Under the Bright Moon, the Former Country Is Too Painful to Look Back On: Xi Jinping Smashes a Winning Hand

On October 17, nine generals including CCP Politburo member and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong were expelled from the Party and the military on the same day. (Dajiyuan composite image)

[People News] The year 2025 is the most humiliating year in Xi Jinping’s 13 years in power: among the 79 full generals personally promoted by Xi, 36 have either fallen or are rumored to have fallen. Xi’s trusted allies in the military have been almost completely wiped out.

In particular, Xi’s No. 1 confidant in the military—CCP Politburo member and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong—and Xi’s No. 2 confidant—CMC member and Director of the CMC Political Work Department Miao Hua—were investigated for “collapsed faith and broken loyalty,” for “seriously undermining the principle that the Party commands the gun and the CMC chairman responsibility system,” and for corruption of an “extremely large amount.” This is equivalent to the breaking of Xi’s left and right arms in the military. Xi has become a “bare-pole commander,” and the military authority he valued most has slipped out of his hands.

When Xi Jinping met U.S. President Trump on October 30, 2025, he read the script word for word—this was a true reflection of Xi’s current situation. Xi has become an actor performing a script written by others. His days of standing at the apex of power, “establishing himself as the sole authority,” are gone forever.

What Xi now worries about most is not national livelihood, but so-called “political security”—the safety of his own family’s lives—“Under the bright moon, the former country is too painful to look back on.”

Why has Xi fallen to such a state after just 13 years in power? What is Xi’s biggest lesson? This question is worth deep reflection by high-level officials in Zhongnanhai who still possess common sense and conscience.

Looking through the chaotic appearances, illusions, and mirages, I believe Xi’s biggest lesson can be summed up in two words: preserving the Party.

I. To Preserve the Party, Xi “Caught the Thieves but Not the King.”

The first major event Xi undertook after coming to power was launching an anti-corruption campaign at the Second Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in January 2013. By the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, Xi had investigated 440 ministerial- and vice-ministerial-level officials and other central-level cadres.

Most of them were promoted and heavily used by Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong. Judging from the list of Xi’s anti-corruption tigers, Jiang and Zeng were essentially the ultimate backers of the most seriously corrupt figures in the Party, government, and military at the time.

At that time, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign was already approaching the “tiger king”—Jiang and Zeng. If Xi had pressed forward, capturing the thieves and the kings, arresting Jiang and Zeng to rectify the system at its source, the anti-corruption movement might have truly become the beginning of a renewed China.

However, despite knowing that Jiang and Zeng were the ultimate backers of the worst corruption at the top levels of the CCP, Xi spared them in order to preserve the Party. As a result, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign was neither a remedy for symptoms nor the root—it became merely a tool of a power struggle.

Anyone Xi deemed not a threat to his power—no matter how corrupt—he would not touch. Jiang and Zeng were untouched; Jiang’s son Jiang Mianheng and Zeng’s son Zeng Wei were untouched; Jiang’s “military secretary,” former CMC General Office Director Jia Ting’an, was untouched; Zeng’s confidant, former Politburo member and Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission Meng Jianzhu, was untouched; a whole cohort of princelings under Jiang and Zeng were untouched. In effect, the system and mechanisms of “governing the country through corruption” established by Jiang and Zeng remained entirely intact.

The further consequence: the more Xi fought corruption, the more corruption spread.

After Xi secured his “third term” at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, a wave of corruption cases broke out starting from the Rocket Force. One batch after another of severely corrupt high-ranking CCP officials fell—surpassing even the Jiang-Zeng era. Even Xi’s most trusted confidants, He Weidong and Miao Hua, turned out to be deeply corrupt.

II. To Preserve the Party, Xi Not Only Refused Political Reform but Dramatically Reverted to Authoritarianism

In 1986, CCP leader Deng Xiaoping said:“If we only reform the economic system and not the political system, the economic reform won’t work, because the first obstacle is people. You advocate decentralization, but others tighten their grip—what can you do? Ultimately, whether our reforms succeed depends on political reform.”

Beginning in 1986, Deng tasked then-Premier Zhao Ziyang with studying political reform. In the Fifth Section of his report to the 13th Party Congress in 1987, Zhao discussed political reform in detail and began to implement it afterward.

However, when the 1989 spring–summer student movement—against profiteering, corruption, and in favor of democracy and freedom—broke out, Deng and Zhao split fundamentally on whether to resolve the issue through democratic rule of law or military suppression. Zhao advocated rule of law; Deng advocated using troops.

Ultimately, CMC Chairman Deng ordered 200,000 troops into Beijing, resulting in the June 4 Tiananmen massacre. Zhao Ziyang was toppled. Deng personally strangled political reform.

From 1989 to Xi’s rise in 2012, the CCP only reformed the economy, not politics. This “limping reform” combined the flaws of planned and market economies—resulting in rampant transactions of power, money, and sex, with virtually no official uncorrupted.

Xi inherited the rotten mess left by Jiang’s corruption and de facto regency. To seize back real power from Jiang and Zeng, Xi launched anti-corruption campaigns, and by the 19th Party Congress in 2017, after taking down 440 tigers, he became the “core.”

But on the one hand, Xi spared Jiang and Zeng; on the other, he offended too many officials. Voices condemning Xi, opposing Xi, calling for his downfall, erupted at home and abroad. Xi’s personal safety became his top priority.

In Xi’s second term, “preserving the Party, power, and life” became the top agenda. Thus Xi moved from centralization to absolute authoritarianism.

