[People News] Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks on a “Taiwan contingency” and the “decapitation” remarks by China’s Consul General in Osaka Xue Jian have sparked a storm that has driven Sino-Japanese relations to a freezing point, and the storm is still raging. In the past, China and Japan have clashed many times, and under the CCP’s media guidance large-scale protests and anti-Japanese waves have erupted domestically. But some analysts believe that the Xi regime’s greatest worry is that anti-Japanese sentiment might evolve into anti-government sentiment.

On November 20, PRC Ministry of Commerce spokesman He Yongqian said that if the Japanese side persists in going its own way and continues down the wrong path, China will resolutely take necessary measures, and Japan will bear all the consequences.

According to multiple Japanese media reports, the Chinese government began on November 19 to suspend procedures for importing Japanese seafood products. However, China did not directly inform Japan that imports were being stopped, instead using the reason of “suspending imports of items whose inspections are incomplete.”

PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Mao Ning said, “Under the current situation, even if Japanese seafood is exported to China, there will be no market.”

Beijing’s restriction on seafood imports has left Japanese fishermen relatively calm. After Beijing in August 2023 completely banned Japanese seafood imports over the Fukushima nuclear plant treated water discharge issue, Japanese seafood exports to markets other than China have continued to expand; the largest category, scallops, long ago broke free of dependence on China, and wholesale prices in Japan have even doubled.

According to Liberty Times, before China’s ban, 50% of Japan’s scallops were exported to China, primarily for shucking and freezing processing and then re-export to markets such as the United States.

Total exports in 2022 amounted to ¥91.1 billion, of which China accounted for 51.3% and the US only 8.6%. After China’s ban in August 2023, total exports were ¥68.9 billion, with China accounting for 37.6%. In 2024 total exports were ¥69.5 billion, with the US at 27.5%, Taiwan 17.5%, and Vietnam 15%. Although 2024’s total exports were 24% lower than 2022, they increased 0.9% from the previous year, proving that Japanese scallops can continue to grow steadily without relying on the Chinese market.

On November 20, Taiwan President Lai Ching-te posted on X that he enjoyed sushi made with Hokkaido scallops and Kagoshima green shellfish at noon. US Ambassador to Japan, Rahm (sic) Glass—[translator’s note: likely refers to Ambassador Rahm Emanuel’s predecessor? The original names differ in sources]—also tweeted on X that intimidation seems to have become a bad habit Beijing cannot kick. The last time Beijing improperly banned Japanese seafood imports, the US supported Japan; this time is the same—we will continue to support our ally Japan.

Bloomberg reported that after Glass met on November 20 with Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, he said, “On behalf of the President, myself and the embassy, I told the prime minister: we support her.”

He noted that although Beijing seems intent on exacerbating the dispute, the US firmly supports the US–Japan alliance and is resolutely committed to defending Japan, including the Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu Islands by China).

Despite Beijing’s limits on seafood imports and warnings to citizens not to travel or study in Japan, many Japanese businesses still back Sanae Takaichi. Japanese citizens have called for “travel domestically, support local businesses.”

Unlike after the 2010 collision incident near the Diaoyu Islands when Beijing played the “rare earths” card against Japan, this time Beijing did not use it. According to Liberty Times, Ke Long, a Chinese scholar and research fellow at the Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research, said the rare-earths move would have limited effect on Japan.

Ke said that after the last rare-earth shock, Japan began to develop recycling technologies to recover rare earths from discarded appliances and parts, and this technology is now very mature.

On the other hand, Japan is also seeking alternative supply chains to reduce dependence on China for rare earths. Ke said that Beijing’s delay of rare-earth export controls to the US for a year is mitigated because many Japanese companies have set up factories in the US, and places like Malaysia will be able to refine rare earths in the future. So even if China plays the “rare-earths” card, it is not terribly frightening for Japan.

On Chinese domestic internet, under the guidance of state media’s public opinion, heated discussions about the Sino-Japanese dispute have begun; patriotic netizens voiced a desire to “brandish the sword” at Japan, but public anti-Japanese demonstrations have not occurred.

Ke pointed out that given China’s current social atmosphere, if the authorities allowed crowds to take to the streets, it would quickly devolve into anti-government demonstrations. He noted that China’s economy is very severe, the wealth gap is widening rapidly, the social bottom is deteriorating, and youth unemployment is high—these two large groups would, once given the chance, easily turn to criminality. There is a very unstable atmosphere in Chinese society, and the CCP dare not allow demonstrations to happen this time.

University of Tokyo researcher Lin Quanzhong also believes that a domestic anti-Japanese wave in China is unlikely to occur.

He told Deutsche Welle that ultimately the Chinese authorities will suppress public anger; Beijing truly does not want protests to break out. If protests did erupt, tensions could ultimately turn against the government. Given China’s poor economy, people would seize the opportunity to vent, which the Xi administration does not want to see.

But Lin also offered another interpretation: the authorities may use the incident to soothe and distract domestic tensions and the people’s grievances caused by the bad economy.

How will this storm ultimately end?

On November 19, a WeChat public account with ties to Xinhua, “Niudanqin,” published an article saying there are three possible developments: First, Takaichi deeply reflects and retracts her provocative remarks; Japan learns its lesson and the Sino-Japanese dispute gradually subsides.

Second, Takaichi “plays deaf and dumb”—implying she will not make similar remarks but will not retract the provocation; Sino-Japanese stalemate continues, and another incident could spark a new crisis.

Third, Takaichi “throws caution to the wind,” and to curry favor with the far right she issues even tougher remarks or even makes a “lightning” visit to Yasukuni Shrine.

But Lin observed and predicted that from past historical experience, although Sino-Japanese frictions have been common over the past decade, they ultimately settle down. “Because Beijing cannot forever refuse to engage with its neighbors.”

In fact, for Beijing, beyond history and territorial issues, the third major factor that can trigger Sino-Japanese conflict is the Taiwan issue.

Historical issues include disputes over textbooks and visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Territorial issues involve the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. For Beijing, the Taiwan issue is extremely sensitive; this time Beijing made a major statement to Japan on this subject for the first time.

An article in The Wall Street Journal on November 19 analyzed that the Sino-Japanese diplomatic crisis reflects Beijing’s use of a “pen-and-gun” strategy—strengthening unity discourse and atmosphere at home while striking at Japan and other allies that express support for Taiwan abroad—aiming primarily to comprehensively isolate Taiwan economically and diplomatically, forcing Taiwan to yield “without firing a shot.”

According to informed sources, Beijing’s decision-makers’ “Plan A” is to burden Taiwan economically, diplomatically and psychologically to the point where negotiating with the CCP leadership becomes the only viable option, thereby forcing Taiwan to yield without firing a shot. “Plan B” is military seizure, making economic coercion or political interference the norm and lowering the threshold for direct conflict when necessary.

The Xi regime currently faces difficulties at home and abroad. Observers believe Beijing will not use force against Taiwan in the short term, but Beijing continues to escalate military harassment in the Taiwan Strait, intending to test whether Trump’s commitment to Taiwan is steadfast.

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