Wang Youqun: Will Xi Jinping Lose His Grip on Power

Xi Jinping's greatest concern is protecting his family. (People News)

[November 4, 2024] In recent months, there have been many rumors about Xi Jinping: claims of his health issues, suggestions of a "soft coup" against him, reports of rebukes by party elders, talk of a "strategic retreat," and rumors of partial loss of authority.

There is no smoke without fire. Whether or not these rumors are true, their emergence is no coincidence. Internal struggles within the CCP’s top ranks have never ceased, and the rumors surrounding Xi are directly related to these power struggles.

Since the CCP's political processes are highly secretive—especially since the 20th National Congress in 2022—following the downfall of several high-ranking officials in the Party, government, and military whom Xi personally promoted, the CCP’s political sphere has entered an even more opaque state, a "black box within a black box." People can only piece together clues to gauge the power dynamics within the CCP’s upper echelons.

For example, on October 30, the People's Liberation Army Daily and PLA's online portal reported that, with the approval of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the CMC General Office recently issued the "Guidelines for the Prosperous Development of Strong Military Culture." Notably, the report did not mention "Xi Jinping Thought" or even Xi’s name, a clear departure from past related reports. This type of omission has become increasingly common recently.

Such anomalies suggest that Xi’s power is not as secure as it once was.

Based on my observations, I believe that Xi’s authority is not only wavering but may face a significant shift, for four main reasons:

First, Xi’s health may indeed be deteriorating.

For years, there have been rumors of Xi suffering from various ailments. Whenever these rumors arise, Xi reappears, seemingly dispelling them. Yet, the rumors persist.

Why? Xi often shows signs of health issues. For example, his head tends to tilt and shake slightly involuntarily. During foreign visits, he has occasionally been seen struggling to walk steadily, or having difficulty standing up or sitting down. At times, he appears fatigued, and occasionally he seems noticeably thinner.

On October 22, when Xi arrived in Kazan, Russia, to attend the BRICS summit, he descended the airplane stairs slowly, holding onto the handrail for support, in stark contrast to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who walked down effortlessly without assistance.

Health issues for Xi are not surprising given the immense pressure he faces. Xi has shouldered all the accumulated errors from the Mao, Deng, and Jiang eras, metaphorically bearing these "three mountains" on his back. Over his 12 years in power, Xi has investigated over 600 high-ranking officials at the provincial, ministerial, and other central levels, making countless enemies. Xi’s deep-seated mistrust, constant suspicion that someone is plotting to seize his power, and the weight of these pressures would likely impact anyone’s health.

Second, Xi’s continuous policy missteps have led to significant discontent.

Xi’s 12 years in office have seen a series of major policy blunders, both domestically and internationally, including:

  • Anti-corruption campaigns targeting lower-level officials while sparing top leaders.
  • Proclaiming that "not an inch of territory left by our ancestors can be lost," while failing to punish traitors.
  • Claiming "a thousand reasons to get U.S.-China relations right," yet treating the U.S. as the "number one enemy."
  • Declaring the defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity while not condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
  • Freezing relations with Kim Jong-un for five years, only to resume support for the Kim dynasty.
  • Insisting on a "zero-COVID" policy despite its impracticality.
  • Stifling freedom of speech by reinforcing "Party media loyalty."
  • Stoking anti-Japanese sentiment over Japan's nuclear wastewater discharge.
  • Pushing the Hong Kong National Security Law, effectively ending "one country, two systems" 27 years early.
  • Intensifying pressure on Taiwan rather than winning the hearts of its people.
  • Retaining Jiang Zemin faction officials such as Wang Huning, Zhao Leji, and Han Zheng.
  • Promoting highly corrupt officials to top positions in the Party, government, and military.
  • Unwisely establishing the Xiong'an New Area on unsuitable land.
  • Favoring state enterprises over private ones, leading to rapid economic decline.
  • Investing heavily in the Belt and Road Initiative, resulting in massive losses.
  • Continuing foreign cash giveaways while 600 million Chinese live on around 1,000 yuan monthly.
  • Rejecting universal values while persistently promoting the "community of common destiny for mankind."
  • Engaging in "wolf warrior diplomacy," leaving China without a single genuine ally internationally.

These flawed decisions have plunged the CCP into an unprecedented crisis, leaving Xi alienated and surrounded by enemies both at home and abroad.

Initially, some Chinese citizens affectionately called Xi "Uncle Xi." Twelve years later, public opinion domestically and internationally is filled with criticism and insult directed at him.

In his quest to consolidate power, Xi has emphasized "loyalty to the Party," meaning loyalty to himself, stressing adherence to the "two establishments" and "two safeguards" and adherence to "Xi Jinping Thought."

However, faced with the long list of mistakes mentioned above, any high-ranking official under Xi's direct control who has any sense would naturally question, "Why should I be loyal to you?"

