October 20, 2024 – On October 17, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader inspected a brigade of the Rocket Force. Due to ongoing rumors that Xi Jinping has lost control over the military, outside observers are closely monitoring these developments. While Xi can still carry out regular military inspections, a review of the CCP leader's military visits over the past two years reveals subtle changes.

No Inspections of the Eastern Theater Command

From October 15 to 16, Xi Jinping was in Fujian for an inspection, followed by a visit to Anhui from October 17 to 18. Both provinces fall under the jurisdiction of the CCP's Eastern Theater Command. On October 19, Xinhua News Agency reported that Xi had inspected a Rocket Force brigade on October 17, likely in Anhui.

Although Xi inspected military forces within the Eastern Theater Command, the Rocket Force brigade is not under its command. He was accompanied by Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, Rocket Force Commander Wang Houbin, Political Commissar Xu Xisheng, and newly appointed CMC General Office Director Fang Yongxiang. However, Eastern Theater Command Commander Lin Xiangyang and Political Commissar Liu Qingsong were absent.

Each of the five CCP theater commands has its own army and air force commanders. The Eastern, Southern, and Northern Theater Commands also have navy commanders, who serve as deputy commanders of their respective theater commands. The Rocket Force is not assigned to any theater command and is directly managed and commanded by the CMC. Xi inspected two provinces within the Eastern Theater Command but did not inspect its troops, choosing instead to visit a Rocket Force brigade. This may not have been his decision.

A little over a year ago, from July 5 to 7, 2023, Xi Jinping conducted an inspection tour in Jiangsu Province. Xinhua News Agency reported that on July 6, Xi inspected the headquarters of the Eastern Theater Command, where he praised the command for its "significant contributions in defending national territorial sovereignty, maritime rights, and the unification of the motherland." He also emphasized the importance of being "daring and skilled in combat."

On October 15, during his visit to Fujian, Xi went to Dongshan Island, an important location for the CCP military’s amphibious landing exercises against Taiwan. Just the day before, on October 14, the CCP military had conducted drills around Taiwan. Xi’s actions were interpreted by outside observers as a tough signal toward Taiwan. However, Xi did not take the opportunity to inspect the military or reaffirm the Eastern Theater Command’s role, suggesting he might not have the autonomy to decide when and where to visit military forces.

During his time in Fujian, Xi Jinping could have taken the opportunity to inspect the military, given that he had close relationships with some military figures during his tenure in Fujian, including generals from the 31st Army. After Xi came to power in 2012, many former 31st Army officers were quickly promoted, including current CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong and Eastern Theater Command Commander Lin Xiangyang. With rumors swirling that Xi has lost control of the military, this could have been a moment for him to visit the military in Fujian, have He Weidong and Lin Xiangyang appear alongside him, and praise their performance during the recent Taiwan drills. However, this did not happen.

Xi Jinping then went to Anhui but still did not inspect the Eastern Theater Command’s troops. Instead, he inspected a Rocket Force brigade, which doesn’t belong to the Eastern Theater Command, suggesting the visit may have been arranged for him. Zhang Youxia accompanied Xi, while He Weidong did not appear, and Lin Xiangyang of the Eastern Theater Command was also absent. Military officers at various levels are likely aware of the implications of these developments.

The Peculiarities of the CCP Military Theory Work Conference

The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) Military Theory Work Conference was held from October 14 to 15 in Beijing, attended by heads of various departments of the Central Military Commission (CMC), theater commands, and military branches. The conference conveyed directives from Xi Jinping, and CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia delivered a speech.

This meeting should have been an opportunity for the CCP leader to address senior military officers, and in some respects, it could have dispelled rumors. However, Xi Jinping was absent, choosing instead to inspect Fujian Province on October 15, skipping this important meeting. Discussions on CCP military theory should ideally be led by the CMC chairman, with the vice chairman assisting and offering suggestions. However, in this case, it was Zhang Youxia who delivered the speech and set the tone.

The principle of the CMC chairman being responsible was not reflected at this important military theory work conference. Instead, the vice chairman was in charge. It seems illogical that Xi Jinping would forego such a significant military meeting for a less critical inspection tour of Fujian.

As a result, while senior CCP military officers gathered in Beijing, Xi Jinping left the capital. During his time in Fujian, he could neither inspect the local military nor have any high-ranking officers accompany him, effectively sidelining the CMC chairman.

