BEIJING, CHINA - MARCH 11: China&9;s President Xi Jinping (L) speaks with former Premier Li Keqiang (C) and National People&9;s Congress Chairman Zhao Leji (R) during the fourth plenary session of the National People&9;s Congress on March 11, 2023 in Beijing, China. China&9;s annual political gathering, known as the Two Sessions, convenes the nation&9;s leaders and lawmakers to set the government&9;s agenda for domestic economic and social development for the next year.
[People News] Since the 20th CCP Central Committee’s Third Plenary Session, terms symbolizing Xi Jinping’s supreme power, such as "Xi as the Core" and "Xi Jinping Thought," have noticeably diminished in party media. Even Xi’s close allies, such as Wang Xiaohong, have gradually downplayed the "Two Establishes," which affirm Xi’s authority. Additionally, Xi has been conspicuously absent from key military meetings, and several of his close military allies have been sidelined. Rumors abound that Xi is being politically attacked by retired party elders, "second-generation reds," and Zhang Youxia, resulting in a reduction of his power. Simultaneously, the military and Zhongnanhai seem to have shifted into the "Zhang Youxia era" and the "Li Qiang era."
Curiously, state media has recently begun to feature Xi Jinping prominently again. Coverage includes his inspections in Fujian and Anhui, meetings with a Rocket Force brigade, attending the BRICS Summit in Russia, and issuing important directives on the work of national-level economic and technological development zones. Xi has once again begun to assert his dominance on national affairs.
On October 21, 2024, Xinhua News Agency, with authorization, published the "Opinions of the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council on Deepening the Reform of the Industrial Workforce." Terms like "Xi Jinping Thought," "Two Establishes," "Four Consciousnesses," "Four Confidences," and "Two Upholds" have resurfaced, indicating a revival of Xi's authority.
The content of this article suggests that the CCP is launching a new phase of class struggle, intending to make the industrial workforce follow the party’s lead and be subservient to it. On the one hand, the government pledges to "implement institutional arrangements that guarantee the role of the industrial workforce as the masters of society." On the other hand, it calls for "adhering to and developing the new 'Fengqiao Experience,' improving mechanisms for resolving labor disputes, and properly addressing contradictions in the labor field." Currently, China faces excess manufacturing capacity, insufficient domestic consumption, and foreign trade barriers from the U.S., Canada, and the EU. The CCP fears that workers without jobs may revolt, so they have begun stability-maintenance efforts within the working class.
This so-called "Opinion on Deepening the Reform of the Industrial Workforce" is clearly a top-level design by Xi Jinping, with Li Qiang’s State Council responsible for execution. As signs of Xi’s declining influence grow, speculation that Li Qiang may succeed him has intensified. At this moment, Li’s continued invocation of the “2442” slogan raises questions: Is he trying to show loyalty to secure Xi’s peaceful transfer of power, or is there something else at play?
On October 18, Li Qiang chaired a State Council executive meeting to discuss measures for promoting the establishment of a unified national market. Xi Jinping, meanwhile, made a high-profile appearance at the National Day banquet, where he hosted reformist elder statesmen Wen Jiabao and Li Ruihuan, sending a signal that his economic policies were making a sharp U-turn. Around the same time, the CCP’s fiscal and monetary policies shifted away from targeted precision and toward large-scale stimulus. Yet, Li Qiang suddenly launched the initiative to establish a "unified national market," which seems perplexing. The essence of a unified national market is centrally controlled economic planning, and its wartime economic characteristics cannot be overlooked—it may be preparation for a possible military takeover of Taiwan.
On October 15, social media platforms across China were abuzz with news that 1,500 companies from the coastal region of Guangdong would be relocating to the southwestern province of Sichuan. The companies, including TCL Group, Lenovo, Xiaomi, Gree, Changhong, Haier, and Huawei, are set to undertake this large-scale relocation. This resembles the "Third Front" construction project that China initiated in 1969 after the Zhenbao Island incident, which was rooted in wartime thinking. It suggests that the CCP is preparing an industrial backup in anticipation of a potential war in the Taiwan Strait. The goal is to safeguard key industries by moving inland, should the coastal regions be attacked or subjected to international economic blockades.
