Many well-known impoverished counties in China have built extravagant government office buildings. Pictured here is the luxurious government building in Zhengding County, one of Hebei Province's poor counties. (Video screenshot)
[People News] On May 2, a WeChat public account in mainland China referenced an article from "Banyue Tan," which exposed the situation of wealthy officials being supported by the impoverished Dafang County in Guizhou, drawing significant attention from netizens.
The article notes that Dafang County in Bijie, Guizhou, is classified as a national-level poverty-stricken county. In 2022, the county's tax revenue was merely 414 million yuan, while in 2023, the salary expenditures for formal staff reached 2 billion yuan, temporary staff 460 million yuan, and retired personnel 170 million yuan, resulting in a total salary expenditure of 2.63 billion yuan—over six times the local tax revenue. The total number of individuals supported by the government exceeds 44,000, while the county's permanent population is around 600,000, meaning that for every 14 local residents, one is supported by government funds.
Even more alarming is that Dafang County is not an isolated case; it reflects a widespread issue across thousands of underdeveloped counties under CCP governance. While the CCP publicly claims to "serve the people," in reality, officials are living off the land, the bureaucratic system is bloated and inefficient, financial self-sustainability is depleted, investments in public welfare are limited, and debt risks are on the rise, ultimately creating a vicious cycle of "the poorer the county, the more officials are supported; the more officials are supported, the poorer the county."
Dafang County case study: 400 million yuan in tax revenue supports 44,000 officials
Dafang County's financial records serve as a textbook example of "eating from the public purse." In 2023, there were 15,580 formal positions with an average annual salary of approximately 128,300 yuan; 28,806 temporary positions with an average salary of only 16,100 yuan; and thousands of retired personnel costing 170 million yuan. When combined, the financial support exceeds 44,000 individuals.
In 2022, local tax revenue amounted to only 414 million yuan, while transfer payments from higher authorities soared to 4.228 billion yuan, exceeding local tax revenue by more than tenfold. The operational model of the entire county can be summarised as 'the East pays, the Central region coordinates, and the West consumes'; locally, there is virtually no wealth creation, with the primary role being the distribution of financial support from developed areas.
Back in 2020, Dafang County was reported by the State Council's Inspection Office for owing 480 million yuan in teacher salary subsidies and misappropriating 340 million yuan from education funds. The saying 'there is money to pay salaries, but no funds for real projects' has become commonplace. Similar circumstances are widespread in the Wumeng Mountain region, with counties like Yongshan and Yiliang in Yunnan, and Weining and Hezhang in Guizhou, experiencing low tax revenues, typically between 100 million and 300 million yuan, while personnel numbers often range from 20,000 to 40,000, leading to salary expenditures that are consistently several times higher than tax revenues.
A more profound issue lies in the dual-track system of 'formal positions + temporary hires.' Those in formal positions benefit from stable, high salaries and perks, receiving compensation without performing work, while the number of temporary hires is often 1.5 to 2 times that of formal staff, shouldering a significant amount of grassroots responsibilities but earning only meagre wages. This system not only inflates the support structure but also fosters internal inequities, while simultaneously circumventing staffing controls.
The national ratio of officials to civilians stands at one official for every 20 people, a disparity that is even more pronounced at the grassroots level.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has consistently downplayed or obscured the statistics regarding the 'official-civilian ratio,' yet various studies and estimates have unveiled a startling reality. Research published in 2025 by Fudan University and other institutions indicates that in 2020, the number of personnel supported by the Chinese government, using a median measure that includes both active and retired staff, was approximately 68.46 million. This figure represents about 4.85% of the total population, equating to one government-supported individual for every 20 people. This ratio has significantly risen from 4.01% in 2004 and continues to grow gradually.
Some perspectives suggest that the broader definition of government-supported personnel may approach or even exceed 80 million. At the grassroots level, particularly in county and township areas, the support ratio is considerably higher than the national average. Two-thirds of government-supported personnel are concentrated in cities and counties. The challenges faced by small counties in the western regions are particularly severe. For instance, in a certain small county in the west, with a permanent population of just over 30,000, there are more than 6,000 government-supported individuals, resulting in an official-civilian ratio as high as 1:5.
Civil servants, public institution employees, and those in quasi-public roles, along with party and community workers, temporary hires, retirees, and casual workers, create a vast and intricate system where those within the official ranks enjoy leisure while those outside work diligently. Although employees of state-owned enterprises are not solely government-supported, the monopolisation of resources and significant hidden financial support are also considerable.