After the Military Theory Work Conference concluded on October 17, Zhang Youxia accompanied Xi Jinping to inspect a Rocket Force brigade in Anhui. Xi’s speech, while emphasizing the need to "uphold political leadership" and "deepen political training" while maintaining the "Party's absolute leadership over the military," did not mention the responsibility of the CMC chairman.

At the Military Theory Work Conference, Zhang Youxia's speech focused solely on military theory, without any mention of "political training" or "the Party's absolute leadership over the military." These are typically indispensable elements of CCP military theory, yet they were noticeably absent.

On October 17, after inspecting the Rocket Force brigade, Xi Jinping also visited the historic Six-Foot Alley in Tongcheng, Anhui. This move was interpreted by some as a sign of Xi potentially harboring thoughts of retirement. Xinhua reported that Xi said, "Coming here, I feel deeply touched... mutual concession and valuing harmony."

At a time when political rumors about Xi Jinping's status were rampant, the usual approach for the CCP leader would have been to emphasize "struggle." Yet, while inspecting the military, Xi spoke of "mutual concession and valuing harmony."

Changes in Reporting on Xi Jinping's Military Inspections in 2024

Since the beginning of 2024, the way Xi Jinping’s military inspections have been reported has subtly changed.

From September 10 to 13, Xi Jinping visited Gansu. On September 13, Xinhua issued a lengthy summary report, with the last section mentioning that on the morning of September 12, Xi met with military officers at the rank of colonel or above from the Lanzhou garrison and posed for a group photo, accompanied by He Weidong.

While Xi inspected the military, Xinhua did not issue a separate report, only briefly mentioning it at the end of a comprehensive summary. This change in reporting was not the first of its kind.

On February 2, Xi Jinping visited Tianjin. Xinhua specifically reported that Xi inspected and visited troops stationed in Tianjin, extended New Year’s greetings, and was accompanied by He Weidong.

From March 18 to 21, Xi conducted an inspection tour in Hunan. In a comprehensive report, Xinhua mentioned in the final section that on the morning of March 20, Xi met with military officers at the rank of colonel or above from the Changsha garrison and posed for a group photo. However, there was no separate report. Zhang Youxia accompanied Xi, and CMC General Office Director Zhong Shaojun was also present in the group photo.

From April 22 to 24, Xi inspected Chongqing. On April 25, Xinhua issued a supplementary report, noting that Xi had inspected the Army Medical University, accompanied by He Weidong. Zhong Shaojun was absent from the group photo, sparking rumors that he had been reassigned from the CMC.

From May 22 to 24, Xi visited Shandong. In a comprehensive report, Xinhua mentioned in the final section that on the morning of May 23, Xi met with military officers from the Jinan garrison and posed for a group photo. There was no separate report, and Zhang Youxia accompanied Xi. Zhong Shaojun was once again absent from the group photo.

As of October 2024, Xi Jinping has inspected the military six times during his trips. Xinhua issued separate reports three times, while the other three inspections were only briefly mentioned in comprehensive reports. The general pattern seems to be that when Xi inspects military bases, hears reports, and delivers speeches, a separate report is issued. However, when he simply meets and poses for photos, no special report is made. This marks a significant change compared to 2023.

Xi Jinping's Military Inspections in 2023

At the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in October 2022, Xi Jinping was re-elected. Shortly thereafter, on November 8, he inspected the Joint Command Center of the Central Military Commission (CMC), accompanied by newly appointed CMC members Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Li Shangfu, Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, and Zhang Shengmin. Xinhua News Agency provided special coverage of this visit. Following this, the COVID-19 outbreak in China became uncontrollable, forcing the regime to end its "zero-COVID" policy, leading to the entire CCP establishment essentially going into a passive mode.

On January 18, 2023, with the pandemic still peaking, Xi Jinping could only greet the troops via video, accompanied by all the CMC members, with Xinhua providing special coverage.

After the CCP’s power transfer at the 2023 National People’s Congress, Xi Jinping conducted an inspection tour in Guangdong from April 10 to 13. Xinhua reported that Xi visited the Navy of the Southern Theater Command on April 11, with Zhang Youxia accompanying him.

