Ma Xingrui's Mental Breakdown During Review Period Leads to His Disappearance

Ma Xingrui implicates three national-level leaders as Xi&9;s faction faces a major purge (video)

[People News] Recently, internal reports have emerged indicating that He Weidong and Zhang Youxia are no longer in the picture. On April 24, self-media personality Lao Deng unexpectedly revealed that Ma Xingrui is no longer present during the review period, with the official internal notice attributing this to a sudden illness and ineffective rescue efforts. He also cited sources stating that this incident occurred more than two months after the review process was initiated.

Ma Xingrui Exposes National-Level Officials

Like the rumours surrounding He Weidong, Zhang Youxia, and others, there has been no confirmation from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regarding the news about Ma Xingrui, nor any other reliable sources to support it. However, in recent days, numerous overseas online media outlets have been reporting that Ma Xingrui disclosed a significant number of officials at the ministerial level and above during his interrogation, including several national-level officials.

On April 11, senior commentator Cai Shenkun made a significant revelation, stating that Ma Xingrui named three 'national-level' heavyweights during the investigation! They are former Vice President Zeng Qinghong, current Politburo Standing Committee member Li Xi, and former Vice President Wang Qishan. On platform X, the list revealed by Xie Wanjun and others also includes current Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong and former head of the Central Organisation Department Li Ganjie, among others.

Cai Shenkun is known for frequently disclosing insider information about high-ranking CCP officials, including advance warnings of their downfalls, which have mostly been confirmed by the CCP later. As a result, his reports often garner significant public attention. He claims to have unique sources of information.

Previously, several media outlets reported that former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong and former Military Commission member Miao Hua were investigated due to their connections with Ma Xingrui. It is said that they formed an alliance and attempted to seize control of the CCP after Xi Jinping's influence diminished.

So, has Ma Xingrui exposed any national-level big figures? Does he have any connections with these individuals? If he has indeed revealed the identities of these high-ranking officials who wield real power, then it is not out of the question that he could be eliminated. He might feel immense pressure, akin to a mountain on his shoulders, leading to mental exhaustion and potentially a heart attack, especially if timely medical assistance is not available. If the Communist Party of China deems him crucial and believes he cannot be silenced, he should be provided with medical personnel for rescue, or during the rescue process, he could be secretly treated and eliminated.

First, let’s discuss Ma Xingrui’s connections with these individuals. Many may wonder how Ma Xingrui, who has a technical background, became involved with these influential figures. In reality, the situation is much more complex than it appears. We need to rewind the timeline back 30 years.

Ma Xingrui’s relationship with Zeng Qinghong

Ma Xingrui began his career as a teacher at Harbin Institute of Technology in the 1980s. In May 1996, at just 36 years old, he was directly transferred to the China Academy of Space Technology, also known as the Fifth Academy of Aerospace, where he took on the roles of deputy director and deputy secretary of the party committee, achieving a bureau-level position. He would typically have been expected to advance within the education system, possibly moving into the ministry and commission system, following the 'academic bureaucrat path.' How did he suddenly transition into the military-industrial sector? This is nearly unprecedented in the promotion of cadres within the Communist Party.

Cai Shenkun's analysis clearly indicates that this move was the result of deep involvement and manoeuvring by Jiang Mianheng and Zeng Qinghong.

At that time, Zeng Qinghong was the key operator of the Organisation Department and the personnel chief for the entire Jiang Zemin era. He had the power to decide who went where without needing to make public announcements; a simple word from him would ensure the system complied automatically. Jiang Mianheng, due to his father Jiang Zemin's connections, had long been involved in sectors such as metallurgy, aerospace, and internet technology. Ma Xingrui, who had extensive networks in the industrial sector, likely ingratiated himself with Jiang Mianheng long ago. After Ma Xingrui took office at the Fifth Academy of Aerospace, he worked closely with Jiang Mianheng.

Jiang Mianheng later advanced in the aerospace sector. From 2004 onwards, he served as the deputy commander of Shenzhou 5, was the chief scientist for the 'Innovation 1' small satellite, and held the position of deputy leader of the lunar exploration project leadership group and deputy commander of the Chang'e project. By 2008, he became the deputy commander of Shenzhou 7, where Ma Xingrui's influence was clearly visible.

