March 11, 2023: Senior members of the CCP’s Central Military Commission line up to take the oath at the National People’s Congress. From right to left: Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Li Shangfu, Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, Zhang Shengmin. (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)
[People News] Since late May, a flurry of shocking revelations and rumours about Xi Jinping's imminent resignation have emerged, leaving observers breathless. Xi himself has not made a single public appearance since May 20, when he travelled to Henan to pray and worship deities — a disappearance that has now lasted over ten days.
In an odd twist, Xinhua Net has published 50–60 so-called "latest reports" on Xi between May 21 and May 30, yet none of them feature any videos or images of him personally, as if deliberately hiding the fact that Xi has gone off the radar. The intention appears to be to fabricate a false impression of normalcy and unity within the Party.
But the truth about Xi losing power is increasingly hard to conceal. On May 30, Xinhua Net published a report about Ding Xuexiang attending the 70th anniversary symposium of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), in which the former top aide to Xi openly distanced himself from his one-time boss and made it clear he no longer supports Xi.
According to Xinhua’s May 30 report, the symposium titled "Inheriting the Spirit of Science, Advancing the Journey of National Strength" was held in Beijing. Ding Xuexiang, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council, attended and delivered a speech.
The article first stated that “Ding Xuexiang, on behalf of the Party Central Committee and the State Council, extended warm congratulations on the 70th anniversary of the Chinese Academy of Sciences academic divisions.” It also noted that Ding said the academy had, over the past 70 years, steadfastly implemented the decisions and plans of the Party Central Committee and led its academicians in staying true to their original mission.
In the entire report, Xi Jinping's name was mentioned only once. There was no reference to key pro-Xi political phrases such as “the core,” “Xi Jinping Thought,” “the two establishments,” “the two safeguards,” “four confidences,” or “four consciousnesses.” Not even Xi's theories on scientific innovation were mentioned.
On the same day, Xinhua also published a few formulaic articles like “Xi Jinping: Strive Toward the Grand Goal of Becoming a Tech Powerhouse” and “Photo Essay: Stories of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Interactions with Scientists,” likely orchestrated by Cai Qi. These are likely intended to maintain a façade as long as there is no official announcement of Xi stepping down.
But Ding Xuexiang was blunt — he simply said nothing about Xi at all, completely cutting ties. As the First Vice Premier overseeing science and education, Ding visited the headquarters of the Communist Party’s tech brain — the Chinese Academy of Sciences — and didn’t mention Xi’s thoughts on innovation, Xi’s supposed care and support for the CAS, or any of Xi’s speeches on the Party’s scientific development. What message does this send? Ding is clearly drawing a line between himself and Xi.
In early May, well-known political commentator Cai Shenkun revealed that there would be a major political shake-up at the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session. Party elders such as Zeng Qinghong, Wang Qishan, and Wen Jiabao reportedly banded together to force Xi to step down at the plenum. Cai’s leak included a new power arrangement: Ding Xuexiang would become Party General Secretary, and Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Jining would be appointed Premier.
In mid-May, independent media figure “Lao Deng” also reported that although Ding Xuexiang had long been considered a staunch Xi loyalist due to his role as Chief of Staff, he had recently been in frequent contact with Jiang Zemin-era powerbroker Zeng Qinghong. Ding reportedly criticised Xi for his arrogance, policy failures, and chaotic military purges — even leaking Xi's internal decisions to anti-Xi factions. Ding is said to have formed alliances with at least five Politburo members and sought to enlist Zhang Youxia, the actual controller of military power, to coordinate with regional and military leaders at the Fourth Plenum to force Xi out, end his life-long rule, and restore collective leadership. Lao Deng believes Ding is politically ambitious and calculating, presenting loyalty on the surface while rebelling behind the scenes, and is aligning with the anti-Xi camp to position himself for power in a post-Xi era. As a “hidden chess piece” of the Jiang faction, Ding is said to be working with Zeng to shape the future after Xi.
However, most observers remain skeptical that Ding Xuexiang could ever succeed Xi. First, Ding is playing both sides — publicly a Xi loyalist, privately retaining Jiang-era ties, making him a political opportunist. Second, the Jiang faction has already been severely purged; even though figures like Wang Huning and Zhao Leji have connections to it, they lack the power to reverse the trend. Zeng Qinghong is ageing and no longer influential. Third, Ding himself lacks experience managing a province or leading a major central ministry, has no military backing, limited political credentials, and was never anointed as a successor, making him far less viable than someone like Hu Chunhua. Fourth, Ding and Cai Qi reportedly have personal grudges, and Cai would likely be the first to block Ding’s rise.
Meanwhile, signs point to a strong resurgence of the Communist Youth League faction (the tuanpai). Setting aside the widespread online rumours about the May 14 expanded Politburo meeting where figures like Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao reportedly condemned Xi, there are also telltale signs in official CCP coverage: 1. Tuanshi figure Shi Taifeng, a Hu Jintao protégé, has suddenly taken charge of three powerful domains — personnel (Organisation Department), the CPPCC, and Party-building — signalling a major rise and possible path to the Politburo Standing Committee. 2. Another tuanpai figure, “discarded crown prince” Hu Chunhua, has made a dramatic comeback as a top contender. On May 25, Hu visited the Vietnamese embassy to offer condolences over the death of Vietnam’s former President Tran Duc Luong — a symbolic gesture of high significance. 3. On April 30, Xi Jinping unexpectedly mentioned “scientific decision-making,” “democratic decision-making,” and “decision-making in accordance with the law” during a planning meeting for the 15th Five-Year Plan. These are hallmark slogans from the Hu Jintao era. The Party’s media then bizarrely republished this old news in late May — a suspicious move suggesting tuanpai is on the rise again. 4. Rumors also suggest that tuanpai heavyweight Wang Yang may return to take the helm as General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and lead this year’s September 3rd military parade.
In summary, Ding Xuexiang’s chances of succeeding Xi are close to zero. Yet even so, he has clearly withdrawn his support for Xi. What does this signify? It suggests that Xi’s grip on power is crumbling — his political prospects are dire, and the authority he once wielded is slipping away. Whether he can land safely is itself in doubt. There are even rumours that Wen Jiabao demanded the CCDI prosecute Xi at the expanded Politburo meeting.
May 24 marked the 23rd anniversary of Xi Zhongxun’s death, yet no senior officials attended the commemorative ceremony at the newly opened “Central Shaanxi Revolutionary Memorial Hall,” which has replaced the “Xi Zhongxun Memorial Hall.” Xi Jinping’s own family was also completely absent. These rare signs all point to one conclusion: Xi Jinping has truly lost power — the tide has turned.
(Originally published by People News)
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