From June 7 to 8, Xi Jinping toured Inner Mongolia. A supplemental report from Xinhua later revealed that on June 7, Xi inspected border control and border defense forces in Inner Mongolia, accompanied by He Weidong.

From July 5 to 7, Xi Jinping was in Jiangsu. Xinhua reported that on July 6, Xi inspected the headquarters of the Eastern Theater Command, with Zhang Youxia by his side.

From July 25 to 27, Xi visited Sichuan. A supplemental Xinhua report revealed that on July 26, Xi inspected the Air Force of the Western Theater Command, accompanied by He Weidong.

From September 6 to 8, Xi Jinping toured Heilongjiang. A supplemental Xinhua report later stated that Xi visited the 78th Group Army on October 8, accompanied by Zhang Youxia.

From November 28 to December 2, Xi inspected Shanghai. Xinhua reported that on November 29, Xi visited the East China Sea Command of the People’s Armed Police Coast Guard, accompanied by He Weidong.

On December 13, 2023, Xi returned from a visit to Vietnam. From December 14 to 15, he was in Guangxi. In the final section of a summary report, Xinhua noted that on the morning of December 15, Xi met with senior officers from the Nanning garrison and took a group photo, with Zhang Youxia accompanying him.

In 2023, Xi inspected the military on seven occasions, held a video greeting once, and Xinhua issued special reports seven times. Only the last brief meeting and group photo in December were not given separate coverage.

As of October 2024, Xi Jinping has interacted with the military six times. Although the total number of military visits hasn't decreased compared to 2023, the number of times he personally inspected military units, received briefings, and delivered speeches has halved to just three, including his recent inspection of a Rocket Force brigade on October 17. Xinhua also issued special reports on these three occasions. The other three visits were simple meetings and group photos, which were not given special coverage. This change is notable and suggests that Xi Jinping’s control over the military may be weakening.

Changes within the CMC

It is now mostly confirmed that Zhong Shaojun stepped down as director of the CMC General Office in April 2024, becoming political commissar of the National Defense University. In September, Chen Guoqiang stepped down as deputy secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, moving to become political commissar of the National University of Defense Technology. There are also rumors that Qin Shitong, political commissar of the People's Liberation Army, is under investigation. These individuals were considered close allies of Xi, and it is said that Zhang Youxia currently holds real control over the military, with Xi’s trusted aides being gradually ousted.

From June 17 to 19, the CCP held a political work conference in Yan’an, Shaanxi. In his speech, Xi Jinping stated, "At present, the international situation, national conditions, Party dynamics, and military matters are undergoing complex and profound changes, and our military faces severe political tests."

These remarks were puzzling at the time, but in hindsight, it seems that the struggle for control of the military had already begun months earlier. Xi stressed the importance of "ensuring the Party's absolute leadership over the military" and emphasized the need to "strengthen political training." He also said that "the CMC should enhance unified leadership, and the CMC Political Work Department, Discipline Inspection Commission, and Political and Legal Committee must improve coordination."

By emphasizing politics, Xi likely sought to maintain control over the military. Twenty days after the military political work conference, on July 9, He Hongjun, executive deputy head of the CMC Political Work Department, was promoted to general. By this point, Xi's confidant Zhong Shaojun had already been removed from the CMC. He Hongjun’s promotion may have initially been seen as an effort to enhance political training, but it may now be interpreted as a sign that He Hongjun was taking over the Political Work Department's operations, potentially sidelining Xi’s ally, Miao Hua, who is the director of the Political Work Department and a member of the CMC.

In 2024, numerous senior military officials and executives from military-industrial enterprises have been purged, and there have been unusual leadership changes in the Southern, Central, and Northern Theater Commands. Newly appointed Minister of Defense Dong Jun has not been promoted to CMC membership at the Third Plenum. All of these developments suggest an ongoing power struggle within the Chinese military. The subtle changes in Xi Jinping’s military inspections may indicate that he is gradually losing control.

Although CCP officials are trying to cover up the significant political unrest to "save the Party," Zhang Youxia still needs to accompany Xi Jinping on military inspections, showing the delicate efforts behind these arrangements. However, in the CCP’s internal power struggles, there is no room for "mutual concession and valuing harmony"—it’s a fight to the death. A bigger drama may be unfolding soon.

First published by The Epoch Times

Editor: Gao Yi