Xi first chaired numerous “leading small groups” to concentrate dispersed power in his own hands; then he broke 40-plus years of precedent by seeking a third term at the 20th Party Congress, reaching the apex of power and becoming another authoritarian ruler after Mao.

Since Xi took office, political reform made no substantive progress—instead, there was a clear regression toward Cultural Revolution-style leftism.

Deng’s reform began with decentralizing Party power—separating Party and government, government and enterprises, and delegating authority. But Xi revived Mao’s slogan: “The Party leads everything—Party, government, military, schools, east, west, south, north, center.”

Deng criticized the problems of “over-centralized Party power,” saying the Party managed many things it should not, could not, and was not good at. Xi returned to managing all things the Party should not, cannot, and is not good at.

The result: one major domestic and foreign policy blunder after another.

For example: the first four Rocket Force commanders appointed by Xi—Wei Fenghe, Zhou Yaning, Li Yuchao, Wang Houbin—were all severely corrupt. Some say Xi’s actions are: “Blunder after blunder; the more he struggles, the more mistakes he makes.”

With Xi’s political regression, he gained absolute power, becoming the sole authority.

When the top beam is crooked, the lower beams are crooked. Officials at every level emulate Xi, seeking absolute power within their own domains.

Absolute power inevitably produces absolute corruption.

From the General Secretary down to village Party secretaries, everyone seeks “absolute power,” resulting in the malignant spread of corruption—cancer cells spreading from marrow to skin. Now it is at the terminal stage; no one can reverse it.

Because Xi regressed toward authoritarianism, China’s economic reform has been “brain dead.” Arbitrary power, violating objective laws, has driven the economy into a dead end.

Today, five obvious signs of CCP system collapse—economic stall, youth despair, breakdown of information control, society reconnecting, and external pressure—are all flashing red.

Scholars predict: The question is not whether the CCP will collapse but when.

III. To Preserve the Party, Xi Shouldered the Three “Black Cauldrons” Left by Jiang Zemin

Xi’s most severe consequence of preserving the Party without arresting Jiang was that he had to bear three enormous burdens.

The world now knows Jiang committed three major crimes:

1. Jiang was the ultimate backer of the most corrupt elites in the CCP’s top leadership.

2. Jiang was the greatest traitor in modern China.

3. Jiang was the chief culprit of murdering Falun Gong practitioners through large-scale forced organ harvesting.

These are grave, capital-level crimes.

After Jiang’s death on November 30, 2022, Xi extolled Jiang with nauseating praise at the memorial service—effectively taking Jiang’s three black burdens onto his own shoulders.

But these burdens are too enormous, too dark, too heavy—far beyond what Xi can bear.

Regarding the first crime: because Xi spared Jiang, Zeng, their sons, and their princeling networks, no matter how many corrupt officials Xi has punished, none of their families or backers have any respect for him. Instead, they resent him deeply and wish for his downfall—some even want him removed outright.

Regarding the second crime: Xi once said, “Not one inch of territory left by our ancestors can be lost.” But Jiang signed treaties with Yeltsin ceding over one million square kilometers of northeast China—far from “one inch,” but millions of acres. This does not even count the territories and waters ceded in the northwest, southwest, and south.

With this burden, Xi cannot hold his head high internationally. Foreign leaders may not say it openly, but internally they despise him.

Regarding the third crime: large-scale organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners has been documented by two renowned investigators—former Canadian Secretary of State (Asia-Pacific) David Kilgour and international human rights lawyer David Matas.

The CCP has always denied organ harvesting. In response, Luo Yu, son of CCP general Luo Ruiqing, once said:“You say you didn’t harvest organs. Fine. The two Davids wrote reports and testified in the U.S. Congress. Why don’t you sue them? Let the world hear why they say you did it, and let them hear your explanation. Why don’t you dare sue? Because once you sue, you’re finished.”

The two Davids called the CCP’s organ harvesting
“an evil unprecedented on this planet.”

By preserving the Party and bearing this burden, Xi cannot possibly endure it—nor can he preserve the Party.

Conclusion

Why has Xi preserved the Party to the extent of facing internal and external crises, nearly becoming isolated? Because this Party is evil at its root.

The Dajiyuan’ 2004 “Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party” stated with irrefutable evidence that the CCP is an evil specter—a cult based on “falsehood, malice, struggle, defiance of heaven and earth, hostility to humanity and divinity.”

Xi’s father Xi Zhongxun hoped his children would “give charcoal in the snow,” yet Xi today ignores people’s struggles with marriage, childbirth, healthcare, housing, employment, and elderly care, while brandishing weapons over Taiwan and burning money, worsening people’s hardships. His father, as Vice Chairman of the NPC, proposed a “Law to Protect Dissenting Opinions,” yet Xi crushes all dissent. His father respected Buddhism, yet Xi continues persecuting Falun Gong practitioners.

Today’s Xi Jinping stands opposite his father Xi Zhongxun. Why?
Because Xi, obsessed with power, has been manipulated by the “evil CCP specter.”

What is the way out? Four ready solutions:

1. Rectify the heart and be sincere: return to traditional reverence for “three feet above your head, the gods watch,” and gain divine assistance.

2. Be kind to the people: end persecution of Falun Gong practitioners and others; those who win the people win the world.

3. Completely abandon the CCP: reject atheism, falsehood, malice, struggle, and return to being children of Yan and Huang.

4. Hold the Jiang Zemin–Zeng Qinghong “bloody-debt faction” accountable: let righteous energy permeate heaven and earth.

—The Dajiyuan
△