New 7 Standing Committee Members Rumored – Who Will Xi Jinping Hand Over Power To?

March 11, 2023: Senior members of the CCP’s Central Military Commission line up to take the oath at the National People’s Congress. From right to left: Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Li Shangfu, Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, Zhang Shengmin. (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

[People News]  Recently, China's political scene has been in turmoil. With rumours swirling about Xi Jinping losing power, netizens are buzzing: Will Xi Jinping step down from the core circle of power after the 4th Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th Central Committee? Rumours suggest that under collective pressure from party elders, Xi will be forced to relinquish part of his power and begin preparations to hand over leadership at the 21st Party Congress. Recently, an alleged list of the new Politburo Standing Committee members has even circulated among the public. Although the CCP has not made any official response, the rumours reflect rising public discontent with Xi’s leadership. This period of political instability has been dubbed the “post-Xi Jinping era,” attracting close attention both domestically and internationally.

Will Xi truly hand over power voluntarily? To whom will he hand it over? Will the successor be selected by internal negotiations among party elders, as traditionally done, or will Xi personally "anoint" his successor? These questions have become particularly sensitive in China’s current political atmosphere.

To analyse Xi Jinping’s potential approach to succession, we can draw from the research of American University associate professor and China political expert Joseph Torigian, particularly his recent book The Party's Interests Come First and his insights shared in podcasts like Undeciphered.

1. Xi Has Broken CCP Power Transition Traditions

Since taking power in 2012, Xi Jinping has consistently dismantled the CCP’s leadership succession norms. From ending the system of designating successors in advance to abolishing presidential term limits, Xi has created an unprecedentedly centralised power structure, making the issue of “successor” especially sensitive and complex. Compared to Mao Zedong’s repeated succession failures, Xi has clearly tried to escape the “historical cycle” by constructing a controllable, loyal, and long-term stable governance mechanism.

Historically, CCP succession logic evolved from Mao’s “strongman dictatorship” to Deng Xiaoping’s “institutional norms,” and then to Hu Jintao’s “collective leadership.” Xi Jinping, however, has taken a different path: modelling after North Korea, using anti-corruption campaigns to purge rivals, concentrating power to build a “New Era core,” and delaying the announcement of a successor. Internally, this approach prevents power struggles and strengthens Xi’s position; externally, it adds strategic uncertainty, making China’s political direction harder to predict.

Why has Xi taken this path? According to independent analysts and media figures like Zhang Tianliang, Wen Zhao, Li Muyang, Zhao Lanjian, and Cai Shenkun, Xi gradually gained confidence and ambition through anti-corruption campaigns, leading to desires for lifelong rule. His establishment of the Xiong’an New Area, construction of the Xi Zhongxun Mausoleum and Memorial Hall reflect his long-term ambitions.

However, now at 72 years old and already having broken precedent with a third term, Xi’s health reportedly began to show signs of decline in 2024. Cai Shenkun revealed in a program that while Xi's mother lived into her 90s and his father, Xi Zhongxun, lived to 89, Xi’s youth was marked by heavy drinking—especially Moutai—which has harmed his health.

Life, ageing, illness, and death are inescapable fates for any human. No matter how much power Xi holds, he must eventually confront the question of succession. So, how will he choose a successor?

2. Insights from Joseph Torigian's Research

According to American scholar Joseph Torigian, Xi Jinping’s personality is heavily shaped by his father, Xi Zhongxun. From a psychological standpoint, attachment theory founder John Bowlby proposed that early relationships between children and primary caregivers deeply affect their future social and emotional patterns. Thus, Xi Jinping’s emotional makeup and political style can be seen as an extension of his father’s legacy. A deeper analysis of Xi Zhongxun’s character and political journey helps us better understand Xi Jinping’s approach to power.

In The Party's Interests Come First, Torigian points out that Xi places enormous psychological emphasis on “loyalty”—not just loyalty to the Party organization, but to the core leadership and his personal authority. This almost obsessive emphasis on loyalty is key to his personnel strategy and political behaviour. It also parallels Xi Zhongxun’s demonstrated loyalty in his own career.

