Xi Jinping's Visit to Liuchi Lane: a Sign of Weakening Power

BEIJING, CHINA - MARCH 11: China's President Xi Jinping (L) speaks with former Premier Li Keqiang (C) and National People's Congress Chairman Zhao Leji (R) during the fourth plenary session of the National People's Congress on March 11, 2023 in Beijing, China. China's annual political gathering, known as the Two Sessions, convenes the nation's leaders and lawmakers to set the government's agenda for domestic economic and social development for the next year. (Photo by Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

People News - On October 17, Chinese state media Xinhua reported that Xi Jinping visited Liuchi Lane in Tongcheng, Anhui Province, expressing that "this visit was very touching." Xi stated that "Liuchi Lane embodies the wisdom of ancient Chinese people. We must promote the traditional virtues of the Chinese nation, emphasizing mutual concession and harmony, and resolving social conflicts to make our society more harmonious."

This brief news piece, just 126 words long, was prominently featured as a subheadline in Xinhua's top report about Xi's visit to Anhui. It was widely reprinted by major media outlets across China. The brevity of the statement belies its significance, hinting at deeper implications.

The story of Liuchi Lane is a well-known one. In ancient times, a local dispute arose over property boundaries between the family of Zhang Ying, a high-ranking official, and their neighbors. Rather than using his power to resolve the issue, Zhang Ying wrote a poem urging his family to retreat three feet on each side, creating a six-foot-wide alley. The story emphasizes the values of not abusing power, knowing when to retreat, and how yielding can resolve conflicts.

Top officials in Zhongnanhai have previously referenced this story to convey political messages. In 1956, during tensions between China and the Soviet Union, Mao Zedong quoted Zhang Ying’s poem in a meeting with the Soviet ambassador, suggesting reconciliation to resolve the conflict.

In November 2014, then-Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Secretary Wang Qishan, one of Xi's closest allies at the time, quietly visited Liuchi Lane. This occurred during Xi and Wang's aggressive anti-corruption campaign, which was sweeping away powerful figures like Zhou Yongkang and Xu Caihou. Following Wang’s visit, Xinhua published articles warning officials to follow discipline and avoid corruption.

So, what message is Xi Jinping sending with his visit to Liuchi Lane today?

The political alliance between Xi Jinping and Wang Qishan, often referred to as the "Xi-Wang system," has long since ceased to exist. Wang Qishan was marginalized by Xi during the 19th National Congress, and after the 20th Congress, several of Wang’s close associates, such as Dong Hong and Fan Yifei, were taken down, signaling that Wang had been sidelined. There have been rumors that Wang Qishan's brother-in-law, Yao Qing, son of former vice premier and Politburo Standing Committee member Yao Yilin, was arrested two years ago.

Recently, new rumors about Wang Qishan have surfaced. Allegedly, on the night of October 7, Wang was placed under house arrest in his residence near the eastern gate of the Forbidden City in Beijing, along with his secretary, family, and close staff. Reports from inside sources claim that significant corruption involving Wang Qishan and the Yao Yilin family has come to light. One unverified claim states that Wang’s former lover, the famous actress Fan Bingbing, has a personal bank account in the U.S. containing $780 billion.

While these rumors are difficult to confirm, it is a fact that Xi Jinping cast Wang Qishan aside years ago after having used him. As for whether Xi will further act against Wang, the likelihood seems low. There's no need for Xi to pursue Wang relentlessly, as Wang no longer poses a threat to him. Xi already faces too many enemies, and given his precarious situation, he has more pressing targets.

In contrast, Xi Jinping is now in a much weaker position compared to when Wang Qishan visited Liuchi Lane, brimming with confidence. Back then, Xi leveraged Wang’s power to suppress political opponents with a mix of hard and soft tactics, effortlessly navigating political schemes.