Third, anti-corruption campaigns within the military have provoked retaliatory backlash.

The CCP has always believed in "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Whoever controls the military wields true authority within the CCP. Xi has spent 12 years trying to assert control over the military.

Yet, to this day, Xi has not fully succeeded in consolidating military power.

Following the 20th National Congress, Xi's anti-corruption campaign in the military reached those close to Zhang Youxia, the CMC's First Vice Chairman, including State Councilor and Defense Minister Li Shangfu, and numerous subordinates from Li’s time as head of the CMC Equipment Development Department.

Li Shangfu took over as head of the Equipment Development Department after Zhang Youxia. By targeting Li Shangfu and his subordinates, Xi effectively clashed with Zhang Youxia.

Zhang Youxia has keenly observed Xi’s military anti-corruption campaign. Xi is aware of the corrupt roots planted by former CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin but has chosen not to investigate. Xi also knows that Jiang’s top aide, Jia Tingan, is highly corrupt but has left him untouched. Meanwhile, Xi has taken down Li Shangfu and several of his subordinates. Zhang Youxia may outwardly agree but likely harbors internal resentment.

In 2024, there have been major shifts in key military positions:

Xi’s two closest allies in the military, who aided him in a major military purge, were reassigned: Zhong Shaojun, Xi’s chief aide and head of the CMC General Office, was moved to the National Defense University, and Chen Guoqiang, Vice Secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Committee, was transferred to the National University of Defense Technology.

Overseas sources have leaked information that former Navy Political Commissar Qin Shengxiang (Admiral), Army Political Commissar Qin Shutong (Admiral), and current Navy Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi (Admiral) have been detained for investigation.

Qin Shengxiang, who served as director of the CMC General Office and head of the Military Reform Office, was a close aide and key assistant to Xi. Qin Shutong, promoted under Xi’s support, was seen as a loyal member of Xi’s faction, while Yuan Huazhi was groomed by Xi’s close ally, Miao Hua, head of the CMC Political Work Department.

These significant changes may likely be orchestrated by CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia.

Fourth, Xi’s previous internal power struggles always ended in narrow victories, but an illness may have now dealt him a heavy blow.

After securing a "three-term tenure" at the CCP's 20th National Congress in 2022, Xi believed that he had solidified his authority, enshrining "Xi Jinping Thought," "two establishments," and "two safeguards" in the Party Constitution. He assumed these Party rules and the Constitution would allow him to prevail in any power struggle.

However, what Xi did not foresee was a sudden illness at a critical moment in the Third Plenary Session. Even more unexpectedly, he found that his influence in the military was far weaker than that of Zhang Youxia.

Xi’s Investigation of Li Shangfu and Others May Be an Attempt to Restrict Zhang Youxia’s Military Power; However, Since the Third Plenary Session in July, Zhang Youxia’s Status in the Military Has Risen Instead of Declined, and He Now Appears to Be the Actual Controller of Military Power, Evidenced by the Following Thirteen Points:

(1) On July 31, retired professor Leng Jiepu from Renmin University of China wrote an open letter to Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, which was published online in early August. The letter stated:

He learned from WeChat that Chairman Xi Jinping was seriously ill and unable to work, and that the entirety of Party, government, and military responsibilities had fallen on Zhang Youxia and others. He suggested that, given the severe situation faced by the CCP, it would be better for it to voluntarily exit the historical stage and transition to constitutional democracy, calling for the establishment of a "Federal Republic of China." On August 11, Professor Leng Jiepu confirmed to Epoch Times reporters that he was indeed the author of the letter.

After the publication of Leng Jiepu's open letter, nothing happened. This indicates that the statement in the letter about Xi being "seriously ill" was not a baseless assertion—Xi indeed fell ill; and the claim that "the entirety of Party, government, and military responsibilities had fallen on Zhang Youxia and others" was not a reckless conclusion; after Xi’s illness, Zhang Youxia, as the de facto leader in the military, has become a decisive force in the political situation.

(2) Since July and August, there have been changes in the military leaders of three of the CCP’s five major war zones: Huang Ming was appointed Commander of the Northern Theater Command, Wu Yanan was appointed Commander of the Southern Theater Command, and the current Commander of the Central Theater Command is unclear; some believe that Political Commissar Xu Deqing may now be in overall charge of the Central Theater Command.

Those familiar with the CCP military’s inner workings, after examining the military and political leaders of the Northern, Southern, and Central Theater Commands, believe that all of them are closely connected to Zhang Youxia, either as former subordinates or with strong ties to him.

(3) From August 27 to 29, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan made his first official visit to China. To the surprise of many, Sullivan met with Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, marking the first meeting between a U.S. National Security Advisor and a CMC vice chairman in eight years.

(4) On September 10, a ceremony was held in Beijing to confer titles and awards to the astronauts of Shenzhou 16 and 17, with Zhang Youxia present to confer the awards.

