Cai Qi Shakes the Foundations of the CCP State — Xi Jinping May Not Even Make It to 2027

On March 12, 2023, CCP Politburo Standing Committee members Cai Qi and Li Xi attend a session of the National People’s Congress. (Noel Celis/AFP)

[People News] The arrest of Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia means that of the six CMC members personally appointed by CCP leader Xi Jinping in 2022, only one now remains.

Observers believe this is not merely Zhang Youxia’s personal downfall. It marks a complete rupture between Xi and the families of his closest former allies, and could trigger systemic fractures within the armed forces—the pillar upon which the CCP regime relies—leading to an unprecedented political shockwave, comparable to the upheaval caused by Lin Biao’s defection in 1971.

Xi’s move against Zhang once again shows the world that in an authoritarian system there is no friendship, only interests. Every action by the party leader serves one purpose: to grip power tightly and secure his rule. Anyone who might shake that power—including former close partners—can be seen as a potential enemy.

Dictators are not only greedy for power but often driven by grand ambition.

Rumors have long circulated that Xi wants to rival Mao Zedong: from the high-profile celebration of the CCP’s centennial in 2021, to orchestrating a constitutional amendment in 2022 to secure a third term, to vowing to achieve “national reunification” even while threatening military action against Taiwan, and to plans to pursue a fourth term in 2027 while commemorating the PLA’s centenary. In that context, the rumors do not stand alone.

Zhang Youxia’s arrest occurred against this complex backdrop. Yet what concerns the international community is not simply whom Xi has purged. The United States worries that without General Zhang, the CCP leadership loses a “brake pad.” Japan fears Xi might resort to external military action to divert internal tensions. Taiwan fears Xi could replace seasoned commanders with political generals willing to gamble on war for promotion.

Although the event was sudden, the shock soon gave way to analysis. Media outlets, think tanks, and scholars worldwide have tried to piece together the causes and consequences.

Xi’s Move Against Zhang Suggests Pressure From a Crisis

Xi’s sudden arrest of Zhang Youxia has added multiple new uncertainties—almost all negative—to an already fragile CCP regime.

Had Xi not broken with Zhang, he might at least have maintained surface-level stability within the PLA. With Zhang gone, that possibility has vanished. The numerous crises facing China have lost a basic stabilizing factor. If one or more sectors erupt simultaneously, Xi could find himself powerless to respond, and the CCP could collapse rapidly.

So what major event forced Xi to take such a risky step?

As foreign media note, Zhang Youxia, already 72 at the 20th Party Congress, broke the informal retirement norm (“seven up, eight down”) and was even promoted to first vice chairman of the CMC, second only to Xi—something that surprised observers.

The BBC called Zhang’s sudden fall shocking: a 75-year-old top active-duty general with combat experience in the Sino-Vietnamese War, Xi’s closest military ally, and a fellow “princeling” from Shaanxi.

For years Zhang was seen as trusted by Xi, allowed to stay in office beyond the usual age limit and surviving multiple waves of military purges. Those assumptions are now history.

Former U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan described it as “an earthquake-level event.”

Analyst Niu Ben said the surprise lies in Xi’s willingness to purge even insiders who might normally be protected. Zhang was due to retire after the next Party Congress; letting him exit quietly would have been easy. Xi chose not to.

Germany’s Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung commented that no CCP leader since Mao has made such a forceful display of power. Zhang’s prestige and influence nearly rivaled Xi’s; he was the last military figure who could stand on equal footing. His removal will reverberate far beyond the military.

In a non-constitutional system reliant on the gun, once Xi believes his military support is unreliable, he will not hesitate to eliminate commanders.

Paranoia and a Loyalty Crisis

Zhang had been Xi’s most important ally in the military, entrusted with modernization and anti-corruption reforms. He played a key role in consolidating Xi’s power.

Now, without transparency, observers can only analyze official language. The most serious accusation against Zhang and Liu Zhenli was “seriously trampling on the CMC chairman responsibility system”—plainly meaning undermining Xi’s absolute leadership over the military.

French analyst Marc Julienne suggested the most likely explanation is that Xi began doubting Zhang’s loyalty.

Former CIA China analyst Dennis Wilder described Zhang as “a tough, blunt old goat” who, despite his alliance with Xi, was never truly subordinate. As a decorated war veteran, he may not have held deep respect for Xi, whose military background was limited to a short staff role.

Bloomberg noted Zhang’s fall intensifies uncertainty ahead of the 2027 leadership reshuffle. Zhang was one of the few with the influence to mobilize resistance against Xi’s potential fourth term.

Observers say this confirms that Xi’s obsession with power has reached an extreme, and the consequences of his purges are unpredictable.

Political Volcano Erupting

Le Monde wrote that Zhang’s fall shows no one near Xi is safe—not generals, Politburo members, or even top state leaders.

Yet Le Monde also noted that the swift official announcement suggests Xi’s camp is highly alert to possible backlash.

Unusually, after years of officials rushing to declare loyalty during purges, there has now been near-total silence. Former Party School professor Cai Xia said the arrests violate Party rules and lack internal legitimacy. The silence itself is a statement under Xi’s decade of high-pressure rule.

Democracy activist Tang Baiqiao cited insiders claiming Zhang and Liu were detained before formal Politburo approval, with procedures retroactively justified.

Yang Zi, writing in The Diplomat, warned their fall could trigger a military crisis, marking the most serious internal PLA turmoil since the Cultural Revolution. He predicts instability throughout 2026 and possible elite splits or even open confrontation.

Cai Qi as the Key Instigator

Blogger Shi Hua argued that Cai Qi was the real operator behind Zhang’s arrest.

Online rumors say Cai Qi placed Zhang under detention at a Central Guard Bureau facility and rapidly expanded the bureau’s force from 4,000 to 12,500 to prevent any rescue attempt.

Shi Hua suggests Xi, known for caution, may have been persuaded by Cai, who feared that if Xi failed to secure another term, Cai himself would be doomed. Controlling the security apparatus, Cai allegedly urged preemptive action.

While there is no hard evidence, Cai Qi’s past ruthlessness—such as winter evictions of migrant workers in Beijing—supports his reputation.

A Regime in Its Final Phase

Many ordinary Chinese, lacking power or weapons, can only watch events unfold, some even hoping intensified infighting will hasten the regime’s end. Others, shaped by state propaganda, worry that instability will worsen economic hardship and open the door to foreign influence.

Over the past decade, China has seen different internal power combinations—Xi-Wang, Xi-Li, Xi-Zhang. If a fourth Xi-Cai pairing emerges, critics say it would mark further decline.

The CCP, they argue, has entered the final stage of decay.

Judging by the broader trajectory, Xi Jinping may not even make it to the PLA’s 2027 centennial. If a single shot is fired somewhere, the Party — which claims the gun must always obey the Party — may meet its own end.

---