File photo: On March 5, 2021, the day before the opening of China‘s National People‘s Congress (NPC), police patrol Tiananmen Square with dogs on a day of heavy air pollution in Beijing. (Photo by Kevin Frayer/Getty Images.)
[People News] In mid-October 2026, just before the 20th Central Committee's fifth plenary session of the Communist Party of China, the political climate in Beijing took a sudden downturn. On October 16, "Qiushi" magazine published a crucial article by Xi Jinping titled "Advancing Comprehensive Strict Governance of the Party with Higher Standards and More Practical Measures." The following day, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission's website provided close coverage, generating an unusual surge of public discourse and political momentum, signalling a political cleanup ahead of the fifth plenary session.
Earlier, on October 13, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission officially announced that Huang Qifan, the former deputy secretary of the Chongqing Municipal Committee and former mayor, was under investigation for serious disciplinary violations. This 74-year-old, who had been dubbed a "political weeble" by outsiders and had remained active as an "internet celebrity economist" nearly a decade after leaving office, ultimately could not avoid repercussions. This incident can be seen as the focal point of the political cleanup preceding the fifth plenary session. A systematic campaign focused on political loyalty, the elimination of dual-faced individuals, and obedience testing and admonitions throughout the Party has entered a critical phase, with a singular ultimate goal: to ensure the absolute stability of Xi Jinping's power structure and to completely eliminate any possibility of power transfer.
In an article published in 'Qiushi', Xi Jinping emphasised the necessity of upholding and strengthening the Party's comprehensive leadership while consistently advancing strict governance of the Party. He stated: 'Implementing the major decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee is a fundamental requirement for maintaining the authority of the Party Central Committee and centralised unified leadership... We stress the 'Two Upholds' and must maintain a high degree of consistency with the Party Central Committee. This must be reflected in our actual actions when implementing the major decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee; we cannot merely shout slogans, nor can we say one thing and do another.'
Since the removal of Zhang Youxia by Xi Jinping, the current power structure in Zhongnanhai has made it increasingly difficult for any disruptive forces within the system to directly challenge Xi Jinping's authority. The Communist Party of China, driven by a 'face-saving' mentality and the need to maintain the illusion of internal unity and democracy, frequently employs the terms 'Party Central' and 'centralised unified leadership' in its organisational discourse. However, those in the know understand that these terms essentially refer to Xi Jinping himself. This has seemingly established an invisible directive, an inherent political logic, and a distinct organisational culture within the Communist Party's hierarchical structure and power operation system.
In the current structure of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) society, decisions are predominantly made by the top leader. Nevertheless, the organization of the unit and the public opinion system prominently feature the party committee and party group as a front. The rationale behind this is straightforward: any erroneous decision made by the top leader is collectively shouldered by every member of the party committee. This reflects the existing power dynamics, where personal centralisation of authority supersedes collective leadership. However, the mistakes and misjudgments stemming from this personal centralisation are attributed to the collective leadership facade, with the party acting as a safety net. Why does this happen? Ultimately, everyone is in the same predicament; they are all integral parts of the party's structure, working to uphold the CCP to safeguard their own interests. The CCP continues to exist thanks to these individuals, meaning that everyone is trying to hammer while also getting hammered.
Conversely, while Xi Jinping wields significant power, it does not imply that everyone is in agreement. The political purges and the economic strategy of advancing state-owned enterprises while retreating private ones under Xi Jinping's regime have left both officials and the public feeling frustrated yet unable to express their anger. Consequently, within the system, officials will publicly align themselves with the party for self-preservation, but in private or semi-private settings, they often seize opportunities to subtly criticise or voice opinions that contradict Xi Jinping's policies. However, from Xi Jinping's perspective, all of this is viewed as extreme disloyalty and outright betrayal.
