Signs of Intensifying Power Crisis for Xi Jinping as More Examples Emerge of Possible Forced Departure

Image: During the March 2024 Two Sessions, Xi Jinping was photographed by foreign media in the Great Hall of the People with an expression of extreme pain while drinking tea. (Illustration by Qing Yu/People News)

[People News] Recently, four new instances have further suggested that Xi’s political crisis is intensifying. Persistent rumors about his weakening authority seem to be on the verge of confirmation. The latest four examples include Xi’s absence from the civil affairs meeting, Li Qiang’s public appearances doubling Xi’s, Zhang Youxia’s in-person army training session in Shijiazhuang, Hebei, and Zhang Youxia’s visit to Vietnam, where he was welcomed with the respect typically accorded to a head of state.

Xi’s Absence from the Civil Affairs Meeting

The main CCP media, People’s Daily and others, reported today (October 27) that the Fifteenth National Civil Affairs Meeting took place in Beijing from October 25 to 26. It emphasized Chinese-style (CCP-style) modernization, the new journey, and the Party’s strengthening of leadership in civil affairs to support basic social welfare. Representatives from provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, relevant central and state departments, and relevant "people’s" organizations attended. The report reflects the CCP’s acknowledgment that worsening living standards, business closures, soaring unemployment, and surges in social unrest across the country are starting to threaten its power. Consequently, all provinces and relevant provincial units were required to participate.

At such an important meeting, however, Xi Jinping did not personally direct, instruct, or speak. Instead, Li Qiang attended and delivered the speech. The Party media reported that Li simply relayed Xi’s directives in his address.

Li Qiang Appears Twice as Often as Xi

Checking Xi's Activities After the Kazan Summit, with Li Qiang's Appearances Outnumbering His. The writer noted that after returning from the Kazan summit, Xi Jinping’s public activities were surprisingly few compared to Li Qiang’s. On the CCP’s “Xi Jinping Activity Report” and “Li Qiang Activity Report” pages, by 2 p.m. on the 27th, Li Qiang appeared four times: Strengthening Universal, Fundamental, and Basic Social Welfare to Actively Address the Needs of the People, State Council Order, Li Qiang Presides Over the State Council Executive Meeting, and Li Qiang Presides Over the Sixth State Council Plenary Meeting. Meanwhile, Xi had only two appearances, both involving minor and somewhat inconsequential matters, neither of which were in person. One was a congratulatory message to another country’s newly elected president, and the other was a reply to university faculty and students, specifically Xi Jinping Congratulates Mozambique's Elected President Nyusi and Xi Jinping’s Reply to the Faculty and Students of Ocean University of China.

Why did Xi hastily leave his long-unseen friend Putin in the middle of the night and rush back to Beijing? It seems unlikely he returned just to send a congratulatory message or write a letter. A few months prior, Putin had reportedly expressed a strong desire to meet with Xi through other high-ranking Chinese officials. Logically, Xi and Putin should have spent more time together after the summit, perhaps hosting a post-summit party and sending Li Qiang or Wang Huning to the airport during the day to formally bid farewell, creating a grand image of BRICS unity and showcasing Xi’s stature. Yet, surprisingly, Xi quietly left for Beijing that midnight, apparently unconcerned with whether Russian officials seeing him off could rest.

What happened? Some speculate that Xi might have seen “smoke” rising over the darkened Zhongnanhai, as if someone had “lit a fire.” Others suggest that former Premier Zhu Rongji might have passed away. However, if Zhu, a former premier, had indeed passed, it’s unlikely that such a situation would warrant an urgent, late-night return from the Party leader without rest.

Zhang Youxia and the Army Combined Training Event in Shijiazhuang

So, what exactly happened? Reviewing Xi's three days in Kazan from October 22 to 24, we see that it was Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Zhang Youxia who made notable moves back in Zhongnanhai, doing two things contrary to Xi’s usual approach. One was the Army Combined Training Event held by Zhang in Shijiazhuang, Hebei, focusing on the Army with active participation from other military branches. Why does this seem out of sync with Xi’s approach?

Since coming to power, Xi has focused on expanding naval power, possibly to counter Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the U.S. Navy, with large investments in the navy, building aircraft carriers, and promoting naval commanders. For instance, Xi’s appointees include Political Work Department Director Miao Hua, Defense Minister Dong Jun, Rocket Force Commander Wang Houbin, and CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission Secretary Wang Renhua, all of whom hail from the navy. In fact, most of the top leadership in the CCP’s military is dominated by the navy. However, Zhang Youxia’s approach, rooted in his army background from the 1980s Sino-Vietnamese War, has a distinctly army-centric focus, which contrasts with Xi’s.

Leading up to the Third Plenary Session this year, Zhang Youxia had been low-profile, even absent from military meetings. However, since an incident in July where Xi reportedly suffered a cut on his head, Zhang has been increasingly active, attending meetings and making speeches, gradually asserting more authority. By enhancing the Army’s operational capabilities, Zhang is solidifying his own influence within the military, arguably in direct opposition to Xi’s military strategy. Shijiazhuang is strategically close to Beijing, the CCP’s political center, which could raise Xi’s suspicions. Political commentator Zhang Tianliang suggests that this could indicate Zhang has taken over part of Xi’s military power.

Furthermore, it’s noteworthy that the Shijiazhuang combined arms training involved relevant CMC departments, the Joint Command Center, various theater commands, military branches, CMC direct units, the armed police, and leaders from military academies. Combat units at or above the brigade level across the military, as well as related training institutions and provincial military districts, participated via video conference, following along with the training.

In his speech at the training event, Zhang Youxia did not mention “Chairman Responsibility” or Xi’s “Strong Army Thought,” nor did the usual expressions of loyalty like, “Follow Chairman Xi’s command, be accountable to Chairman Xi, let Chairman Xi be assured.” Xi’s close ally He Weidong was left sitting off-stage. In CCP military history, it is customary for the two CMC vice-chairmen to sit side-by-side if they appear together at an event. This time, however, one sat on the stage while the other sat below, clearly indicating a hierarchical relationship. Moreover, the military personnel in attendance were observed taking notes attentively, a scene typically reserved for Xi’s speeches.

Political analyst Chen Pokong noted that this indicates a shift from “Chairman Responsibility” and “Xi’s Strong Army Thought” to a system where the vice-chairmen hold the responsibility instead.

Zhang Youxia’s Head-of-State Treatment in Vietnam

The second unusual event occurred just hours before Xi’s plane returned from Kazan to Beijing, with Zhang Youxia leading a delegation to Vietnam. According to Vietnamese sources, Zhang received head-of-state treatment, meeting with Vietnam's General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, President Vo Van Thuong, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, while he engaged in in-depth discussions on international and regional affairs with Defense Minister Phan Van Giang, witnessing the signing of agreements to enhance defense cooperation. During the visit, Zhang, a veteran of the Sino-Vietnamese War, spoke extensively on "cherishing the traditional friendship between the two parties, two countries, and two militaries...keeping pace with the times to strengthen cooperation across political, economic, security, and cultural spheres, continuously promoting healthy development of military relations, and supporting the construction of the China-Vietnam community with a shared future." His tone was that of a supreme CCP leader.

Oddly, CCP media remained silent, only releasing a brief, under-500-word announcement on the Ministry of Defense website around noon on the 26th, following significant outside pressure.

With these strange events, how could Xi feel secure in Kazan? How could he not rush back to Beijing in the middle of the night? As the Party leader, reaching this point may confirm that the rumors of his power being curtailed are indeed grounded in reality.