March 11, 2023: Senior members of the CCP’s Central Military Commission line up to take the oath at the National People’s Congress. From right to left: Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Li Shangfu, Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, Zhang Shengmin. (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)
[People News] After the CCP’s military newspaper published an editorial last month criticizing “military tigers” He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others, it published another article today (13th) once again mentioning the He Weidong–Miao Hua case, discussing anti-corruption and removing political risks, and unusually referring to “gunfire.” Overseas interpretations of this major military case have already produced at least two versions of “military infighting,” involving the subtle relationship between Xi Jinping and Zhang Youxia.
Military Newspaper Mentions “Gunfire” When Discussing He Weidong–Miao Hua Case
Expert: It Might Have Nearly Turned Into an Armed Clash
On November 13, the CCP military newspaper published a commentary on “political army-building,” revisiting the major case of He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others. The article stated:“If we do not thoroughly remove the rotten elements before the guns go off, it will leave major political security risks. At critical moments, the consequences would be unimaginable.”
Current affairs commentator Li Linyi told The Dajiyuan that it is normal for the CCP military to talk about anti-corruption, but emphasizing “major political risks” and “removing rotten elements before the guns go off” evokes associations with mutiny or armed rebellion—implying the other side planned to act but was arrested before they could, “almost leading to a firefight.”
Earlier, the communiqué of the Fourth Plenum of the 20th CCP Central Committee on October 23 confirmed that He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others were expelled from the CCP for “broken loyalty” and “seriously undermining the Party’s principle of commanding the gun and the CMC chairman responsibility system.” The next day, the military newspaper published an editorial saying that “thorough investigation of corrupt elements such as He Weidong and Miao Hua” had “powerfully eliminated major political risks.”
Ming Juzheng, honorary professor of political science at National Taiwan University, analyzed in the program Frontline Politics and Economics that the military newspaper’s use of terms such as “broken loyalty” and “seriously undermining the Party’s command of the gun” are extremely harsh—much more severe than corruption accusations—suggesting possible disloyalty to the top leader, or even more serious political conspiracy.
By October 31, 2025, The Dajiyuan found that among the 79 full generals promoted by Xi Jinping, around 36 had already been officially dismissed, removed, or rumored to have fallen—nearly half. Among them, 5 full generals including Li Shangfu were officially removed in 2023, and 9 full generals including He Weidong were expelled from the Party and military in October 2025.
At the Fourth Plenum in late October, 27 military representatives were absent, including 22 full generals. Southern Theater Command Political Commissar General Wang Wenquan, who did not miss the Plenum, then missed the November 5 commissioning ceremony of the Fujian aircraft carrier—indicating he may also have fallen. As for fallen lieutenant generals and major generals, while lists cannot be confirmed, some whistleblowers claim the number may involve over a thousand officers.
The November 13 military newspaper article stressed, “If corruption occurs in the military, combat effectiveness will be lost and the army will collapse without fighting,” and that the CCP military becomes “stronger, purer, and more combat-ready the more it fights corruption.”
Li Linyi stated that although corruption certainly harms combat capability, the shockwaves from this internal power struggle have already severely weakened the army’s cohesion and fighting power. The authoritarian system inherently produces corruption, and the CCP has entered a vicious cycle of “the more it fights corruption, the more corruption grows.” Now it is “without anti-corruption the Party dies; with anti-corruption the Party also dies.”
Two Versions of Military Infighting Emerge — Both Involving Xi’s Loyalist Factions Turning on Each Other
Two versions regarding the background of the He Weidong–Miao Hua case have recently appeared.
Version 1 — Proposed by independent commentator Du Zheng
On November 9, Du Zheng first proposed in Up Media that Xi Jinping unusually promoted his confidant Miao Hua to oversee military personnel, then extraordinarily promoted another confidant, He Weidong, directly to Politburo member and CMC vice chairman. Xi turned a blind eye to Miao Hua’s massive selling of ranks, resulting in widespread “promotion with illness” chaos.
After appointment, He Weidong’s ambitions expanded. He targeted Zhang Youxia and launched a “retroactive investigation into military equipment,” punishing a group of generals. South China Morning Post reported that during the March 2024 CCP “Two Sessions,” He Weidong told military delegates he would crack down on “fabricated combat capabilities.” His criticism was aimed at equipment procurement flaws under Zhang Youxia and fraudulent training practices within the ranks.
Du Zheng said that next, figures in Zhang Youxia’s faction counterattacked, reporting Miao Hua’s selling of ranks. Xi had no choice but to agree to a probe. Shortly after Miao Hua was suspended and investigated, He Weidong suddenly “disappeared.” As a civilian-born officer, He Weidong could not possibly outfight princeling Zhang Youxia.
Version 2 — Revealed by former CCP Central Party School professor Cai Xia
Cai Xia disclosed in the YouTube program Fangfei Time another version: the purge was not entirely led by Xi Jinping but was instead initiated by Zhang Youxia as a preemptive political counterattack. The retroactive equipment investigation and Rocket Force corruption scandal were closing in on Zhang Youxia, so he did not sit and wait—he struck first. He Weidong and Miao Hua, along with 9 full generals, fell in succession—possibly a counterstrike from Zhang Youxia.
Cai Xia also revealed:
“He Weidong and Miao Hua once conspired to form a ‘private army’ in the Tianjin–Langfang corridor not subordinate to any theater command, to provide Xi Jinping with emergency armed support. But the plan was discovered by Zhang Youxia and became the leverage used to purge them.”
At the Fourth Plenum, 9 full generals were removed; Zhang Shengmin was promoted to CMC vice chairman but did not obtain a Politburo seat. Cai Xia said Xi and Zhang Youxia have temporarily reached a “mutual-destruction stalemate” where “neither side can completely eliminate the other, so both must coexist temporarily.”
Li Linyi compared the two versions: he believes the first is more about infighting among Xi’s own loyalists, forcing Xi to take action, while the second—regarding a “private army” formed for Xi—implies Xi’s involvement. In either case, Xi—whether actively or passively removing He Weidong and Miao Hua—has nearly destroyed his own military authority.
Zhang Youxia Publishes Article Praising Xi at a Sensitive Moment
On November 12, Zhang Youxia wrote an article in People’s Daily praising Xi Jinping, mentioning him at least 20 times, claiming comprehensive military rectification, preventing “two-faced people” and fake loyalty, and upholding the core.
Li Linyi told The Dajiyuan that since rumors have surged recently about Zhang Youxia dominating the military like a king, his article might be an attempt to dispel rumors under pressure from internal struggle. But historically, CCP officials who loudly declare loyalty to the top leader often fail to uphold it at critical moments—and later either get discarded or rebel.
(Reported by Dajiyuan journalist Ning Haizhong)
△

News magazine bootstrap themes!
I like this themes, fast loading and look profesional
Thank you Carlos!
You're welcome!
Please support me with give positive rating!
Yes Sure!