Illustration: On March 12, 2023, CCP Politburo Standing Committee members Cai Qi and Li Xi attend a session of the National People’s Congress. (Noel Celis/AFP)
[People News] According to reports from the official media of the Chinese Communist Party, from April 23 to 24, Cai Qi, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Secretariat, who is also a close ally of Xi Jinping, conducted research and inspections in Datong City, Shanxi Province, focusing on establishing and implementing the correct view of political achievements in educational work. The report notably lacked Cai Qi's typical flattery and the usual slogans expressing loyalty to Xi. Importantly, in the third paragraph, there is a statement that reads: " We must deeply study Xi's 'important discourse and the vivid practice of adhering to the correct view of political achievements during his time in local work.'
The main issue with this statement is: why not mention learning from Xi's vivid practice of adhering to the correct view of political achievements during his entire work period? Instead, it only emphasises his performance during his local tenure. Given that CCP officials are expected to 'learn from examples,' there should be numerous instances of Xi's work at both local and central levels that officials can follow. Is Cai Qi's failure to mention Xi's adherence to the correct view of political achievements after entering Zhongnanhai due to a sense of guilt or fear?
Certainly, Cai Qi is not the first senior official to highlight Xi's adherence to the correct view of political achievements during his local work. A few days ago, in my article titled 'Qi Zhan Xi's Adherence to the Correct View of Political Achievements in Local Work, Wang Huning and Other Senior Officials in High-Level Black,' I noted that on April 17, a report regarding a study class held by the Party Group of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference to establish and implement the correct view of political achievements included the following statement: 'Everyone unanimously believes that during Xi Jinping's local work, he consistently adhered to the correct view of political achievements to achieve results, setting a brilliant example for the entire party.'
At that time, the author posed a question: High-ranking officials of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) praised Xi Jinping for maintaining a correct view of political achievements during his tenure in local government, which is commendable. So, after Xi moved to Beijing, transitioning from a member of the Politburo Standing Committee to the party leader, did he abandon this correct view? Is there no longer anything worth learning from him?
The author speculates that one reason for this is that these officials lack the authority to evaluate Xi's performance in Zhongnanhai; they can only assess his achievements from his time in local governance. After all, Xi's work in Hebei, Fujian, and Zhejiang has generally been well-regarded. However, not evaluating does not mean they are unaware that Chinese society under Xi's leadership is on the brink of collapse. Consequently, Xi's achievements are unimpressive, and his reputation both within the party and among the public is quite poor.
All high-ranking officials in the Communist Party of China are aware of this, and Cai Qi is certainly no exception. Whether Wang Huning and Cai Qi are acting intentionally or unintentionally, they are essentially engaging in subtle criticism. The saying goes, 'If the upper beam is not straight, the lower beam will be crooked.' Which of these officials, entrenched in the CCP for decades, does not understand this? They merely shout slogans and put on a façade. Despite the party leader's poor performance, they can still exaggerate his achievements; they can learn in a haphazard manner and create chaos, yet in terms of propaganda, everything seems to be going well.
Another reason for only highlighting Xi's adherence to the view of political achievements at the local level is that Xi, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, and other high-ranking officials believe that 'adhering to the correct view of political achievements' is directed at local officials, excluding themselves. How contradictory is this to their constant claims of 'serving the people'? Does this not reveal their hypocrisy?
On May 22, 2020, during the discussions of the Inner Mongolia delegation at the third session of the 13th National People's Congress, Xi Jinping stated: 'Party members and cadres, especially those in leadership positions, must clearly understand that the power they hold and the positions they occupy are granted by the Party and the people, intended for serving the Party and the people, and can only be used to benefit the populace. Leaders at all levels should cultivate a correct understanding of power, achievements, and their careers, steering clear of vanity, empty accomplishments, and the pursuit of false fame, and genuinely commit to serving the public and bringing benefits to their communities.'
Are Xi, Cai Qi, and Wang Huning considered 'leading cadres'? Shouldn't they also practice 'avoiding vanity, empty accomplishments, and the pursuit of false fame'? If they are not part of this group, then who are they? Does this not contradict their speeches directed at Party officials?
Moreover, according to the Communist Party of China, the essence of a correct view of achievements is to adhere to a people-centred development philosophy, prioritising the welfare of the people as the greatest achievement, and using public satisfaction as the standard for evaluation.' Xi has stated, 'To assess whether a cadre's performance is good, the key is to look at the public's opinion.' So, are the people of China currently satisfied with Xi and officials at all levels? How many of them enjoy a good reputation? The answer is evidently negative.
A decade ago, some internet users compiled a list of social chaos prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and compared it with the situation under the Communist Party of China, discovering that the Party not only matched each issue but often exceeded them. Specifically:
1. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, nearly 200,000 violent incidents occurred annually. In contemporary mainland China, protests against the government are frequent and escalating. Over the past decade, collective rights protection and violent protests have surged across the mainland, exacerbating tensions between the government and the populace, with public sentiment growing increasingly intense as people feel 'forced to rebel against the authorities.'
2. Before the Soviet Union's disintegration, the budgets for stability maintenance and national defence were roughly equal. In contrast, the Chinese Communist Party's budget for stability maintenance has consistently surpassed its national defence budget for many years. For instance, the CCP's national defence budget for 2025 is projected to be around 1.78 trillion to 1.81 trillion yuan, reflecting a year-on-year growth of 7.2%, with increases exceeding 7% for four consecutive years. Reports suggest that the budget for the armed police and stability maintenance initiatives is expected to match or even outpace the growth rate of the national defence budget.
3. Before the Soviet Union's collapse, young people were enthusiastic about civil service careers and the associated power. In recent years, the 'civil servant craze' in mainland China has not diminished. In 2021, nearly 1.2 million individuals registered for the civil service examination, an increase of 310,000 from the previous year. By 2025, over 3.4 million candidates passed the qualification review, with the actual number of participants in the written exam estimated to be between approximately 2.586 million and 2.831 million, with plans to recruit 39,700 individuals. What accounts for this trend? The current economic downturn, the withdrawal of foreign companies, and the widespread bankruptcy of private enterprises have left many young people struggling to find employment.
4. Before the Soviet Union's disintegration, corruption was widespread, often accompanied by special privileges. Today, the level of corruption within the CCP far surpasses that of the Soviet Union, with the vast fortunes of high-ranking officials such as Jiang Zemin, Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Xu Caihou, and Guo Boxiong—who have been exposed and prosecuted—provoking significant public outrage.
Fifth, high inflation was observed before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Currently, mainland China is facing rising inflation alongside deflation, exacerbated by the pandemic's effects, leaving ordinary citizens in a difficult situation.
Sixth, prior to the Soviet Union's disintegration, GDP was on the rise, yet the standard of living for the populace was continuously declining. This mirrors the current situation in mainland China, where even once-thriving cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen are now experiencing economic downturns, leading to an increasing number of citizens downgrading their consumption habits.
In this context, aside from those with vested interests, no one in China is satisfied. The leaders, including Xi Jinping, along with high-ranking officials, have merely been promoting one 'image project' after another, as well as 'face projects' and 'unfinished projects.' Where have they managed to satisfy the populace? Where have they gained a positive reputation? How much longer can the Chinese people tolerate a party leader and political party that prioritise grandstanding over the welfare of the people? The frequent emergence of serious social issues and the recurring ominous signs from above have already sounded the alarm for the Chinese Communist Party.
(First published by People News) △
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