Beijing’s Red Wall Under Lockdown, Xi Jinping Reportedly Under House Arrest

Dark clouds hang over Tiananmen Square in Beijing. (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

[People News] According to sources within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Politburo’s expanded meeting that began on May 14 is still ongoing. However, during this period, Xi Jinping went on local inspection tours, and has now been completely silent for four consecutive days since the morning of May 20 — an extremely rare occurrence in the CCP system.

A video report by “Jiang Feng Time” indicates that the atmosphere in Beijing has grown unusually tense, with areas surrounding the Red Wall (Zhongnanhai) entering a de facto state of semi-lockdown. For several nights, police have been heavily deployed within Beijing’s Second Ring Road, inspecting people and vehicles, even questioning nighttime pedestrians. Pigeons near Zhongnanhai have been confiscated, birds are banned from flying in the area, drones are strictly prohibited, and security is tight with guards posted every few steps. The area is now virtually impenetrable.

At the same time, insiders report that while the Politburo's expanded meeting continues, Xi Jinping is not in Beijing. This is a high-level meeting that no one has dared or been able to stop, dragging the entire power structure of the CCP to the edge of a cliff. Not only has the meeting been prolonged and security heightened, but the full Standing Committee has not appeared together once or made any collective statements.

So, where did Xi Jinping go during his local inspection tour? According to public reports, he was in Luoyang on May 19 and in Zhengzhou on May 20, where he received briefings from the Henan Provincial Committee. But strangely, since the morning of May 20 — now four days ago — there has been no further word on where he went or what he has done, and it's unknown whether he has returned to Beijing. For the head of the Party and the state to remain in the provinces during an ongoing Politburo meeting is highly unusual in the CCP system.

Meanwhile, on May 23, Xinhua News Agency abruptly announced a slew of new provincial- and ministerial-level appointments. Notably, this occurred before any date for the Fourth Plenary Session has been announced, indicating that the CCP Central Committee and regional governments have begun reshuffling personnel ahead of schedule.

One key personnel move: Liu Guiping was appointed Deputy Party Secretary of Tianjin. Though not a widely recognised name, this appointment is extremely significant. Liu, born in 1966 in Hengnan, Hunan, holds a PhD in economics and has a background in finance. He was once a subordinate of Wang Qishan in the Guangdong Agricultural Bank, and has served as Vice President of the Bank of China and Deputy Director of the National Financial Supervisory Administration. In 2022, he was assigned to Tianjin as Executive Vice Mayor, overseeing the city’s financial system. His promotion to Deputy Party Secretary signals that Tianjin is now under the control of non-Xi loyalists.

More importantly, Liu’s promotion was not a result of local recommendation but was directly arranged by the CCP's Central Organisation Department. This suggests that personnel authority has been seized by Party elders, and Xi himself had no hand in or control over the process. Localities are already bypassing the General Secretary in their personnel operations. Tianjin has been the domain of Chen Min’er, a senior Xi loyalist from the Guizhou faction. Chen was responsible for the financial collapse in Dongshan County, and now the financial lifeline of Tianjin has been handed to Liu Guiping. This might be the first major strike against Chen Min’er.

Another notable appointment is Wei Jianfeng, a cadre Xi dislikes from the Shaanxi faction, who was appointed Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Discipline Inspection Commission on May 22. This commission is the real power in a province — it can investigate and punish. Wei is not one of Xi’s people; this is part of the elders' move to deploy oversight mechanisms. Yunnan also saw a change in its political-legal system with Hu Dapeng, who was seconded from the Ministry of Public Security’s general office in 2024, being swiftly promoted to the Yunnan Provincial Standing Committee. This central appointment of a security figure is critical, since whoever controls these “knives” (security apparatus) will maintain the new order post-Fourth Plenum.

Shanxi also got a new governor: veteran financial figure Ge Haijiao. Born in 1971, he comes from the Everbright Bank system and is a tough player in the banking sector. He was previously the Executive Vice Governor of Hebei and Chairman of the Bank of China in 2023. Now he has been appointed as Governor of Shanxi, replacing the investigated Jin Xiangjun. This move from banking to provincial governance is a cross-sectoral promotion. The implication? He is trusted by the elder faction. Don’t forget that Ge worked in Everbright, CCB, and the Agricultural Bank — all hotbeds of "red aristocracy." Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has cracked down hardest on princelings in the financial sector, and now their representatives are returning — clear evidence that Xi has lost control of personnel matters.

With Liu Guiping, Ge Haijiao, Hu Dapeng, and Wei Jianfeng in place, the elders have already deployed a full new leadership lineup. They are simply waiting for the Fourth Plenary Session to finalise everything. Whether Xi will step back or be relegated to an honorary position like “President Emeritus” depends only on how he chooses to act. The Red Wall meetings continue, and the reshuffle is in full swing — but has the core of Xi’s power been touched? The answer is: very likely, and very soon.

Liu Fei has officially been appointed to the Zhejiang Provincial Standing Committee and as Party Secretary of Hangzhou. Who is Liu Fei? He’s from Jilin, a technocratic official who has worked in Jilin, Hunan, and Yunnan. He rose during Sun Zhengcai’s tenure in Jilin and continued to be promoted even after Sun’s downfall — a sign of his complex background. In 2023, he was Party Secretary of the Yunnan Provincial Organisation Department; as of January 2024, he was Vice Governor of Yunnan. Being transferred directly to Hangzhou means a return to the power centre from the periphery.

