PLA Leadership's Lunar New Year "Consolation Visits" Reveal Unresolved Mysteries

Image: A Chinese military canine and demolition unit conducting a security sweep at Tiananmen Square. (Photo by Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

[People News] As the Lunar New Year approaches, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership is busy staging the usual "consolation visits" to project the image of care and unity. The Central Military Commission (CMC) is no exception. However, this year, the performance seems to have left some "tracks," subtly hinting at the turbulent undercurrents and intense power struggles within Zhongnanhai.

On January 25 and 26, reports from the Ministry of National Defense and Xinhua News Agency covered the pre-holiday inspection and consolation visits by the Party leader to the Northern Theater Command headquarters. The reports stated that Xi Jinping "visited grassroots officers and soldiers via video link, inspecting combat readiness duties and task execution." In previous years, Xi would visit troops in person, with officers lined up to applaud and chant slogans like "Follow the chairman's directives." This year, however, the focus was solely on combat readiness. While readiness for war is undoubtedly important, many online commenters questioned why combat readiness and duties were inspected via video. Some asked bluntly, "Is the CCP planning for war? Can combat readiness really be evaluated through a video link?" Others speculated whether Xi avoided visiting in person due to severe outbreaks of COVID-19 at the grassroots level or fears of assassination.

The reports also mentioned that Xi subsequently held a video call with relevant military units, emphasizing that "all military units must enhance combat readiness duties and effectively respond to any potential emergencies." This raises further questions: What kind of emergencies are being anticipated? Are these reports suggesting internal instability within the military, or is there a foreign threat? The report concluded by mentioning the participation of Zhang Youxia and others, prompting some netizens to speculate, "Oh, so the combat readiness is for internal issues, and they even brought a hostage along."

Zhang Youxia, the CMC’s first vice chairman, appeared more frequently than Xi in these reports. In addition to participating in the aforementioned activity, Zhang visited the Information Support Force, emphasizing the need to "strengthen political guidance, deepen training for combat readiness, implement reforms, and strive to achieve new progress in force construction." The rhetoric was lofty and authoritative, resembling that of a chairman. However, the phrase "political guidance" left room for interpretation: where exactly is it guiding? The answer remains ambiguous, leaving the public to guess.

Meanwhile, He Weidong also conducted consolation visits, this time to troops stationed in Beijing. Unlike Zhang, He emphasized the need to "resolutely complete the tasks assigned by the Party and the people." He is widely regarded as one of Xi's most trusted allies, reportedly promoted to monitor others. His comments, too, seem to carry implied messages—perhaps the kind that, if you understand, you understand.

However, neither Zhang nor He delivered the usual public expressions of loyalty to Xi, such as "resolutely following Xi Jinping's command, being accountable to Xi Jinping, and reassuring Xi Jinping." This subtle omission suggests that Xi's position might be quietly weakening.

The Ministry of Defense's 2025 "Spring Festival" reception stands out as the most intriguing development. The term "Spring Festival" here is a Party-specific phrase, reflecting how the CCP has reshaped the traditional meaning of the Chinese New Year through its political culture. According to reports, the reception was held at the August 1st Building, and what made it noteworthy was the sudden appearance of Defense Minister Dong Jun. The report mentioned only briefly: "Defense Minister Dong Jun collectively met with the attending guests."

In recent weeks, based on coverage of public appearances by senior military officials, observers speculated that Dong Jun had encountered trouble. He had been absent from public view for over a month, leading analysts to suggest that he might be under investigation due to ties with Miao Hua, Yuan Huazhi, and others. Since the end of last year, activities that typically involve the defense minister, such as international visits, had instead been undertaken by Liu Zhenli, a member of the Central Military Commission and Chief of the Joint Staff Department. For example, Liu visited Malaysia, where he met with Defense Minister Mohamad Hasan and Armed Forces Commander Mohammad Affandi, and Indonesia, where he met with Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto and Armed Forces Commander Agus Subiyanto. Some political commentators concluded that Dong Jun had been sidelined, possibly as retaliation from Zhang Youxia’s faction, and was not traveling abroad because he was detained.

Now, however, Dong Jun has suddenly reappeared. A closer look at the details surrounding his reported appearance reveals some oddities. The brief 300-word article contains no direct quotes or statements from Dong Jun, nor any words of consolation. The text merely outlines generic statements about the PLA’s objectives, written in the tone of the "Defense Ministry website" or an editorial voice, rather than attributing them to Dong Jun with phrases such as "Dong emphasized." For a high-profile event hosted by the Ministry of Defense, the absence of any remarks by the defense minister is highly unusual. Even more peculiar is the fact that what should have been a festive event featured no audio, video, or photographs—nothing visual at all. This raises further questions: Did Dong Jun actually appear, or was his name merely included to dispel rumors?

These various strange occurrences beg the question: what do they mean? What are they trying to indicate? The answers remain for readers to interpret.