[People News] According to reports from Chinese military media and Xinhua, the Central Military Commission held a Lunar New Year gala performance in Beijing on February 6 for retired military cadres stationed in the capital. After the removal of CMC members Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli shook both the military and the Party, Xi Jinping — now nearly “a man alone” — attended the event accompanied only by the remaining CMC member and Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin.

From the CCTV footage, as Xi entered the theater with Zhang at his side, he still appeared physically unsteady while walking. Compared with last year, when two other CMC vice chairmen accompanied him, having just one person behind him this time looked rather lonely — a stark reflection of the brutality of CCP power struggles.

What stood out most in the video was Xi’s “inner guards.” These soldiers from the Central Guard Bureau were apparently stationed throughout the venue. Particularly noticeable was one guard standing behind Xi to his right, wearing an earpiece and positioned among the retired cadres in the aisle. As Xi began shaking hands, this guard kept staring intently toward Xi’s left rear, appearing highly alert. His vigilance was especially obvious on camera.

In last January’s video of the same event, guards stood in similar positions, but their posture and gaze appeared more relaxed and less conspicuous.

Besides that guard, the footage also showed more than a dozen young soldiers behind Xi as he turned to greet female cadres seated in the front row. Two of the guards at the front, both wearing earpieces, had sharp, watchful eyes that followed Xi’s every movement.

Compared with last year’s CCTV footage, this year’s security personnel appeared markedly more tense, as if fearing something might happen. Could this suggest that after removing Zhang and Liu, Xi has still not fully secured the military’s loyalty, leaving open the possibility of unforeseen incidents? This may also explain why Xi reportedly fears danger, frequently changes residences, and strengthens security.

At least on the surface, however, Xi has secured public displays of military loyalty. This can be seen in several ways:

First, when reporting the remarks of retired cadres, media again used phrases such as “more closely unite around the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core,” and referenced “Xi Jinping Thought,” “Xi’s Thought on Strengthening the Military,” the “Two Establishes,” the “Two Upholds,” and “implementing the CMC chairman responsibility system.” However, compared with similar coverage in January 2024, references to the “Four Consciousnesses” and “Four Confidences” were missing. Perhaps it is not yet the right moment for Xi to re-emphasize “political consciousness, overall situation consciousness, core consciousness, and alignment consciousness.”

Second, when introducing the opening chorus “Eternal Glory,” media described it as expressing “the shared voice of the entire armed forces to firmly safeguard the core and resolutely obey command,” language similar to 2024.
But in January 2025 coverage of the same type of performance, the opening song “Following” was described as expressing loyalty to the Party and implementing political military-building principles, without mentioning Xi as the “core.” The renewed emphasis on “the core” this year suggests that military propaganda has shifted after the removal of Zhang and Liu.

Third, during the performance, CCTV gave Xi several close-up shots, in addition to showing retired senior officers attending with him. In January 2025, CCTV gave Xi no close-ups at all, instead showing a wide shot of all current and former military leaders present. In 2024, however, Xi received three close-ups before the camera turned to other generals such as Zhang Youxia and He Weidong.

Do these differences in coverage from 2024, 2025, and 2026 signal changes in Xi’s status? Xi, who reportedly lost some military authority after a stroke in July 2024, now seems to have returned to the position he held before that incident.

The shifts in military and state media suggest that after taking down Zhang and Liu, Xi has regained part of the power he once lost. But because his actions violated internal Party procedures and because of widespread dissatisfaction within the Party, military, and society after a decade of controversial policies, the foundation of his current power remains unstable. Situations could arise at any time — perhaps another reason for the heightened tension among his guards.

Several other details from the performance also merit attention:

One is that none of the retired cadres shaking hands with Xi in the front row wore military uniforms this year, whereas several did last year. Why?

Second, former defense minister Chang Wanquan, former air force commander Ma Xiaotian, former Joint Staff chief Li Zuocheng, and former Rocket Force commander Jing Zhiyuan were absent. Are they under investigation, restricted, or simply unwilling to attend?

Third, Zhang Shengmin, walking behind Xi, appeared extremely cautious. Few retired cadres greeted or shook hands with him. If Zhang was indeed the one who reported Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, it would be unsurprising if he were unpopular within the military.

A simple performance report actually reveals a great deal. Whether Xi can truly return to the status of unchallenged “core” depends not only on whether he can fully control the military, but also on his health. If Xi were to suffer another stroke, how would the CCP’s situation unfold?