Ma Xingrui established a personal trust with the Jiang family that extended beyond a professional relationship—reportedly, during that time, he was even qualified to visit Jiang Zemin's home directly. This type of relationship has a specific form in the political ecology of the Chinese Communist Party: 'vassal loyalty.'

Following Xu Jiayin's downfall, revelations about his connections with Zeng Qinghong and Ma Xingrui surfaced, indicating that Ma Xingrui's ties with Zeng Qinghong and the Jiang family are indeed significant.

Of course, Ma Xingrui later aligned himself with the Xi family’s faction, advancing all the way to Xinjiang. This also suggests that the influence of the Jiang family and Zeng Qinghong is substantial enough to challenge Xi Jinping's authority within the Communist Party. Cai Shenkun analysed that in the current high-level structure of the Communist Party, Zeng Qinghong poses the greatest threat, possessing 'structural influence' that could potentially undermine Xi Jinping's power in extreme circumstances.

Why did Xi Jinping seek to remove his confidant Ma Xingrui? This question sheds light on the situation. Is it possible that Ma Xingrui mentioned Zeng Qinghong's name in such a challenging environment? The likelihood is quite high.

The Relationship Between Ma Xingrui and Li Xi

Li Xi currently serves as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and as the Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. He has been out of the public eye for over 20 days, with his last public update dating back to early April.

Interestingly, on the Xinhua News Agency's 'Li Xi Report Collection' webpage, all news regarding his phone calls and letters has been erased, indicating that all past communications he had, both domestically and internationally, have been deleted.

The most recent meeting activity recorded is from April 8 of this year, titled 'Emphasising at the National Inspection Work Conference...'. The latest investigation and research update is dated August 23, 2025, which discusses his emphasis on certain issues during a research trip in Shandong. In the meeting section, the latest entry is from September 4 of last year, noting that he met with the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba, President Díaz-Canel, and Zimbabwean President Mnangagwa. The outbound visit section is also stuck on last September's visit to Belarus, which is outdated news.

On the special page for Li Xi's activities on the Communist Party of China News website, the situation is similar, with even the 'letters and calls' section missing.

What has happened to Li Xi? Why is he also currently in a state of disappearance?

The connection between Ma Xingrui and Li Xi dates back to 2017. In January of that year, Ma Xingrui was appointed as the Governor of Guangdong Province, while Li Xi served as the Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Committee. The two worked together for four years, with one in the role of secretary and the other as governor. In the context of local power dynamics within the Chinese Communist Party, such a long-standing partnership between a secretary and a governor often signifies more than just administrative collaboration; it indicates a deep entanglement in personnel decisions, resource allocation, and major project decision-making, suggesting a collegial relationship.

Analyst Cai Shenkun highlights a crucial point: the relationship between the two is likely not simply one of 'superior and subordinate,' but rather involves cross-system exchanges of interests and collaborative power dynamics.

What specific exchanges of interests did they engage in while in Guangdong? How have they continued to interact since then? As a close confidant of Xi, Li Xi is also a trusted ally of Xi, and their dealings are known only to them. Thus, theoretically, if Ma Xingrui's downfall involves the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), then for Ma to implicate Li Xi would be tantamount to self-destruction.

On December 7, 2025, commentator Jiang Wangzheng disclosed that Ma Xingrui's case is under the full responsibility of Liu Jinguo, the top deputy secretary of the CCDI, and that Li Xi and his family are also implicated. On April 23, Jiang Wangzheng reported again that Li Xi had been suspended. These claims remain unverified, and the authorities have not released any information.

Additionally, there are reports suggesting that Li Xi's wife had financial connections with Ma Xingrui's wife, involving significant sums. Commentator Du Zheng noted that Li Xi needs to address issues related to his partner Ma Xingrui from their time in Guangdong, and Ma Xingrui may possess relevant evidence concerning Li Xi's tenure.

Recently, two former associates of Li Xi from his tenure in Liaoning—Xu Daqing and Zhou Liyuan—have both faced significant setbacks, which many observers interpret as a move to 'cut the hem' of Li. On April 13, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission announced on their official website that Xu Daqing, the former Party Secretary and Chairman of the Liaoning Province Transportation Construction Investment Group Co., Ltd., is currently under investigation for 'suspected serious violations of discipline and law.'