Why does this matter? Hangzhou and the Zhejiang Province have been the political base of Xi Jinping and the springboard for Premier Li Qiang’s rise. These positions are traditionally held by Xi's faction. The "Zhejiang dual core" — Party Secretary of Zhejiang and Hangzhou — has always been a Xi stronghold. Replacing the leadership there is not a routine reshuffle; it’s a strategic repositioning. If Xi were still in control, he wouldn’t allow someone with connections to Sun Zhengcai (a fallen rival) to parachute into his political base and replace a frontline Xi loyalist.

Meanwhile, in Ningde, Fujian — Xi Jinping’s political birthplace — there has also been a quiet transition of power. Zhang Yongning has taken office. A local Fujian cadre, Zhang, was disciplined in 2020 for a building collapse incident in Ningde. The punishment was jointly approved by Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. He was once considered a model county-level Party Secretary and has now been reinstated. This appointment is rich with political symbolism: it's not merely replacing Xi's people — it's reinstating those he once punished. That’s a statement.

Sources suggest this move was tacitly approved by the Central Organisation Department. Fujian Provincial Party Secretary Zhou Zuyi has sensed the shift in the political wind. Rather than appointing someone from the Communist Youth League faction or other external systems, he chose a clean-handed local official who had been previously suppressed by Xi — someone who understands local affairs and is now strategically placed. Once the Fourth Plenum concludes, how investigations are conducted or how the regime is wrapped up will follow naturally.

From Ningde to Hangzhou, Tianjin, Shanxi, Hunan, and Yunnan, a new leadership map has quietly unfolded — covering the CCP’s red power bases, financial arteries, security apparatus, and key provincial capitals.

 

On May 24, Chinese Premier Li Qiang quietly departed for Jakarta, Indonesia. On the surface, it seemed like a routine diplomatic trip to attend the 70th anniversary of the Bandung Conference. But a closer look at the language in the official news release reveals much more: Li flew on a chartered plane (“包機”) rather than a state official aircraft (“專機”), and was referred to merely as “Premier of the State Council” (“國務院總理”), not as “a leader of the Party and the state.”

This suggests that Li Qiang, once seen as Xi Jinping’s loyal secretary and a rising figure in Xi’s system, has been downgraded to a caretaker foreign liaison. His official form remains intact, but his political weight appears to be silently stripped away.

More tellingly, on the very same day, the Xi Zhongxun Memorial Hall—named after Xi Jinping’s father—was quietly renamed the Guanzhong Revolutionary Memorial Hall. This memorial was a symbolic monument to the Xi family’s political lineage. Its renaming is a clear signal: Xi’s symbolic legacy is being downgraded, and his political pedigree is being personalised. If Xi Jinping were still in full command, such a symbolic insult would have been unthinkable. This appears to be the beginning of a systematic effort by Party elders to politically cleanse the Xi name, not by attacking Xi directly, but by erasing his family and symbolic imprint first.

From Li Qiang taking a chartered flight to the renaming of the Xi Zhongxun Memorial Hall, it indicates that Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and others from the elder generation have long since laid out a strategic roadmap for phasing out Xi. Subsequent reports suggest that figures like Yin Li, Chen Jining, and even Ding Xuexiang are reluctant to take over, not because they don’t want to, but because the Chinese Communist Party is out of money, the situation is dire, and no one wants to shoulder the blame.

Thus, while Li Qiang appears to carry out foreign visits, he likely understands he is being quietly ushered toward the exit, used as a transition figure before a reshuffled leadership is formally unveiled.

With China’s political map being redrawn, only one region still loudly proclaims loyalty to Xi: Xinjiang. The local Party boss Ma Xingrui, a longtime Xi loyalist from Shandong, continues to serve as Xi’s last regional stronghold.

On May 21, Ma chaired a high-profile meeting in Xinjiang promoting the Party’s “Eight-point frugality code,” emphasising discipline and allegiance.

Ironically, this same code was originally crafted by Party elders and now serves as a tool both factions use to purge the other's loyalists.

Xinjiang is not valued because of its strategic importance, but because it is remote. Ma Xingrui reportedly fears using even the telephone, relying instead on signals and guesswork. He is quoted as saying: “This bet—I’m placing it on Xi. If I lose, I’ll just go to jail.”

At the same time, another person fled from Beijing to Urumqi—that was Yu Shaoliang, president of the People's Daily and one of Xi Jinping's long-time propaganda writers.

Who is he? Born in 1964, Yu graduated from the Chinese Department of Hebei University. Back when he was a reporter for the Xinhua News Agency's Hebei bureau, he became acquainted with Li Zhanshu and Xi Jinping and was one of the earliest figures involved in compiling and writing biographies about Xi’s father.

Starting in 2004, he served as head of Xinhua's Shaanxi bureau, specialising in praising Xi’s father. He later rose through the ranks, serving in the Hubei Organisation Department, as deputy party secretary of Shanghai, and eventually as editor-in-chief of People’s Daily. He is widely recognised as a leading figure in the political propaganda apparatus—a symbolic figure within the idol-making media structure of the Xi era.

This sudden trip to Xinjiang was anything but a routine business visit. Yu Shaoliang is well aware that the political climate in Beijing has shifted. He and Xi are bound together by shared interests—they're on the same sinking ship. Yu went to Xinjiang seeking safety, hoping to align himself with Ma Xingrui.

But the problem is, Ma Xingrui himself is under surveillance by He Zhongyou, the Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. He's essentially trapped, with no way to escape. Xinjiang has become the last flickering flame of the Xi faction.

On one side, Ma Xingrui is holding the line alone; on the other, Yu Shaoliang is fleeing to avoid disaster. A "Urumqi endgame" is quietly unfolding.

They are no longer just officials—they are political exiles awaiting purge. Not because they’ve done something wrong, but because they ended up on the losing side.