Why was He Weidong's case only disclosed on the eve of the Fourth Plenary Session?

On March 4, 2025, He Weidong attended the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. (Photo credit: Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images)

[People News] Over seven months ago, rumours began circulating online regarding the downfall of He Weidong, the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China. Today, the Communist Party has officially confirmed its downfall.

On the afternoon of October 17, Zhang Xiaogang, the spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defence of the Communist Party of China, announced that the discipline inspection and supervision commission of the Central Military Commission is investigating nine senior officials of the People's Liberation Army, with He Weidong being a prominent figure among them. He is a member of the Politburo and a close confidant of Party leader Xi Jinping.

He Weidong is considered a trusted aide of Xi Jinping, having been rapidly promoted by him. Alongside Miao Hua and others, he was utilised by Xi to monitor and balance the influence of Zhang Youxia within the military. He had a long tenure in the 31st Group Army of the Nanjing Military Region, where he held various positions, including Director of the Reconnaissance Department, Chief of Staff of the 31st Group Army, and Commander of the Shanghai Garrison.

In 2016, He Weidong was transferred to the Western Theatre Command, serving as Deputy Commander and Commander of the Army of the Theatre Command. In 2019, possibly due to Xi recognising his loyalty to the Party and the new era of Xi Jinping Thought, he was promoted to Commander of the Eastern Theatre Command and elevated to General, despite being at the retirement age for Major Generals. In January 2022, he was moved to the Joint Operations Command Centre of the Central Military Commission, which is directly overseen by Xi Jinping. At the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party, he was not a representative and originally could not even be ranked as a candidate member of the Central Committee, yet he was directly 'elected' as a Central Committee member, becoming a member of the Politburo, and ultimately promoted to Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, breaking the norm for such an elevation.

Unexpectedly, in less than three years, He Weidong became a prisoner. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) currently accuses him of 'seriously violating party discipline, suspected of serious job-related crimes, involving particularly large sums, being extremely serious in nature, and having a very negative impact.' As a result, the CCP has expelled He Weidong from the party and transferred the criminal issues to military prosecution authorities for review and prosecution. Zhang Xiaogang stated that this action has been approved by the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, and will be confirmed at the upcoming plenary session of the Central Committee.

The CCP's strong and angry accusations suggest that He Weidong bears significant responsibility, possibly even more serious than that of Miao Hua, and he may face severe punishment from the CCP.

So, why did the CCP only announce He Weidong's incident just before the Fourth Plenary Session, despite rumours of his troubles having circulated for seven months?

He Weidong's downfall has indeed placed Xi Jinping in a difficult position, complicating his ability to manage both internal and external party dynamics. Xi had originally hoped that He would help consolidate the Xi faction's power, assist in promoting senior military leaders, weaken anti-Xi forces, and support Xi's military unification of Taiwan, thereby establishing his authority for an indefinite term. However, with the repercussions from the purges of his own allies like Li Shangfu and Li Yuchao still fresh, announcing He Weidong's fall would be a significant embarrassment. How would the anti-Xi faction perceive this? What would both domestic and international observers think? The sentiments of the people and the military could easily become unstable, so it is prudent to delay the announcement if possible.

Additionally, nine senior members of the Communist Party of China (CPC) are currently under investigation by officials. This includes Miao Hua, a member of the Central Military Commission; He Hongjun, the former executive deputy director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission; Wang Xiubin, the former executive deputy director of the Joint Operations Command Center of the Military Commission; Lin Xiangyang, the former commander of the Eastern Theater Command; Qin Shutong, the former political commissar of the Army; Yuan Huazhi, the former political commissar of the Navy; Wang Houbin, the former commander of the Rocket Force; and Wang Chunning, the former commander of the Armed Police Force. All of these individuals are influential figures capable of wielding military power. It is highly likely that He Weidong and these officials have formed a political faction within the military, creating a group led by He Weidong and Miao Hua. If issues concerning these individuals are disclosed promptly, it could impact 'political security.' If mishandled, the potential black swan and grey rhino events that could lead to the CPC's downfall may emerge from within the military, which is why there has been a delay in disclosure.

The factional struggles within the CPC military are not simply a conflict between corruption and anti-corruption; they represent a blatant power struggle that is quite severe. Therefore, any disclosures cannot be made rashly until various relationships are resolved.

With the Fourth Plenary Session approaching, the CPC is compelled to shuffle personnel during this meeting to establish a new personnel structure, making disclosures unavoidable. Furthermore, after more than six months of internal notifications within the party and military, public sentiment has become more accepting, reducing the likelihood of undue speculation. The Xi faction and the anti-Xi faction, the ruling faction and the elder faction, as well as the party and the second-generation red elites, are likely to have reached a compromise.

In any case, as long as the CPC, which values struggle, does not abandon its corrupt system, this ongoing delay in public disclosures will continue. Tomorrow, we may still see Zhang Weidong and Wang Weidong being ousted in the failures of power struggles.
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