Public records indicate that Xu Daqing and Li Xi had direct interactions within the Liaoning political landscape. From April 2014 to May 2015, Li Xi served as the Governor of Liaoning Province, during which Xu Daqing was the Deputy Secretary-General of the Provincial Government. In May 2015, Li Xi was promoted to Secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Committee, and just six months later—in November 2015—Xu Daqing was elevated to Chairman and Party Secretary of the Liaoning Province Transportation Construction Investment Group.

What can we deduce from this relationship?

Additionally, Xu Daqing is not the only former subordinate of Li Xi in Liaoning to have encountered difficulties.

On January 18, Zhou Liyuan, aged 71, fell from grace after having been out of his position for many years. Zhou Liyuan is often referred to as Li Xi's 'steward' during his time in Liaoning, and his downfall is equally noteworthy.

Records show that when Li Xi became Governor of Liaoning Province in 2014, Zhou Liyuan served as the Secretary-General of the Provincial Government and Director of the General Office, directly assisting him for a year. Notably, Zhou Liyuan and Xu Daqing worked together for three and a half years.

With these two key former associates now facing issues, there is a widespread belief that Li Xi's situation is undergoing subtle changes.

The relationship between Ma Xingrui and Wang Qishan.

Wang Qishan was once a staunch supporter of Xi Jinping, providing significant backing during Xi's constitutional amendments. However, after the 19th National Congress, Wang did not secure a position in the Standing Committee and instead took on the largely ceremonial role of Vice President. Throughout Xi Jinping's first term, Wang Qishan took considerable risks, potentially alienating both party insiders and outsiders, under the pretext of anti-corruption efforts. He assisted Xi in removing 440 officials at the vice-ministerial level and above, effectively clearing various obstacles in just five years. During the constitutional amendment process, Wang actively supported Xi and even took the initiative to counter several Standing Committee members who opposed the changes. He believed that after helping Xi eliminate the factions associated with Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, Xi would view him as an ally and work collaboratively with him. However, following his departure from the Politburo Standing Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Zhao Leji began to marginalise officials that Wang had recommended, and Wang's closest secretary was labelled a 'serious corrupt element' and imprisoned.

Reports suggest that Ma Xingrui suffered a complete mental breakdown under intense political scrutiny, which has implicated 'political factions' involving figures like Zhang Youxia and Wang Qishan. This indicates that Wang had connections with high-ranking military officials such as Zhang Youxia, and since Ma had dealings with Zhang, he possessed evidence regarding Wang Qishan's political faction.

With Ma's passing, the internal conflicts within the Communist Party are intensifying.

To date, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has not confirmed these reports. The opaque nature of the CCP's system means that the public lacks the right to know, resulting in a flurry of analyses and speculations. However, historically, many of these analyses and speculations have later been validated. Thus, if we consider that Ma Xingrui is entangled in such a complex issue involving high-level factions, it is certainly possible that he could be removed from his position now. His situation should serve as a critical observation point ahead of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee.

Multiple insiders within the CCP have revealed that the investigation into Ma Xingrui has been planned for a considerable time. The nature of the Ma case goes beyond mere corruption; it has struck at the most sensitive political nerves in the power struggles within the CCP. The deeper significance of the Ma Xingrui case is that it signals the highest leadership's efforts to address political risks have entered a critical phase; any attempts to establish personal authority outside the power centre will face severe backlash from the system.

According to official sources from the CCP, in the first quarter of 2026, 56 provincial and ministerial-level officials were disciplined, which is four times the number of punishments during the same period in 2025. In the first quarter of 2026, 30 provincial and ministerial-level cadres were investigated, surpassing the total number of cases filed in the same periods of 2025 and 2024, which was 29.

It is likely that before the 21st National Congress next year, this kind of backlash and the CCP's anti-corruption campaign will intensify, with more high-profile figures, including big tigers, giant tigers, and fierce tigers, being brought to light, only to be ultimately confined back into iron cages.

Currently, the entire political landscape is marked by a silence reminiscent of the calm before a volcanic eruption, serving as a response to the recent backlash. In the cases involving Ma Xingrui, Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, and Liu Zhenli, there has been no surge of loyalty expressions from the party, government, and military. This collective silence not only indicates a profound fear regarding officials and the stability of the political sphere but is also indicative of the growing fragmentation within the Chinese Communist Party. △