It’s well known that during the Cultural Revolution, Xi Zhongxun was purged, and the entire Xi family fell into political disfavour starting in 1962. Xi Jinping’s youth was therefore shadowed by political hardship—he was labelled a “current counterrevolutionary,” publicly humiliated, and subjected to struggle sessions until the family was rehabilitated in 1978. As recounted in Go Life with Go by Nie Weiping, Xi received no protection from his father during that time and was often ostracised among elite children.

How does Xi view this suffering? Psychologically and in light of his background, these early adversities shaped his unique understanding of power, loyalty, and struggle.

Torigian argues that Xi selects potential successors based on four key criteria: 1. Absolute loyalty to the “Central Party”—in essence, loyalty to Xi’s policies. 2. A background of hardship or grassroots experience, avoiding “refined egotists.” 3. Rich experience in party, government, and military systems to handle complexity. 4. No independent factional ties to avoid the rise of rival power centres.

Based on these criteria, several figures have emerged in public speculation: Ding Xuexiang, Longtime chief of staff to Xi, is considered a “shadow successor.” Chen Min’er: Part of the “Zhijiang New Army,” ideologically aligned with Xi, seen as a red-blooded orthodox figure. However, none of these have been publicly confirmed as Xi’s chosen heir.

According to Cai Shenkun, Xi will not consider leaders born in the 1950s or 1960s but will choose someone from the post-1970s generation. Potential 1970s-born candidates include:

Liu Jie (b. 1970, Governor of Zhejiang): Rose from technician in a steel company to high-level roles in several provinces, including Party Secretary of Hangzhou and now Zhejiang Governor. Advocates of “political loyalty” and high-quality development aligned with central policies.

Li Yunze (b. 1970, Head of the National Financial Regulatory Administration): A finance expert with leadership roles in top banks and provincial governments. Appointed head of the newly created financial regulator—shows high trust from the central government.

Shi Guanghui (b. 1970, Deputy Party Secretary and Political-Legal Affairs Chief of Inner Mongolia): Long career in political-legal work, including Shanghai and Guizhou. Known for his experience in border region governance and social stability.

Lu Dongliang (b. 1973, Acting Governor of Shanxi): Former senior executive at Aluminium Corporation of China. Transitioned from corporate to political leadership, demonstrating strong administrative and political adaptability.

Zhuge Yujie (b. 1971, Deputy Party Secretary of Hubei): Formerly held key posts in Shanghai’s administration, including Secretary-General. Known for his organisational work and cadre management skills, he now brings his urban governance experience to central China.

Internationally, China’s succession question is followed closely due to its far-reaching implications. U.S. and EU policy predictions, East Asia’s stability assessments, and global supply chain security are all linked to the power dynamics in Beijing. Xi’s refusal to name a successor is also interpreted by some media outlets as a deliberate effort to maintain strategic ambiguity.

Whether Xi Can Hand Over Power Is the Key Question

In 2023, shortly after turning 70, Xi repeatedly warned that the CCP must prepare to face “major storms and waves.” On the eve of the CCP’s 102nd anniversary, the Party journal Qiushi published a full text of Xi’s speech at the Central Party School, where he warned of the possibility of a tragedy akin to the fall of the Soviet Union.

Recently, The Epoch Times reported that despite appearances, Xi has effectively lost power. Real authority is allegedly held by Wen Jiabao and Zhang Youxia. At the same time, succession rumours abound. It’s said that Party elders have designated Wang Yang as General Secretary, Hu Chunhua as Premier, and Zhang Youxia as Chairman of the Central Military Commission. The remaining four Standing Committee slots are rumoured to be selected through competitive elections among seven candidates: Ding Xuexiang, Yin Li, Li Shulei, Zhang Guoqing, Chen Jining, Yuan Jiajun, and Zhang Qingwei.

Since early 2024, signs of the CCP regime's collapse have intensified—leadership disarray, passive officials, disloyalty in the military, and widespread public resentment. Public anger toward the CCP resembles a volcano ready to erupt. Many observers believe the regime could fall at any moment. Thus, the question of who succeeds Xi is no longer just about "who"—but "how" the transition happens, and whether the CCP regime can even survive to pass power at all.

(First published by People News)