After the 20th Central Committee’s Third Plenum, Xi’s so-called "core" was weakened by the combined efforts of anti-Xi factions and senior Party elders. Zhongnanhai appears to have reverted to a more collective leadership model. Although Xi still appears prominently in state media, he has been frequently absent from key meetings, and his loyalists in the military have been systematically removed, with military control shifting to Zhang Youxia. Meanwhile, economic and monetary policies have quickly shifted away from Xi’s agenda, signaling a transfer of economic power. At the same time, Li Qiang has stopped playing the role of Xi’s follower and is now enjoying his own moment in the spotlight, gaining influence within Zhongnanhai. Although Xi may find this difficult to accept, he has no choice but to yield to the pressure of the current political climate.

At present, the CCP’s oppressive rule has led to an increasing number of violent incidents at the grassroots level, including extreme cases where civilians are killing officials. These outbreaks of social unrest are the consequences of Xi Jinping’s policies and the CCP’s own governance. Xi's visit to Liuchi Lane, accompanied by Party media’s slogan of "mutual concession, valuing harmony, and resolving social conflicts to create a more harmonious society," seems to offer a solution to societal ills. However, the deeper message may be a call for peace aimed at anti-Xi factions.

The rumors of Wang Qishan’s house arrest have sparked speculation, with political commentator Tang Jingyuan suggesting that this could be seen as dismantling the legacy of Xi's anti-corruption campaign from the 18th National Congress. If this is the case, Xi’s appeal for reconciliation is not about Wang Qishan but rather about salvaging his own collapsing political legacy and avoiding the fate of being completely sidelined and eventually held accountable for his actions.

In the doctrines of the Communist Party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitution, and the black handbooks of officials at various levels, there is no talk of "mutual concession" or "harmony." Instead, the philosophy is one of life-or-death struggle, following the gangster rule of "survival of the fittest" where might makes right. What matters is who has the biggest fist, and the contest is about deceit, hypocrisy, and manipulative schemes rooted in thick-skinned strategies.

Stalin and Mao Zedong, despite their public talk of Communist brotherhood and eternal Sino-Soviet friendship, actually despised each other. Stalin never truly trusted Mao and repeatedly rejected his requests to visit the Soviet Union. Mao himself criticized Stalin, listing seven sins, including Stalin's authoritarianism.

In 1956, during the Soviet Union's 20th Congress, Khrushchev made a secret speech criticizing and exposing Stalin's dictatorship. Despite this, Mao Zedong, in an effort to maintain the appearance of unity within the global communist bloc, defended Stalin, even as relations between China and the Soviet Union began to sour. When Mao referenced the story of Liuchi Lane at the time, it was still an attempt to uphold the image of an unbreakable alliance within the global communist movement.

Xi Jinping's visit to Liuchi Lane signals his unstable hold on power and precarious position. This move can be seen as a veiled message aimed at placating anti-Xi forces, a tactical maneuver to buy time. At the same time, it serves as an attempt to maintain the appearance of unity and harmony within the Party, mimicking Mao Zedong’s approach of presenting one face to the public while acting differently behind the scenes.

During Xi's recent trip to Anhui, he staged a "close to the people" act, deviating from the usual practice during his local visits where residents were instructed to stay indoors, close their windows, and draw their curtains for security. This time, Xi broke protocol by rolling down the car window, waving at bystanders, and allowing them to take photos with their phones. This is reminiscent of the high-profile National Day reception earlier this year, where Xi hosted reform-era elders like Wen Jiabao and Li Ruihuan. Both instances are carefully crafted political shows designed to create a sudden shift in his governing approach, in an effort to regain public support and extend the Party's grip on power.

Xi’s recent trips, from Fujian to Anhui, were marked by his isolation—absent were close allies like Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong. Instead, he was accompanied only by He Lifeng, a deputy premier from the Fujian faction, highlighting the loneliness and diminished authority following his weakening power base. The brutal nature of Party infighting becomes evident as Xi avoids politically symbolic locations like the historical CCP headquarters in Shanghai or the revolutionary site of Yan’an, opting instead for the symbolic Liuchi Lane in Tongcheng. His shift from glorifying the Party’s revolutionary history to visiting a site symbolizing concession and retreat indicates his concern over his weakening authority and precarious situation.