Cai Qi Again Downplays Xi at the Capital Planning Commission Meeting

On October 23, 2022, Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi attends a press conference at the Great Hall of the People with other newly appointed Standing Committee members and both domestic and international journalists. (Photo by Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

[People News] On November 20, at the symposium held in the Great Hall of the People to commemorate the 110th anniversary of Hu Yaobang’s birth, Cai Qi—who had been questioned by the outside world over the past ten days for his absence from major events such as the opening ceremony of the Guangzhou National Games and the Central Conference on Rule of Law—finally made an appearance. However, last year, when Xi Jinping visited Fujian and Anhui in October and Hubei in November, Cai Qi, who often accompanied Xi, was also nowhere to be seen.

At this appearance, in his concluding remarks at the meeting, Cai Qi did not flatter or praise Xi as he usually did, but merely said that people must unite around the Party Central Committee with Xi as the core, and repeated the already overused “2442” pledge of loyalty.

However, according to state media reports, at the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the 20th Capital Planning and Construction Commission held on the same day, in his remarks as director of the commission, Cai Qi mentioned only the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core and the need to study and implement Xi’s discourses on the planning and construction of the capital. He made no mention of “2442,” and before referring to studying Xi’s discourses, he emphasized “thoroughly studying and implementing the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee.” He also stressed that “under the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee, further improving the Commission’s working mechanism” was necessary. Does this arrangement of wording suggest that the authority of the “Party Central Committee” is being placed above Xi? Has Cai Qi been forced to submit to the “Party Central Committee” rather than Xi himself?

A strange question arises: Why did Cai Qi downplay Xi in all his speeches on the same day? Why mention the loyalty slogan in one setting but not in the other?

We may as well examine Cai Qi’s wording during previous meetings of the Capital Planning and Construction Commission in the 20th term.

At the fifth meeting held on March 28 this year, Cai Qi mentioned the “centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core” and the need to “thoroughly implement” Xi’s discourse, but he did not use any flattering words or cite the “2442” slogan.

In the fourth plenary meeting on November 8, 2024, the report stated only that there was a need to “thoroughly study the important speech by Xi Jinping on the planning and construction of the capital,” and did not mention Xi again. Similarly, there were no flattering words and no “2442.” This was after the July rumors from the Third Plenum that Xi had suffered a stroke and later rumors that he had lost power. At that time, Cai Qi and other confidants of Xi should have been in a state of panic.

But in the report of the Commission’s third meeting in 2023, there was wording such as: “These changes stem fundamentally from having Xi Jinping at the helm, and having Xi… Thought providing scientific guidance. The next 10 years will be a critical period for capital planning and construction. We must further understand the decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes’ to achieve the political consciousness of the ‘Two Upholds’.” Unsurprisingly, this was a quotation from Cai Qi’s remarks.

In the report of the Commission’s second meeting in November 2022, the wording included: “The Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core has always placed capital planning and construction in a prominent position. During his inspections of Beijing and Hebei to observe post-disaster reconstruction, Xi Jinping issued important instructions…” and that it was necessary to “deeply understand the decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes,’ strengthen the ‘Four Consciousnesses,’ fortify the ‘Four Confidences,’ and achieve the ‘Two Upholds,’ insisting on the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee over capital planning and construction work…” This should also have been Cai Qi’s pledge of loyalty.

That Cai Qi has been downplaying Xi in the three Commission meetings since Xi’s incident, with a clear absence of flattery and loyalty slogans, is obviously highly abnormal. From the side, it reflects changes in Xi’s political power.

Additionally, regarding Xi’s large, unfinished vanity project—the Xiong’an New Area— the sixth meeting recently stated: “We must firmly and orderly relocate non-capital functions and better support the construction of the Xiong’an New Area in Hebei.” The fifth meeting did not mention Xiong’an at all. The fourth meeting stated: “We must unswervingly relocate non-capital functions, actively support the construction of the Xiong’an New Area, and promote the high-quality development of the sub-center.” The third meeting stated: “Promote the Beijing city sub-center and the Xiong’an New Area—‘the new twin wings’—to soar together.”

From “soar together,” to merely “actively support,” and now “better support,” the strength of support has clearly declined.

Online complaints about the miserable state of the hugely expensive Xiong’an New Area have long circulated: highways leading to Xiong’an are almost empty; Xiong’an Railway Station is desolate inside and overgrown with weeds outside; the area is sparsely populated, shops have closed; universities planning to relocate have only built front gates… Now, the CCP leadership finds itself unable to dismantle Xi’s failed vanity project even if it wants to.

In fact, since the full Third Plenum, it has become extremely common for several members of the Politburo Standing Committee to downplay Xi. And as Xi’s Chief of Staff, Cai Qi’s changes are an important barometer for judging whether Xi still holds power.

As for the CCP media having ignored “2442” for a period and then reintroducing it after the Fourth Plenum—albeit in a clearly perfunctory manner—the author believes the main reason is that whoever currently controls the situation still wishes, before the truth of the internal power shift is revealed, to continue masking the power transition within the CCP while also releasing some signals in the process. But how long can the CCP continue to conceal it?

(People News Exclusive) △