Xi's Absence from the Key Central Meeting and Solely Issuing Instructions is Unusual

On March 5, 2025, PLA delegates arrive at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing to attend the opening of the National People's Congress. (Photo by Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

[People News] On November 18, major state media outlets of the Communist Party of China reported that the Central Committee held a comprehensive rule of law work conference in Beijing from November 17 to 18. Zhao Leji, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and Chairman of the National People's Congress, attended and spoke at the meeting. Ding Xuexiang, also a member of the Standing Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council, attended and conveyed important instructions from Xi Jinping. All news headlines stated, 'Xi Jinping makes important instructions on the comprehensive rule of law work.' It is widely acknowledged that under a one-party dictatorship, this meeting serves merely as a facade for the Communist Party to mislead the international community.

The news report begins with three paragraphs detailing Xi Jinping's instructions, followed by information about the meeting's convening, then five paragraphs summarising Zhao Leji's speech, and concluding with remarks from Chen Wenqing, the Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, along with other high-ranking officials. This includes Wang Xiaohong, the former Minister of Public Security, who recently died suddenly and was rumoured to have been 'detained.'

On the surface, the Communist Party's report afforded Xi Jinping the dignity and respect he is due. However, when compared to a similar meeting held five years ago, notable differences emerge.

The first Central Comprehensive Rule of Law Work Conference took place from November 16 to 17, 2020, and is typically held once every five years; this year marks the second occurrence. At the inaugural meeting five years ago, Xi Jinping not only attended but also delivered an 'important speech.' The meeting was presided over by Li Keqiang, with other Standing Committee members, including Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Zhao Leji, and Han Zheng, all in attendance, and Wang Huning providing the summary remarks.

Five years ago, Xi Jinping placed significant importance on the meeting he chaired, which resulted in full attendance from the Standing Committee members, undoubtedly elevating the meeting's status. However, this year, Xi was absent, leading to only two Standing Committee members participating, and the concluding remarks were delivered by a Politburo member, underscoring the meeting's downgraded significance.

Moreover, in contrast to the reports from five years ago, there has been a clear reduction in the praise directed at Xi. This year, the language used to reference Xi's directives was more conventional and lacked the assertiveness of a 'superior.' In stark contrast, five years ago, Xi outlined 11 demands in his speech, which were detailed in 14 paragraphs in the report, accurately reflecting Xi's consolidation of power.

During that earlier meeting, Li Keqiang lauded Xi's speech, stating that it 'provided strategic guidance for the comprehensive rule of law work in the current and future periods, characterised by strong political, ideological, and theoretical significance, serving as a guiding... programmatic document.' He also referenced the loyalty phrase 'Four Four Two.' Wang Huning, in his summary remarks, further amplified his flattery, describing Xi's speech as 'highly insightful, broad in vision, rich in content, and profound in thought, reflecting far-reaching strategic thinking, a clear political orientation, a strong sense of historical responsibility, and a genuine concern for the people.'

Five years later, Zhao Leji, in his speech, began by praising Xi, although to a lesser degree than Wang Huning. Despite Xi's instructions lacking any new content, Zhao confidently stated that they were 'high-level, profound in thought, and possess strong political, ideological, and guiding significance, pointing out the direction for advancing comprehensive rule of law in the new journey.' Such platitudes seem intended to emphasise Xi's status, yet the fact that Xi was absent from this meeting is quite puzzling.

Moreover, Zhao referred to 'Xi Thought,' but before discussing the 'two establishments' and 'two safeguards,' he stressed the importance of 'upholding the Party's leadership over comprehensive rule of law.' This small detail suggests that 'the Party's leadership' takes precedence over maintaining Xi's position.

In contrast, Chen Wenqing's summary speech was rather ordinary and fell short of Wang Huning's standards.

So, why did Xi miss this significant meeting? Was it a voluntary decision or an involuntary one? Was it due to health issues or other factors?

The author believes that health reasons could be a possibility, but if the Communist Party aimed to uphold the high standards of this meeting, they would likely have found a way to ensure Xi's attendance. Currently, Xi, much like Hua Guofeng in the past, must adhere to the established protocols before any official announcement. His ability to attend events is no longer solely his decision, but rather depends on the approval of those controlling the situation behind the scenes.

