Was Xi Jinping Betrayed by the Party — and Does He Still Believe in It? He Once Spoke a Rare Truth

In September 1967, Xi Zhongxun was criticised at Northwest Agricultural University (Wikipedia).

[People News] As the leader of a socialist country, does Xi Jinping truly believe in communism? Many people assume the answer is yes. Yet, he once confided to former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe a revealing truth: if he had been born in the United States, he wouldn’t have joined the Communist Party—he would have joined the Democratic or Republican Party instead. A recent article translated and published by CommonWealth Magazine from The Economist suggests that although Xi was once persecuted by the Communist Party and even betrayed by his own family, this didn’t open his eyes to the dangers of dictatorship. Instead, it further cemented his faith in power.

It’s widely known that during Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution, Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, was purged. Because of this, a teenage Xi Jinping was also branded a “capitalist roader.” His mother, Qi Xin, once joined the crowds at a struggle session to denounce him, shouting “Down with Xi Jinping!” Xi was imprisoned and forced to sleep on a freezing floor during winter. “My body was crawling with lice,” he once wrote. After escaping, he returned home begging his mother for food. She not only refused but, fearing implication, reported him to the Red Guards. Xi fled into the rain, weeping.

The Economist article, translated by Li Lixin and published in the June 9 edition of CommonWealth Magazine, references historian Joseph Torigian’s upcoming English-language biography of Xi Zhongxun, titled The Party Above All. The article poses a critical question: Why would Xi Jinping remain loyal to a regime that once persecuted his father? But perhaps the better question is: How could he betray a Party that his father sacrificed everything for?

So, does Xi Jinping truly believe in communism? In the Communist Party? The article reveals a private admission by Shinzo Abe.

In The Memoirs of Shinzo Abe, published seven months after his assassination, Abe recounts stories of meetings with global leaders. In the book, he reveals, “President Xi once told me that if he had been born in the U.S., he probably wouldn’t have joined the Communist Party. He would have joined either the Democratic or Republican Party.” This was because Xi believed there was no point in joining a party that couldn’t attain political power. Abe concluded that Xi didn’t join the Communist Party out of ideological conviction, but purely to seize power—he is, Abe wrote, “a hardened realist.”

Abe also noted that in their earlier meetings, Xi’s remarks seemed to follow a pre-written script. But around 2018, Xi began speaking more freely, which Abe saw as a sign that his political power had reached new heights.

Since becoming China’s top leader in 2012, Xi has gradually consolidated power through political and economic reforms, along with his sweeping anti-corruption campaign. His grip over the state eventually became unprecedented.

In 2017, “Xi Jinping Thought” was enshrined in the Party Constitution as guiding ideology. Rather than elaborating on Marxist theory, Xi’s doctrine mostly outlines signature policies—chief among them, the absolute and unchallenged control of the Communist Party over all aspects of Chinese society. In practice, Xi has encouraged a cult of personality, suppressed dissent, and promoted a more aggressive nationalism and foreign policy.

In 2018, Xi amended the Chinese Constitution, abolishing the two-term limit for the presidency, allowing him to remain in power indefinitely. In effect, Xi became China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, assuming lifelong control as president, Party general secretary, and chairman of the Central Military Commission—a modern-day emperor in all but name.

Xi Jinping climbed to the top of the power structure by exploiting the mechanisms of the Communist Party.

But since 2024, particularly following the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee, a subtle yet telling undercurrent has emerged in Chinese politics—a quiet campaign of “de-Xi-ification” is underway. This process isn’t just about toning down Xi’s personal image, but suggests a deeper loosening at the core of power.

An article by commentator Gong Renzhi argues that although Xi reshaped the Party’s loyalty structure through fear and purges, this never translated into genuine institutional legitimacy. The paradox of totalitarianism, he writes, is that while power appears stable when concentrated, any crack can destabilise the entire structure. He adds that when a political system no longer offers authority to trust, responsibility to bear, or a credible vision, it no longer needs an enemy—it will collapse from within. "De-Xi-ification" may not mark the arrival of democracy, but it could be the prelude to the collapse of a totalitarian regime.

In his 1971 book The Russians, American journalist Hedrick Smith, after visiting Moscow, described the peculiar mindset of Soviet officials. He found that very few still believed in communist ideology—even the Soviet leaders themselves. His observations were later confirmed in a memoir by Brezhnev’s niece, Lyuba, who recalled that Brezhnev once said to his brother, “What communism? That’s just empty talk to fool the people.”

Epoch Times columnist Zhou Xiaohui has similarly argued that today’s high-profile Chinese officials who loudly promote Marxism or swear loyalty to the Party’s “original mission” rarely believe in communism at all. Rather, they use it to preserve their own power and privileges, and to reject democratic constitutionalism, ensuring the Chinese people remain under Party control.

In reality, most officials at all levels in China’s system clearly understand the Party’s corruption and wickedness. In private, they curse the Party—but in public, they flatter superiors to protect their vested interests.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, most Soviet officials—who lacked true belief and were opportunists at heart—stood by and watched, accepting the Party’s downfall without protest. Zhou believes that China’s current officials, being cut from the same cloth, will meet the same fate: when a triggering event causes the collapse of the CCP, few, if any, will step forward to defend it, despite once swearing loyalty to the “core.” This, Zhou argues, is the CCP’s inescapable destiny. △

(First published by People News)