In his article in Qiushi, Xi Jinping issued a clear warning about the need to be vigilant against 'two-faced people'—those who harbour dual intentions and whose words do not align with their actions. Some individuals loudly profess their political loyalty, quickly express their opinions with high rhetoric, yet in practice, they merely pay lip service while acting independently. They may even ignore orders and prohibitions, engaging in the 'seven things that exist.' Others promote liberalism in thought, opportunism in politics, sectarianism in organisation, self-centeredness in work, and a paternalistic approach in fulfilling responsibilities. Such behaviours 'violate the principles of party character, severely obstruct the implementation of major decisions and deployments from the Party Central Committee, and pose a significant threat to the Party's cause and image. We must be bold in exposing and decisively eliminating these issues.' Xi Jinping emphasised that it is essential not only to punish individuals but also to target their motivations. During the leadership transition process, we must remain vigilant and ensure that 'two-faced people,' political fence-sitters, ambitious individuals, and those who say one thing but mean another do not evade scrutiny.
An article published on the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection's website on October 17 directly connected this warning to the upcoming Fifth Plenary Session. It stressed the importance of consistently advancing the comprehensive and strict governance of the Party, reiterating a strong message that 'regardless of one's position, contributions, or retirement status, anyone involved in corruption will find no escape and no so-called safe landing.' In the political circles of the Communist Party, there is a saying that one does not target the poor or the lazy, but specifically goes after those who are blind to their actions. The downfall of Huang Qifan serves as a bloody reminder of this political message from the Communist Party.
Huang Qifan served in Chongqing for approximately 15 years, collaborating with several municipal party secretaries, including Bo Xilai and Sun Zhengcai. He successfully navigated the political turmoil that resulted in the downfall of two Politburo members, and after his departure from office, he frequently made public appearances with economic insights. Following the announcement of his investigation, the official report referred to his title from his time in Chongqing. The Chongqing Municipal Standing Committee quickly held a meeting, clearly expressing their 'strong support for the decisions of the Party Central Committee,' and described this as a demonstration of a thorough effort to eliminate toxic influences and to continuously restore and purify the political environment. Since the 20th National Congress, there have been numerous political upheavals in Chongqing, with several high-ranking officials dismissed. Huang Qifan's fall illustrates that as long as Xi Jinping wields the sword of political loyalty, no one is safe; there are no temporal boundaries and no secure spaces for a soft landing.
Recently, with the Fifth Plenary Session on the horizon, various rumours have emerged online, such as Li Qiang potentially succeeding as General Secretary, Xi Jinping retaining only the position of Chairman of the Military Commission, or following Jiang Zemin's 'Nine Dragons Governing Water' approach by relinquishing the roles of State President and General Secretary to govern 'behind the curtain.' However, a closer examination reveals that these rumours are impractical within the framework of realpolitik. The signals sent by Huang Qifan's investigation, along with significant articles from Qiushi magazine and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection's website, clearly indicate that Xi Jinping is still undertaking systematic political cleansing, as his power structure has not yet stabilised to a point where a transition of power is feasible.
Firstly, Xi Jinping's military authority is currently unstable. The military's extensive purges are still being carried out covertly, the structure of the Military Commission is incomplete and facing pressure for adjustments, and issues regarding military morale and mutual trust among commanders remain unresolved. In this context, voluntarily giving up the highest positions in the party and government while retaining only the chairmanship of the Military Commission would effectively undermine his own authority. Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin were able to maintain only the chairmanship of the Military Commission because they had firmly established their control over the military, which was highly obedient. At present, military power still requires ongoing purging and consolidation; Xi Jinping cannot afford to weaken his direct leadership over the party and government while his power base is not yet fully secure. The intertwining of political and military power means that losing the party's core leadership position would significantly diminish the actual mobilisation and command effectiveness of the Military Commission chairmanship. Individuals like Huang Qifan, once regarded as technocrats, have ultimately been included in the purges, demonstrating that even previously valuable local officials may face accountability if they no longer fully align with current political and loyalty standards. This further illustrates that the transfer of power is not merely a simple handover of positions, but must be based on absolute control and unwavering loyalty as essential political prerequisites.