On November 9, the military newspaper published an article titled 'Purifying Party Spirit through Constant Practice,' which emphasised that 'personal interests must subordinate to the interests of the whole Party, and the interests of individual Party components must subordinate to the interests of the whole Party.' Is this a subtle indication that Xi and other senior officials should prioritise the broader context?

In fact, since the news of Xi Jinping's stroke surfaced during the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China in July last year, there have been increasing signs over the past year suggesting that Xi's power has been weakened or even stripped away, with the real authority now held by the behind-the-scenes elders of the Communist Party. This trend is evident. For example, in the last four months, several signs have emerged:

First, on November 9, just before the opening of the 15th National Games, Xi Jinping met with representatives from various sectors in Guangzhou and took photos with them. Notably, Cai Qi, the director of the General Office, was absent, and the accompanying personnel were of a lower rank, with no Politburo members at the vice-premier level present. Furthermore, in the group photo, the distance between Zhang Youxia and Xi's seat, as well as the distance to the senior officials on either side, was essentially the same, all occupying prominent positions. Could these be indications that Xi's power is waning?

Second, on November 5, during the commissioning ceremony of the 'Fujian Ship' at a military port in Sanya, Hainan, the expected attending generals were absent, the number of welcoming personnel was reduced, the accompanying specifications were downgraded, and Xi was deprived of the opportunity to review the naval honor guard, as well as not taking photos with all the officers and soldiers. Such treatment clearly does not align with his role as 'Chairman of the Central Military Commission'.

Third, during the 'September 3 Military Parade', three points suggested that Xi has lost military power. One point is that Zhang Youxia, who is rumoured to hold military authority, appeared on the Tiananmen Tower and stood alongside retired members of the Politburo Standing Committee, which has been quite rare in the past decade.

Secondly, the commander of the military parade has been promoted to lieutenant general, which appears to reflect a lack of respect for Xi Jinping. At the same time, the general who should have assumed this role, Wang Qiang, the commander of the Central Theatre Command, has seemingly 'disappeared.' Wang Qiang was unexpectedly promoted to general by Xi Jinping prior to the 20th National Congress and is regarded as part of Xi's faction. His absence is not a positive development for Xi.

Thirdly, during the live television broadcast, the commentary repeatedly stressed 'the Party's absolute leadership over the military' and 'the military under the Party's leadership.' This is a departure from the phrases used in the 2019 and 2017 parades, which included 'obeying Chairman Xi's orders' and 'implementing the military commission's responsibility system.'

Fourth, on August 20, Xi, who is experiencing health issues, travelled to Tibet to attend the so-called 60th anniversary celebration of the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region, an event he traditionally may not have participated in. State media reported that Xi Jinping led a delegation to the event, but Wang Huning was designated as the head of the central delegation. While Xi led the central delegation to Tibet, he was not the head of it, which is unusual compared to past instances.

Furthermore, although Xi attended the event, he did not deliver a speech, appearing more as a figurehead. In his speech, Wang Huning mentioned 'Xi Thought,' 'Xi Core,' and the loyalty phrase 'two four four two,' but he consistently emphasised that the Communist Party is the core of leadership, which contrasts sharply with the speeches made by Yu Zhengsheng and Jia Qinglin in previous years. In my opinion, the focus on 'the Party' seems intended to downplay the significance of Xi's core leadership. Could this be an indication of Xi's diminishing power?

Furthermore, during the trip to Tibet, Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, did not accompany Xi Jinping as he had in the past. Instead, Xi was joined by Zhang Shengmin, a member of the Military Commission who later succeeded He Weidong as Vice Chairman at the Fourth Plenary Session. Does this suggest that the rumours about Xi losing military power are not baseless? Does it indicate that Zhang Shengmin's promotion in August had already been confirmed internally?

Despite the state media's recent high-profile coverage of Xi, which creates the illusion of a stable position, certain details often provide insight. For example, the latest central meeting that Xi was supposed to lead, which he did not attend, and the lower profile of the meeting serve as new evidence.

(First published in People News) △