(5) From September 12 to 14, the Xiangshan Forum, focusing on military and security issues, was held in Beijing, with Zhang Youxia as the primary representative of the Chinese side.

(6) On October 15 and 16, Xi visited frontline areas facing Taiwan, such as Zhangzhou and Xiamen, delivering a speech directed at Taiwan, surprisingly without any military leaders accompanying him. In Fujian, Xi also did not meet with any local military officers above the rank of division commander.

(7) While Xi was inspecting Fujian on October 14 and 15, a military theory work conference was held in Beijing, attended by Zhang Youxia, who delivered a speech.

(8) While Xi was in Fujian on October 15, Zhang Youxia met with Russian Defense Minister Belousov, who was visiting Beijing.

(9) While Xi was visiting Kazan, Russia, from October 20 to 22, Zhang Youxia attended a comprehensive military training event in Zhangjiakou, Hebei, and delivered a speech at the concluding meeting.

(10) From October 24 to 26, Zhang Youxia visited Vietnam, receiving an exceptionally high level of state protocol. Reports by Vietnamese official media indicated that during Zhang Youxia’s meetings with Vietnamese Communist leaders, Xi Jinping's name was not mentioned.

(11) On October 25, the 2024 meeting of the Advisory Board of Tsinghua University’s School of Economics and Management was held at the School of Economics and Management. Zhu Rongji entrusted Tsinghua University President Li Lumeng to convey his greetings to the advisory board members and invited experts. Former Vice President Wang Qishan has taken over from Zhu Rongji as Honorary Chairman of the advisory board and hosted a banquet for attendees.

Former CCP Politburo Standing Committee member and former Premier Zhu Rongji has rarely appeared publicly since his retirement. Former Politburo Standing Committee member and former Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Wang Qishan has faced continuous investigations into his former associates, leaving him humiliated by Xi’s actions. Now, the reappearance of Zhu Rongji and Wang Qishan has drawn public attention.

Although Xi has been attacking elder intervention, his disastrous handling of domestic and foreign affairs, widespread governmental apathy, and public dissatisfaction have also triggered discontent among retired elders.

Some commentators believe that Zhang Youxia, also a second-generation red elite, is closely connected with the CCP elders. Since the Third Plenary Session in July, taking advantage of Xi’s illness, Zhang Youxia has joined forces with CCP elders, initiating a process to strip Xi of his power. I believe this possibility exists.

(12) On October 28, the CCP Politburo held a meeting to review the "Comprehensive Report on the Third Round of Inspections of the 20th Central Committee." The Xinhua summary had two notable omissions: no mention of "Xi Jinping Thought" and no mention of the "Two Establishments" and "Two Safeguards." In previous reports of the first and second rounds of inspection reviews by the Politburo, these were mentioned.

This Politburo meeting also specifically mentioned the need to "strictly enforce democratic centralism and promote the ability of leaders to move up or down."

Since Xi’s "three consecutive terms" at the CCP’s 20th National Congress in 2022, there has been little mention of democratic centralism, with an emphasis instead on "the authority of one" — that is, Xi having the final say. Now, the sudden emphasis on "strictly enforcing democratic centralism" indicates that the "authority of one" power structure has been broken. This is likely connected to Zhang Youxia’s assertive control of military power.

The report also specifically mentioned "promoting the ability of leaders to move up or down." Who can move up? Who can move down? Some commentators suggest that this may imply that if Xi "can move up," he should also "be able to move down."

I believe that Xi certainly should "be able to move down." If Xi Jinping were not the son of CCP elder Xi Zhongxun, he would now just be an ordinary retiree.

(13) On October 29, Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the "Special Study Session for Provincial and Ministerial-Level Leading Cadres on the Spirit of the 20th Central Committee’s Third Plenary Session," in which, unusually, he did not mention "Xi Jinping Thought."

From October 30 to November 3, Xinhua released four consecutive commentaries on studying Xi’s speech, none of which mentioned "Xi Jinping Thought." On November 2, the PLA Daily and PLA News published a report titled "Effectively Unify Thoughts and Actions, Creatively Implement the Reform Task," also omitting "Xi Jinping Thought."

Conclusion

In summary, since July, due to a sudden illness, Xi’s control over the military has likely fallen into the hands of Zhang Youxia.

Xi currently retains the titles of General Secretary of the CCP, President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission in name only and merely reads prepared speeches at significant events.

To avoid major political turmoil, before finding a suitable successor for Xi, Zhang Youxia may adopt a temporarily conciliatory stance, first shifting from the "authority of one" back to "collective leadership." Once the time is ripe, he may find an excuse to announce Xi’s "retirement."

Of course, if Xi chooses to put up a final fight, his end might not be favorable.

(Dajiyuan Exclusive)

Editor: Gao Yi