Hu Chunhua’s Signed Article Uses an Unusually Authoritative Tone

Composite image: Hu Chunhua (left) and Wang Yang are rumored to become successors.

[People Newa] In yesterday’s article, “What’s Behind Hu Chunhua Publishing Before Several Standing Committee Members?”, I pointed out that mainland Chinese media has taken an unusual step by explicitly highlighting in headlines when certain Politburo Standing Committee members or senior officials publish signed articles in People’s Daily. This shift signals that the “strengthening of collective central leadership” mentioned at the Fourth Plenary Session is being put into practice—suggesting that Xi Jinping’s personal authority has been diminished.

In that same context, it is particularly noteworthy that Hu Chunhua, Vice Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and once designated by Hu Jintao as a “successor-in-waiting,” published his article “Thoroughly Study and Implement the Spirit of the Plenary Session and Promote High-Quality Development Under the 15th Five-Year Plan” on October 29—before several Standing Committee members. The timing itself carries political significance, but the tone of Hu’s article reveals even more beneath the surface.

If the timing of the publication alone doesn’t convince observers of Hu Chunhua’s changing political position, then a close reading of his roughly 1,000-word piece certainly will. Its tone is far from what one would expect of a CPPCC vice chairman—it reads instead like that of a higher-ranking leader.

Hu opens with the line:“During the plenary session, I personally listened to General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech. I was deeply educated, deeply inspired, and greatly encouraged. We must conscientiously study and implement the spirit of the plenary session.”

The phrasing “I personally listened” (wo xianchang lingting) is redundant—after all, everyone at the session was present and listening. Was Hu hinting that some key figures—perhaps Party elders like Hu Jintao—attended virtually instead of in person? And why the emphasis on “I”?

Then follow three short sentences of personal emotion, unusually direct expressions of inspiration—rare in Hu’s official writing since becoming CPPCC vice chairman. Only after this does he pivot to say “we must…” But who exactly does this “we” refer to? The entire CPPCC? All Party members? For Hu to use such language implies he speaks on behalf of a broader leadership group—a notable departure from a merely subordinate role.

Compare this to Hu’s earlier statements. In April 2023, shortly after the first session of the 14th CPPCC, he humbly described himself as “a newcomer to the CPPCC” who had gained “some preliminary understanding” of Xi’s ideas on improving the work of the People’s Political Consultative Conference.

By October 2024—after rumors of Xi’s stroke and declining power during the July Third Plenary Session—Hu’s tone changed. In the People’s Political Consultative Daily, he praised Xi’s speeches as “visionary, profound, rich in content, and highly political and guiding,” pledging to “thoroughly study and implement them” while modestly sharing “a few of my thoughts.”

But in October 2025, Hu’s tone shifted yet again: confident, emotional, and even representative of others. This progression—from humility to self-assured authority—strongly suggests a power realignment in Zhongnanhai.

Other CPPCC vice chairmen who published articles on the same day—Shi Taifeng, Shen Yueyue, Wang Yong, Zhou Qiang, and Bagatur—used standard bureaucratic language. None emphasized personal feelings or “I.” So why did Hu write differently?

Hu’s piece, even in its abridged form, covered four main themes:

1. The “great significance” of the 20th Central Committee’s Fourth Plenary Session.

2. A review of the “new historic achievements” since the 20th Party Congress and Third Plenary Session, including:

   • economic recovery and improved living standards,

   • ongoing reforms,

   • firm expansion of opening-up,

   • strengthened industrial and supply-chain resilience, and

   • deepened Party self-reform.

3. Understanding and implementing the 15th Five-Year Plan recommendations.

4. Implementing the plenary spirit—where he briefly mentioned the CPPCC’s role, but only for about 100 words, showing that it was not his main focus.

For someone who is still officially a vice chairman, Hu’s approach—addressing national strategy and assessing the Party’s historic trajectory—reads more like a speech by a Politburo-level figure or higher.

Hu’s references to Xi Jinping are also oddly phrased. He wrote:

“Since the 20th Congress, especially since the Third Plenary Session, the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has led the whole Party and the people of all ethnic groups through arduous struggles… Xi has firmly grasped the direction, personally commanded the frontline, and taken the lead… In the face of extreme U.S. pressure, Xi’s strong leadership upheld our bottom line… Xi’s theoretical system has achieved new innovations… These achievements once again prove that Xi, as the core of the Party Central Committee and the entire Party, is our greatest source of confidence and strength.”

At first glance this seems like praise—but the tone reads oddly evaluative, almost summative, even final, as if delivering a political eulogy rather than routine flattery.

By contrast, Shi Taifeng’s article simply credited “Xi’s steering and guidance” for recent achievements, and emphasized the need to “uphold the Party’s leadership, especially the centralized leadership of the Central Committee”—language echoed by other vice chairmen. These, analysts note, subtly reflect Xi’s shrinking authority, cloaked in ritualistic loyalty.

That Shi Taifeng, as the first vice chairman, and others maintained a subordinate tone while Hu Chunhua openly evaluated Xi’s overall leadership raises the question: why could Hu write what others could not?

Moreover, while the others elaborated on the CPPCC’s role and Xi’s “explicit instructions” on consultation work, Hu’s focus was macro-level governance—far beyond his formal portfolio.

This suggests Hu’s “departure from duty” mirrors his increasingly high-profile behavior before the Fourth Plenary Session—and may indicate a new political role emerging for him amid the Party’s power reshuffle.

At the very least, Hu Chunhua’s article conveyed a clear message: his tone was not that of a vice chairman but of someone positioned above—perhaps preparing for a comeback.

(First published by People News) △