On October 19, Xinhua reported that Xi Jinping inspected a Rocket Force brigade on the 17th. Photos published by PLA Daily and CCTV showed that Xi was accompanied by Zhang Youxia, Wang Houbin, Xu Xisheng, and Fang Yongxiang during the visit. The Rocket Force is directly controlled by the Central Military Commission (CMC). Just before the Third Plenary Session, Xi removed the top leadership of the Rocket Force, replacing them with Wang Houbin and Xu Xisheng, both from the Navy. The dismissed Rocket Force generals were closely tied to Zhang Youxia. Moreover, when the CCP officially revealed the charges against Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, it was mentioned that Li was guilty of bribery, and his former boss was none other than Zhang Youxia.
In June, during a military work meeting in Yan'an, Xi Jinping stated, "Currently, the international situation, national conditions, party conditions, and military conditions are undergoing profound and complex changes. The political challenges facing our military are intricate and challenging." He urged senior officials to confront these problems head-on, show courage, reflect deeply, and address ideological issues. Xi’s criticisms seemed to be directed at Zhang Youxia.
Rumors have spread that during the Third Plenary Session, Xi Jinping suffered a sudden stroke. In response, Zhang Youxia, fearing for his position, joined forces with Wang Xiaohong to orchestrate a soft coup, successfully reducing Xi’s power. Xi subsequently disappeared from the public eye for several days, and the decrease in media coverage of him led to widespread speculation that his authority had been severely diminished.
In Xinhua's report on Xi’s inspection of the Rocket Force brigade, Xi stressed the need to "implement the spirit of the CMC Political Work Conference in the troops," "continue deepening political training," and "uphold the absolute leadership of the party over the military." He also emphasized the importance of strengthening "awareness of potential crises, war preparedness, and combat readiness," and ensuring the solid improvement of "strategic deterrence and combat capabilities."
The extensive coverage of Xi’s Rocket Force inspection, along with the deliberate publication of photos showing Zhang Youxia’s presence, seems to serve three purposes: First, it counters external rumors about Xi losing military control, implying that Xi still holds military power. Second, Xi’s emphasis on war preparations, combined with China’s recent launch of a DF-31A intercontinental ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean for the first time in 44 years, sends a strong message warning the U.S. not to interfere in the Taiwan Strait. Third, Xi is signaling that his efforts to clean up the Rocket Force were justified and effective, improving the force’s combat capabilities.
According to former CCP Navy Lieutenant Colonel Yao Cheng on his social media program, Xi’s recent inspections of Fujian and Anhui were closely monitored by his military allies, He Weidong and Miao Hua, stationed in Shanghai. The Rocket Force brigade Xi inspected in Anhui is part of the 61st Base in Huangshan. Although Xi’s power within the military has weakened, he has not completely lost control. After more than a decade of consolidating influence, Xi has many loyalists within the military. He may be biding his time, waiting for the right moment to strike back, making the situation within the military highly complex. Xi might even take a gamble and launch a war in a bid to regain his full power.
Yao Cheng’s analysis is not without merit. High-level CCP power struggles are often a matter of life and death. If Xi Jinping were to lose his grip on power, it could very well mean the end of his life, so he will not give up easily. Mao Zedong temporarily conceded during the 7,000-cadre conference but soon after launched the Cultural Revolution to take down Liu Shaoqi. Similarly, Deng Xiaoping seized military power from Ye Jianying by launching the Vietnam War.
However, Xi Jinping’s plans to invade Taiwan may not be as easy as they seem. Currently, Donald Trump’s election prospects are looking strong, and he may be re-elected as the next U.S. president. Trump’s "strategic ambiguity" on Taiwan is not genuine ambiguity—he holds the ultimate card that no one can fully predict. If Xi attacks Taiwan and angers Trump, the consequences could be catastrophic. △
(People News Exclusive)
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