The fiscal self-sufficiency rate of counties stands at 38%, with 90% of expenditures allocated to personnel costs and debt repayment.
A report from Southwest University of Finance and Economics in 2025 reveals that the average fiscal self-sufficiency rate for the 2,774 county-level regions across the country is merely 38%. This implies that for every 100 yuan spent, 62 yuan is sourced from higher-level financial support. In underdeveloped counties in the central and western regions, the self-sufficiency rate is generally below 20%, with some counties reporting as low as 1%.
These county towns largely replicate the model of Dafang County. Tax revenues are low, with most counties generating between 100 million and 300 million yuan, facing industrial hollowing and low agricultural added value. The collapse of the real estate market has led to a corresponding collapse in land finance. In 2024, the average income from land transfers at the county level across the country is projected to drop by 18.3%. Rigid expenditures, such as county wages and debt interest, account for 70-90% of the budget, leaving only the prospect of 'drawing a big pie' for investments in people's livelihoods.
By 2025, the total debt at the county level nationwide is expected to exceed 40 trillion yuan, with an average debt of about 2.2 billion yuan per county. Many counties have debt ratios that exceed warning levels, relying on new borrowing to pay off old debts. The norm has become 'wages depend on transfer payments, and development relies on borrowing.' When transfer payments fluctuate, it leads to a series of negative incidents, including public transport suspensions, delayed teacher salaries, and migrant workers resorting to aggressive wage demands.
Concentration of power, distorted assessments, and hereditary positions have become entrenched
The disproportionately high ratio of officials to citizens in the Communist Party of China (CPC) is rooted not only in institutional redundancy and profit-driven motives but also in the nepotistic inheritance of advantageous positions within the system. The fiscal support system has effectively turned into a family club that solidifies interests and perpetuates intergenerational cycles.
Monopolised industries have become a major area of hereditary succession, with 'iron rice bowls' in sectors like tobacco, oil, railways, electricity, and banking being passed down through generations. The tobacco industry is the most typical example of a 'rent-seeking' sector, where the phenomenon of 'third-generation tobacco' is common, with three generations entrenched in the same system. Grandfathers work in tobacco, fathers take over, and children continue to 'pass on the torch.' There are even extreme cases, such as a 'second-generation' tobacco worker who publicly boasts about a monthly allowance of 200,000 yuan and multiple properties, inciting anger among smokers.
Similar terms include 'Iron Three Generations', 'Electric Two Generations', 'Oil Two Generations', and 'Tax Two Generations'. A popular saying among the public states: 'If one person works in taxation, the whole family becomes wealthy'; 'With banks plus insurance, two electricity companies plus one grass, and oil plus petrochemicals, even the doorman earns quite a bit.' Employees in these monopolised industries earn an average salary that is 2-3 times higher than that of other sectors, and when considering hidden benefits, the actual disparity is even greater.
Intergenerational inheritance is also prevalent in the civil service and public institution sectors. Children of parents within the system have a significantly higher success rate in securing positions, with some grassroots areas experiencing phenomena such as 'fathers and sons in the same hall' and 'husbands and wives in the same post'. Research from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and others indicates that the likelihood of children of officials becoming cadres is more than 2.1 times that of non-official children. Surveys reveal that 37.8% of children of government officials or corporate leaders continue to pursue careers as civil servants or corporate leaders, a figure that far exceeds that of children from ordinary families.
The Communist Party of China is grappling with multiple challenges, including economic stagnation, social discontent, and a governance crisis.
The hereditary nature of high-ranking positions among officials directly hinders economic growth. The vitality of the private economy is stifled, and young people are adopting a laid-back lifestyle, which exacerbates internal competition. On a societal level, feelings of injustice are accumulating explosively, with phrases like 'it’s hard for poor families to produce noble sons' and 'reading is useless' gaining popularity, leading to anxiety among lower-class youth that morphs into latent dissatisfaction with the system. The rigid expenditures associated with high-welfare hereditary positions crowd out investments in public welfare, with the Gini coefficient remaining persistently high, and the disparities between industries, urban and rural areas, and social classes widening, creating a potential powder keg for social instability.
The absurd financial situation in Dafang County highlights the severe challenges facing county-level economies under the Communist Party and the comprehensive failure of grassroots governance.
(First published in People News) △
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