Secondly, Li Qiang, as Premier, is considered relatively weak compared to his predecessors and is colloquially referred to as the 'weak chicken Premier.' He is not Xi Jinping's first choice within his most trusted inner circle. If the position of General Secretary were to be given to Li Qiang, Xi Jinping would find it hard to feel completely secure. Additionally, core figures in the inner circle, such as Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, and He Lifeng, may not fully support this decision either. More importantly, Li Qiang's early experiences in regions like Zhejiang reflect a market-oriented and commercial mindset, which could conflict with Xi Jinping's focus on state-owned enterprises, prioritising security, and a comprehensive national security approach to economic governance. The underlying logic of economic policy is inconsistent; once power is transferred, there is a risk of divergence and derailment in policy implementation and resource allocation. Xi Jinping is unlikely to easily hand over the highest authority to a candidate whose ideology does not fully align with his own and who has a relatively limited base of authority. The lifelong accountability and relentless pursuit seen in Huang Qifan's investigation exemplify the re-concentration of power and the initiation of a new round of rectification, rather than signalling a transfer of power or confirmation of succession.
Third, the Taiwan issue stands as one of the central themes and greatest anxieties in Xi Jinping's political career. He has framed the unification of Taiwan as a pivotal political objective for national rejuvenation, intricately linking it to his efforts in military strengthening, the narrative of national revival, and the political promises made prior to his ascension. War, at its core, is an extension of politics; should he retain only the role of Chairman of the Central Military Commission while losing the highest leadership position within the Party, the complexities of war mobilisation, political mobilisation, and decision-making coordination would increase significantly, thereby raising both the feasibility and political costs associated with military unification. If Xi Jinping fails to make tangible progress toward unification during his tenure, it would not only represent a policy failure but could also be perceived as a deficiency in political capability, potentially undermining the political commitments and organisational trust that were central to his rise to power. Losing the core leadership of the Party would mean voluntarily relinquishing the political instruments necessary to achieve this goal and diminishing the capacity to mobilise support for this political aim, which would starkly contrast with Xi Jinping's long-standing political narrative and ambitions for military expansion. Viewed from this angle, if Xi Jinping were to transfer power or retreat from the forefront, it would imply that he is not only incapacitated but that his political life is effectively paralysed—an outcome he would find utterly unacceptable.
Fourth, the tendency for lifelong rule and an obsessive fixation on power are common traits among many highly centralised leaders throughout history. The political careers of figures such as Mao Zedong, Stalin, Brezhnev, and Kim Jong-un illustrate that even when in poor health, they seldom relinquish their authority easily. The succession of power typically favours internal family ties or absolutely controllable direct relationships, rather than transferring it to outsiders or non-core trusted individuals. The 'magical effect' of power can also lead both the leaders and those around them to misjudge their health. Associates and doctors of the leader often hesitate to provide complete and honest reports, and the leader may overestimate their own condition. The Wall Street Journal has revealed details of official visits, noting that a private lounge was restricted to only the leader and Peng Liyuan, which raises intriguing questions. This arrangement suggests that the knowledge of Xi Jinping's actual health status may be tightly confined to a very small circle. Aside from the doctors, it remains a mystery who currently has the most comprehensive understanding of Xi Jinping's true health condition. Given this complex and asymmetric information structure, the likelihood of Xi Jinping voluntarily relinquishing power is nearly zero.
In summary, the investigation into Huang Qifan and the concurrent release of significant articles by "Qiushi" and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) are aligned with Xi Jinping's personnel and policy strategies for the Fifth Plenary Session. This meeting is anticipated to further solidify Xi Jinping's core authority, enhance compliance, and promote a thorough cleanup. The trajectory from the strict governance of the Party discussed in earlier Politburo meetings, to the explicit warnings in "Qiushi" articles about 'two-faced individuals', and the CCDI's reaffirmation of limitless anti-corruption measures, suggests that the political logic behind the Fifth Plenary Session and the 21st National Congress at Zhongnanhai will not involve a transfer of power. Rather, it will signify a continued concentration of Xi Jinping's power and an ongoing extension and purging of the political blacklist. All these actions will be personally directed and orchestrated by Xi Jinping until the moment he faces a catastrophic failure or the CCP experiences an unexpected collapse.
(First published by the People News)△
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