PLA Daily Scales Back Zhang Youxia Criticism; He Weidong Suicide Rumor

On March 4, 2025, He Weidong attended the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. (Photo credit: Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images)

[People News] The incident of Zhang Youxia’s arrest has triggered strong backlash within the Chinese military. Senior officers have responded with silent resistance and refused to make public statements. Party media and the PLA Daily have also unexpectedly fallen silent, plunging into dead quiet. Zhongnanhai has been shaken deeply, and Xi Jinping finds himself at a loss as to whether to advance or retreat. Meanwhile, in Beijing as well as Inner Mongolia, Shandong, Anhui, and other regions, large numbers of military vehicles have moved out without warning, and residents have reported intense gunfire in multiple locations. The political situation in China has become increasingly opaque, with a sense that a storm is about to break.

On January 30, the CCP convened a Politburo meeting, presided over by Xi Jinping. The official Party media release contained no photos, no video, and no list of attendees, and made no mention at all of the Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli cases. At such a sensitive and turbulent moment, Xi secretly presided over such a high-level “three-no” meeting. Faced with outside questioning over his bypassing of the Politburo to suddenly arrest the military’s top general Zhang Youxia—thus creating procedural illegality—Xi continued to respond with silence and blankness. This not only astonished observers but further revealed his guilty conscience and his predicament of riding a tiger he cannot dismount.

Whether Xi, through intimidation and internal pressure at this Politburo meeting, managed to retroactively obtain “legal” authorisation for the arrests of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli is unknown. However, the absence of any official announcement on this matter suggests either that Xi failed to win over all Politburo members or that he dared not announce it promptly out of fear of provoking even stronger backlash and triggering a more severe political shock and sudden crisis.

At this point, the ones truly suffering and tormented are Xi Jinping and his followers. A step backward means loss of power and total destruction; a step forward means unknown dangers, turmoil, and an uncertain future. Military morale, popular support, and Party loyalty have all been lost. Mutiny, popular revolt, or a coup could erupt at any moment.

Facing pressure from inside and outside the Party and the focus of both domestic and international opinion, Xi, on one hand,d uses diplomatic appearances to create the illusion that the overall situation is under control; on the other hand, he carries out tactical propaganda countermeasures and political positioning to divide anti-Xi forces and weaken their will.

Against this background and calculation, on January 31, the PLA Daily once again published a commentary article criticising Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, titled “Firmly Strengthen Confidence in Certain Victory in Anti-Corruption and Certain Success in Building a Strong Military.” Compared with the January 25 PLA Daily editorial “Resolutely Win the Tough and Protracted Overall Battle Against Corruption in the Military,” this new article shows several notable features:

First, the article’s status was downgraded. On January 25, the PLA Daily published an editorial; on January 31, it published a commentary article. The difference is significant. An editorial represents the highest will and official position of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission—the most authoritative and serious form of commentary. In plain terms, it was Xi Jinping’s final political verdict on Zhang Youxia. Yet after that top-level political signal was issued, it sank like a stone into the sea. For a full week, the military remained silent; no theatre commands, senior officers, military academies, or related institutions followed up with statements. Party and government organs also made no statements, an extremely rare phenomenon.

A PLA Daily commentator article, by contrast, only represents the views of the newspaper’s editorial department. It is a mid-level commentary requiring approval only from the Political Work Department and is interpretive and follow-up in nature. In other words, after seeing that a week had passed with total non-cooperation and silence from top to bottom in the military, Xi became anxious and instructed the PLA Daily editorial staff to make a statement, lower the standard, and see whether anyone would follow and line up behind him.

Second, the new commentator article no longer mentions Zhang Youxia’s “five major crimes,” such as “seriously trampling and undermining the chairman responsibility system,” and instead focuses solely on corruption and anti-corruption, stressing that “anti-corruption will certainly win, and strengthening the military will certainly succeed,” and that “there are no forbidden zones, full coverage, and zero tolerance.”

Six days earlier, however, the PLA Daily editorial had thunderously listed Zhang Youxia’s five major crimes: seriously betraying the trust of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission; seriously trampling and undermining the chairman responsibility system; seriously encouraging and affecting the Party’s absolute leadership over the military; seriously damaging the authority and image of the CMC leadership; and causing enormous harm to political army-building, the political ecology, and combat effectiveness.

Why are these no longer mentioned? Most likely because Xi realised the previous attack was too fierce and amounted to self-exposure of the power struggle and political conflict between himself and Zhang Youxia, indirectly confirming outside speculation about an internal power struggle. Moreover, the collective silence of the various services and senior officers after the official announcement fully demonstrated that Xi lacks military support and that rumours of his loss of control over the armed forces are not groundless.

Helpless, Xi adjusted his strategy and focused on corruption charges, trying to turn Zhang Youxia into an “ironclad case.” The commentator's article declared that “they will forever be nailed to the pillar of shame in history.” Xi’s intentions are obvious: this is a retreat in form but an advance in substance—insidious, ruthless, and highly dangerous.

Third, this commentator's article was not reprinted by Xinhua News Agency, an unusual move. People’s Daily and the Ministry of National Defence website only placed it in obscure corners. This is telling. Major Party media have their own calculations: compared with Cai Qi’s command baton, people fear the military’s guns more.

While downgrading the criticism of Zhang Youxia, the article simultaneously elevated Xi Jinping’s political status, mentioning “the two establishments” and “the four safeguards,” and reviving the slogan “implement the chairman responsibility system, resolutely follow Chairman Xi’s command, be responsible to Chairman Xi, and reassure Chairman Xi.” Such language had nearly disappeared from Party media after Xi lost power at the Third Plenum in 2024. Now it has been brought back again, carrying the absurd flavour of a second enthronement attempt. Unfortunately for Xi, only the eunuchs are shouting; the officials and the military are not playing along—apart from covering their mouths and laughing in secret. Xi has tied himself to a power-struggle war chariot unprecedented in history, and will not stop until he destroys himself.

Another piece of news today is particularly intriguing. The YouTube account “Lu President,” which had earlier accurately broken the news of Zhang Youxia’s arrest, posted on X: “After verification from multiple sources, former CCP Politburo member and CMC vice chairman Comrade He Weidong has committed suicide. Past matters aside, may the deceased rest in peace!” He also said that “even the guards have been arrested.”

This claim has sparked controversy. Mr Cai Shenkun had already revealed half a year ago that both He Weidong and He Hongjun were dead. Most commenters expressed doubt, since a detained official at the level of a CMC vice chairman would almost certainly be under strict guard and unable to commit suicide; Zhang Yang and Wu Guohua committed suicide at home.

If this news is true, the situation would take on dramatic and explosive twists. It would mean someone wanted He Weidong to die, and only then could he have succeeded in killing himself. Another point is that news of Zhang Youxia’s arrest likely had not reached He Weidong; otherwise, seeing a political enemy fall, why would he take his own life? Perhaps remnants of Zhang Youxia’s faction are exerting pressure to add chaos and suffering to Xi Jinping. Even if Zhang Youxia is completely finished, Xi’s own faction may still face total ruin; the military will have no one left to use and no one left to trust.

At present, Beijing’s political situation remains in a period of extreme uncertainty and high risk of eruption.

(First published by People News)