under the influence of the Communist Party of China. The "wolf warrior" diplomacy employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also favoured by Xi, who has completely abandoned Deng Xiaoping's strategy of "hiding one's capabilities and biding one's time."
The Communist Party of China's expansion and infiltration worldwide, combined with U.S. President Trump's election in 2016 and his re-election in 2024, which positioned the Communist Party of China as the "number one enemy," along with the damage inflicted by the party during the three-year pandemic and the negative effects of its policies on host countries, as well as its support for Russia and Iran, have awakened more governments and citizens globally. This has resulted in repeated failures in Xi's diplomatic efforts, a significant decline in his international image, and increasing isolation of the Communist Party of China on the global stage. Xi's reputation within the party and among the public is deteriorating rapidly.
In July 2024, following reports of Xi Jinping's stroke from the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China (CPC), his influence within both the military and the party experienced a temporary decline, a trend that continued into early 2026. However, in January 2026, after Xi ousted Zhang Youxia, the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission who wielded significant military power, Xi appeared to reclaim some of his authority, resuming his directives through state media.
Nevertheless, Xi Jinping, who violated the principle of 'centralised and unified leadership' established at the Fourth Plenary Session of the CPC, faces challenges in regaining his former peak of power. The military's passive responses towards Zhang and Liu, along with the brainwashing campaigns across various military branches promoting a 'correct view of achievements' while omitting any mention of 'Chairman Xi', coupled with the unusual statements from senior CPC officials—especially the recent reshuffling of several high-ranking officials, including the downfall of Wei Xiaodong, a former aide to Xi's office director Cai Qi and a member of the so-called 'Fujian Gang'—indicate a fierce power struggle within the CPC's upper ranks, where Xi does not seem to hold the advantage.
The ongoing irregularities within the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) suggest that the upper echelons may have secretly reached some form of agreement. This speculation is further supported by the recent statements from CPPCC members regarding Xi's diplomatic efforts, as such expressions have been notably rare in the past.
During four symposiums held in March, June, July, and November 2025, committee members expressed slightly varying opinions, which clearly reflect the shifts in how the power brokers have chosen to promote Xi following his loss of influence.
In the March statements, they initially stated, 'We must consciously align our thoughts and actions with the Central Committee of the CPC's scientific assessment of the current situation,' before referencing 'two four four two'. Notably, they did not mention 'Xi's core'.
In a report at the end of June, aside from praising 'Xi Thought', there was no mention of any loyalty language. The report at the end of July concerning the symposium first highlighted the importance of the Third Plenary Session, stating that 'learning the spirit of the Third Plenary Session is a major political task for the Foreign Affairs Committee both now and in the future', and that it is essential to 'effectively unify thoughts and actions with the spirit of the plenary session and the decision-making arrangements of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China', followed by a reference to '2442'. Yet, there was still no mention of 'Xi Core'.
By late November, during another meeting, the significance of the Fourth Plenary Session was again emphasised, followed by a mention of '2442', with a statement that it is necessary to 'accurately grasp the scientific judgments, decision-making intentions, target tasks, and strategic measures of the Party Central Committee', and still no reference to 'Xi Core'.
On March 30 of this year, at the first quarter learning symposium of the eighth group of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, both '2442' and the need to 'unify thoughts and actions with the judgment of the situation and decision-making arrangements of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China with Xi at the core' were mentioned. More than two months later, nearly the same group of individuals, while using similar expressions but omitting references to 'awareness' and 'confidence', also notably emphasised the necessity of adhering to 'the centralised and unified leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and maintaining diplomatic authority within the Central Committee'. This is certainly not a coincidence.
If this is not a coincidence, it suggests that there has indeed been some kind of operation within the upper echelons of the Communist Party that remains unknown to the outside world, and this is likely related to the distribution of power within the Party.
(People News first published) △
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