Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin Have Made Public Appearances to Express Their Support for Xi Jinping While Maintaining a Low Profile Alongside Cai Qi

On December 4, 2024, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping, accompanied by members of the Central Military Commission (CMC), visited the headquarters of the newly established Information Support Force in Beijing. During the visit, Xi met with representatives of the Party Congress of the Information Support Force, extending "warm congratulations." However, most faces in the group appeared devoid of smiles. Zhang Youxia, standing behind Xi. (Video screenshot)

[People News] While the 20th Central Committee's Fourth Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China did not result in the expected personnel changes, this does not imply that all is calm within the Party. The temporary tranquillity could be disrupted at any moment. Recent statements and appearances by senior military officials and leaders from Zhongnanhai continue to shed light on whether Xi Jinping truly wields power.

On November 3, the first report meeting aimed at studying and implementing the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session was held for the entire military. Zhang Shengmin, who has recently been appointed Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, appeared alongside Zhang Youxia, who is believed to hold significant power in the military as the First Vice Chairman of the Military Commission. They met with members of the propaganda team and listened to reports. Liu Zhenli, the only other member of the Central Military Commission besides Xi and the two Zhangs, also attended. The military newspaper published two related news articles.

One article summarised the speeches given by Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin. Zhang Youxia emphasized the need to "guide officers and soldiers to deeply understand the spirit of Chairman Xi's important speeches" and to support the "two establishments"; Zhang Shengmin referred to the loyalty language of the "two four four two" standard and the implementation of the Military Commission Chairman's responsibility system, stating that "we must effectively align our thoughts and actions with the decision-making and deployment of the Party Central Committee."

The other article focused on Zhang Youxia, a member of the Central Propaganda Team, and the content of his report at the Military Commission. The report indicated that Zhang Youxia stated, "We must deeply understand and implement Chairman Xi's important speeches and planning suggestions," particularly emphasising the need to thoroughly implement Xi Jinping's thoughts on strengthening the military, without mentioning any other topics.

When considering these two news articles in isolation, it appears that Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, and Zhang Shengmin are still demonstrating loyalty to 'Chairman Xi,' suggesting that rumours about Xi's diminishing military power are unfounded. However, this may be an attempt to obscure the reality.

First, let’s look at the news from late July 2024 regarding the first report meeting on the spirit of the Third Plenary Session, which occurred shortly after Xi faced some challenges. In his remarks, Zhang Youxia stated, 'We must unify our thoughts and actions with the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and Chairman Xi.' In contrast, this year, Zhang Shengmin said, 'we must effectively unify our thoughts and actions with the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee,' omitting any mention of 'Chairman Xi.' Does this suggest that the military's thoughts and actions are no longer aligned with Xi?

Next, we turn to the news from November 4, 2022, following the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party, when the military held its first report meeting. At that time, Zhang Youxia's comments clearly indicated that Xi was firmly in control of the military. He emphasised the need to fully implement 'Xi Jinping Thought' and to 'solidify the ideological and political foundation of safeguarding the core and obeying commands, unifying thoughts and actions with the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and Chairman Xi.' Additionally, He Weidong, the then Vice Chairman of the Military Commission who had not yet fallen from grace, not only expressed loyalty but also employed typical rhetoric, stating that the spirit of the 20th National Congress must be 'internalised in the mind and heart, and take root on the ground.'

The shift from the phrase 'unifying thoughts and actions with the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and Chairman Xi' in previous years to this year's 'unifying thoughts and actions with the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee,' without mentioning 'Chairman Xi,' makes it clear that the question of whether Xi maintains control over the military is evident.

Examining Cai Qi, who was promoted by Xi and is seen as a close ally, reveals a notable shift in his rhetoric. Specifically, Cai Qi's praise for Xi has noticeably lessened.

As reported by state media, on October 27, a mobilisation meeting was convened to study and implement the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee. Cai Qi, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Secretariat, attended and spoke at the meeting. The first paragraph of the report did not mention Xi, nor did it include the usual phrases about implementing Xi's directives for effective communication. Instead, it referenced 'two four four two' and emphasised the need to 'practically unify thoughts and actions with the decision-making and deployment of the Party Central Committee.' In the second paragraph, Cai Qi mentioned Xi Jinping twice, once referring to 'the Party Central Committee with Xi at its core' and once discussing Xi's speech.

In contrast, during the mobilisation meeting following last July's Third Plenary Session, despite reports of Xi's serious illness, Cai Qi still emphasised the need to implement Xi's 'important instructions' and 'two four four two' in the opening of his speech. In the second paragraph, he referred to Xi three times, including detailed discussions on Xi's 'series of new thoughts, new viewpoints, and new judgments on comprehensively deepening reform,' and thoroughly explaining the 'spirit of Xi's important speech' at the Third Plenary Session.

It is evident that from last year's promotion of Xi's 'important speech spirit' to this year's mere 'speech,' the 'spirit' has diminished, and references to Xi have also decreased, the implications of which are quite clear.

Furthermore, comparing Cai Qi's speech at the mobilisation meeting after the 20th National Congress in 2022 highlights the extent of his sycophancy. Undoubtedly, this year's Cai Qi seems to have transformed into a different person in his praise. What could be the reason for this change?

Additionally, on November 3, Cai Qi published an article in state media concerning party governance, which clearly downplayed Xi Jinping while emphasising the party's role.

In fact, as early as March of this year, during a party building meeting, Cai Qi's praise for Xi had noticeably diminished. In May, while inspecting educational efforts to implement the spirit of the Central Eight Regulations in Tangshan, Hebei, state media reported that Cai Qi only stressed the importance of studying Xi's relevant discourses, without any expressions of loyalty such as the 'two establishments.' This was quite unusual for Cai Qi, as previous reports about him have always included expressions of loyalty.

Cai Qi's unusual behaviour and Xi's diminishing power appear to be closely connected. His reduced praise for Xi, along with Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin's superficial expressions of 'loyalty,' effectively excludes 'Chairman Xi' from military thought and action. This suggests that the changes within the upper echelons of the Communist Party are not baseless. Is the current central leadership's insistence on having many high-ranking officials continue to express loyalty an attempt to conceal the truth until next year's Two Sessions?

(First published in People News) △