If Zhang Youxia Followed Zhang Guotao’s Path, Would the Outcome Be the Same?

Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, remarked that Xi&9;s faction has been entirely apprehended. (Video screenshot)

[People News] After Xi Jinping removed Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, reporting by military and state media again shifted tone. Xi has once more become the central figure in coverage, and top Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials have increased their public expressions of loyalty to him. Mentions of the “collective, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee” have become rare. Amid continuing instability, Xi’s foremost goal is to secure the military’s loyalty. Therefore, reviving the theme of “politically building the military” is unsurprising. Over the past year or more, when Zhang Youxia was effectively leading the military, greater emphasis had been placed on strengthening the military’s own capabilities.

On February 9, the PLA Daily’s “Great Wall Outlook” column published an article titled “Political Strength Is the Most Fundamental Strength,” which can be seen as a signal. The author is from the Political College of the National Defense University—apparently also an opportunist.

The article opens by declaring that “to build a strong military, one must first be strong politically; political strength is the most fundamental strength.” It quotes Xi’s words—“political character is the essential attribute of the military” and “we must first view military building from a political perspective”—to stress that “talking politics must always be the primary requirement.”

The entire article revolves around this point, though its logic is rather muddled. After circling around, what the author really wants to say is that “talking politics” means a question of “political stance,” learning to “guard against political risks,” and to “resolutely uphold and implement the CMC chairman responsibility system, obeying the command of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi in all actions.” In short, it demands loyalty to Xi. This suggests that many in today’s military are not truly loyal to Xi and have “problems” with their political stance.

The article cites the historical example of Zhang Guotao to argue that “whether one is politically reliable concerns the Party’s future and destiny, and the success or failure of its cause.” Some analysts believe the mention of Zhang Guotao may be an oblique reference to Zhang Youxia. In the first PLA Daily editorial after Zhang’s fall, heavy accusations were leveled at him: that he “seriously trampled and undermined the CMC chairman responsibility system, seriously encouraged political and corruption problems that affected the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and endangered the Party’s ruling foundation, seriously damaged the image and authority of the CMC leadership, and severely impacted the political and ideological foundation of unity and progress among officers and soldiers.” Some of these charges resemble those once used against Zhang Guotao.

As a negative example of betrayal in CCP narratives, Zhang Guotao has been repeatedly cited in Party writings. For instance, during the sensitive period of the Beidaihe meeting in August 2021, state media published Xi Jinping’s criticism of Zhang Guotao, in which Xi accused him of “using his control of troops to make himself important and setting up a separate central authority.”

Similarly, on May 1, 2021, the Party journal Qiushi published an article by Zhang Qingli, vice chairman of the CPPCC, titled “Safeguarding Party Unity and Centralized Leadership Is Crucial to the Party’s Rise or Fall—Reflections on Studying Party History.” The main message was that upholding Xi as the core and maintaining a high degree of consistency with him is of utmost importance, akin to following Mao Zedong Thought in the past. The subtext suggested not only placing Xi alongside Mao, but also revealing internal disunity and even signs of division within today’s CCP.

Notably, the article unusually cited early CCP leaders Zhang Guotao and Wang Ming as negative examples of “splitting the Party,” “blackmailing the central leadership,” and “placing personal authority above the central leadership.” However, the CCP’s characterization and vilification of Zhang Guotao and Wang Ming do not align with historical reality.

Take Zhang Guotao as an example. According to CCP and Zhang Qingli’s account, after the CCP fled north, when the First and Fourth Red Army Fronts met in June 1935, Zhang Guotao, leader of the Fourth Front Army, disagreed with the Central Committee over whether to go north or south. Relying on his stronger military force, he allegedly tried to coerce the Central Committee and openly embarked on a path of splitting the Party and the Red Army.

But what were the facts? At the time of the rendezvous, Zhang’s Fourth Front Army still had around 50,000 well-equipped troops, while Mao’s Central Red Army had fewer than 10,000 survivors. CCP history claims Zhang intended to swallow up the Central Red Army, citing as evidence a secret telegram allegedly seen by Ye Jianying containing the phrase “resolve by force.”

Strangely, not only did Zhang Guotao and Chen Changhao deny the telegram, but Zhu De, Liu Bocheng, Xu Xiangqian, and even those who handled the message said they had never seen it. More strangely, Mao believed it to be true and fled overnight with his close forces, leaving behind the Fifth and Twelfth Corps, as well as the Fourth and Second Front Armies, who knew nothing of his departure. What was the connection between Mao and Ye?

The next day, when Zhang and others discovered Mao had disappeared and could not be contacted, a high-level joint meeting elected a new temporary central leadership with Zhang Guotao and Zhu De. This became Zhang’s alleged “crime” of “setting up another central authority.” Later, under mediation by the Comintern, Mao made self-criticisms, and this temporary central leadership was dissolved. Why did Party history reverse black and white on this matter?

As for Zhang Guotao’s march south being labeled “fleeing” and splitting the CCP, this too was a charge imposed by Mao and the Party. At the time, the Comintern had proposed three escape routes for the CCP: via Xinjiang to the Soviet Union, via Inner Mongolia to the Soviet Union, or southward to establish a new base area. As Zhang wrote in his memoirs, “our main issue at the time was survival or death,” and they were seeking “a path to survival.”

Ultimately, Zhang’s southward march was blocked by Nationalist forces, and he led the Fourth Front Army north again, reuniting with Mao’s forces in northern Shaanxi by the end of 1936. Some believe that after taking command, Mao ordered the Fourth Front Army to continue north as originally planned while pretending to set a rendezvous point, exposing their movements and drawing Chiang Kai-shek’s forces into pursuit, while Mao and Zhou Enlai quietly slipped to Yan’an. Used as bait, the Fourth Front Army suffered devastating blows. Mao and Zhou later shifted blame onto Zhang, accusing him of unauthorized flight and setting up another central authority.

After the reunion, Mao appointed Zhang Guotao as political commissar of the Red Army but effectively stripped him of military power. He then split the Fourth Front Army into eastern and western routes; the western route was sent into the Qilian Mountains, where it was annihilated. Some say Mao deliberately eliminated a rival force. Seeing tens of thousands of his troops meet such a fate, what must Zhang Guotao have felt?

After the Xi’an Incident and the Red Army’s reorganization into the Eighth Route Army, Zhang was reduced to chairman of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region government, with no real power. Yet Mao still targeted him in meetings. Later, Wang Ming, the CCP’s representative to the Comintern, ordered the execution of three of Zhang’s senior officers while passing through Xinjiang.

These acts led Zhang Guotao to leave the CCP in April 1938 under the pretext of visiting the Yellow Emperor’s Mausoleum and to join the Nationalists. He later published a statement saying, “This Communist Party is no longer the Party I once longed for and fought for with blood.”

Zhang spent his later years in Canada with a harmonious family life, and his three sons settled in North America. One could say that had he not left the CCP, he might have survived the Yan’an Rectification but not the Cultural Revolution. Compared with many early CCP leaders such as Liu Zhidan, Xi Zhongxun, and Liu Shaoqi, Zhang Guotao was fortunate.

If the PLA Daily article is hinting that Zhang Youxia is like Zhang Guotao, then compared with Zhang Guotao—who saw through the CCP and left it—Zhang Youxia, who intended to preserve the Party, meeting such an end may have been unavoidable. Whether he can meet a peaceful end is no longer up to him. If Zhang Youxia, before being arrested, had followed Zhang Guotao’s example—distancing himself from or even abandoning the CCP—might his ending have been different?

(First published by People News)